The Internal Brakes On Violent Escalation: A Descriptive Typology by Busher, Joel et al.

Joel Busher, Coventry University
Donald Holbrook, University College London 
Graham Macklin, Oslo University
We would like to thank the CREST team and stakeholders for their support and guidance throughout the 
course of this project. We would also like to thank Tam Sanger for their excellent transcription services, Rachel 
Monaghan for their comments on an earlier draft of this report, and the interviewees who kindly gave up their 
time to share their experiences and insights with us.
This is the full report from the The Internal Brakes on Violent Escalation: A Descriptive Typology programme, 
funded by CREST. To find out more information about this programme, and to see other outputs from the 
team, visit: www.crestresearch.ac.uk/projects/internal-brakes-violent-escalation/
About CREST
The Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST) is a national hub for understanding, 
countering and mitigating security threats. It is an independent centre, commissioned by the Economic 
and Social Research Council (ESRC) and funded in part by the UK security and intelligence agencies 
(ESRC Award: ES/N009614/1).
www.crestresearch.ac.uk
The Internal Brakes on Violent Escalation:
A Descriptive Typology
FULL REPORT
FEBRUARY 2019
©2019 CREST Creative Commons 4.0 BY-NC-SA licence. www.crestresearch.ac.uk/copyright
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..........................................................................................................................5
1.1 The typology ...................................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 Discussion and conclusions ......................................................................................................................................... 7
1.3 Proposed applications of this research ...................................................................................................................... 7
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................8
Read more ...................................................................................................................................................................................9
2. DEFINITION OF ‘INTERNAL BRAKES’ AND PROJECT SCOPE .............................................10
3. METHODOLOGY ..............................................................................................................................12
3.1 Case selection, data and analysis ............................................................................................................................. 12
3.2 Two important limitations and challenges  .............................................................................................................. 13
4. BUILDING THE TYPOLOGY: THREE BASIC THEORETICAL IDEAS .................................... 15
4.1 The logics of non- or limited violence ....................................................................................................................... 15
4.2 The proximity or distance of internal brakes to the act of violence ....................................................................... 17
4.3 The underlying difficulty of doing violence .............................................................................................................. 18
5. A TYPOLOGY OF THE BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION.................................................20
5.1 Brake 1  ......................................................................................................................................................................... 22
5.2 Brake 2  .........................................................................................................................................................................24
5.3 Brake 3  ........................................................................................................................................................................ 26
5.4 Brake 4 ......................................................................................................................................................................... 29
5.5 BRAKE 5 ........................................................................................................................................................................ 31
6. CONCLUSIONS ..............................................................................................................................35
7. REFERENCES ....................................................................................................................................37
ANNEX A: 
TRANS-NATIONAL AND BRITISH JIHADI GROUPS FROM 2001 TO 2016 ............................42
1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................42
2. Al-Muhajiroun and the removal of brakes ................................................................................................................44
3. Internal brakes in trans-national and British jihadi groups .................................................................................... 47
4. Summary ..................................................................................................................................................................... 56
5. References ...................................................................................................................................................................57
ANNEX B: 
THE BRITISH EXTREME RIGHT IN THE 1990S .............................................................................60
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................60
2. Internal brakes on violence within the British extreme right ............................................................................... 66
3. References ..................................................................................................................................................................80
ANNEX C: 
THE ANIMAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN THE UK, 1972-EARLY 2000S .............................. 82
1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................. 82
2. Internal Brakes in the Animal Liberation Movement ..............................................................................................87
3. Timeline ......................................................................................................................................................................102
4. References .................................................................................................................................................................106
5ExEcutivE Summary
BUSHER , HOLBROOK & MACKLIN
EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY
Why do some ‘extremists’ or ‘extremist groups’1 choose 
not to engage in violence, or only in particular forms of 
violence? Why is it that even in deeply violent groups 
there are often thresholds of violence that members 
rarely if ever cross? 
Part of the answer will lie in the counter-measures 
deployed by state and non-state actors, and in other 
external constraints that inhibit the opportunities, 
capabilities and motivation of such groups to deploy 
violence. Yet the fact that few if any groups carry out 
as much violence as they are capable of indicates that 
in most cases external constraints comprise only part 
of the answer. 
The basic premise of this project is that another part 
of the answer lies in what we call the ‘internal brakes’ 
on violent escalation: the intra-group mechanisms 
through which group members themselves contribute 
to establish and maintain parameters on their own 
violence. 
Such internal brakes are often evident in detailed 
accounts of decision-making within groups that use 
or flirt with violence, yet they are rarely examined 
systematically. The aim of this project then was to 
develop a descriptive typology of the internal brakes on 
violent escalation that could provide a basis for more 
systematic analysis of such brakes.
We used three very different case studies to construct, 
test and refine the typology: the transnational and UK 
jihadi scene from 2005 to 2016; the British extreme right 
during the 1990s, and the animal liberation movement 
in the UK from the mid-1970s until the early 2000s 
(See Annexes A-C). Drawing across the literatures on 
social movements and contentious politics, terrorism 
studies, peace studies, and the sociology, psychology 
and anthropology of violence, we also undertook 
a review of existing research into the inhibition or 
1 For the purposes of this project, we us the term ‘extremist groups’ to refer to those groups in which a significant proportion of members have shown a willingness 
to deploy or support illegal strategies of action. We intentionally adopt a broad definition as our aim is to develop a typology with broad applicability across a 
wide variety of groups. We are aware that this definition might be problematic in non-democratic or narrowly-democratic states where the thresholds of illegality 
might be very low.
non-emergence of violence, how violence ends or 
declines, and intra-group dynamics during processes of 
escalation, de-escalation and non-escalation.
1.1 THE TYPOLOGY
The typology is based around five underlying logics 
on which the internal brakes identified in this project 
operate:
 y Strategic logic
 y Moral logic
 y The logic of ego maintenance
 y The logic of out-group definition
 y Organisational logic
While these logics sometimes coincide with one 
another, at other times they operate independently and 
sometimes appear even to contradict one another. Each 
of these underlying logics underpins a brake, which in 
turn is associated with a series of ‘sub-brakes’. 
BRAKE 1
Identification of non- or less violent strategies of 
action as being as or more effective than more 
violent alternatives (strategic logic).
 y 1a. Expressions of scepticism about their ability 
to beat their opponents in a violent struggle, 
including concerns that greater militancy will 
increase backlash or repression from opponents or 
the state towards them and their supporters.
 y 1b. Expressions of concern that violent escalation 
will undermine support for the group.
 y 1c. Attempts to build or maintain ties with 
strategically useful allies who are not supportive 
of violent escalation.
 y 1d. Identification of political opportunities 
that favour (re)adoption of non- or less violent 
strategies of action.
 y 1e. Identification of non- or less violent strategies 
of action that are perceived to be effective, 
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including identification of ‘sufficient’ levels of 
violence.
BRAKE 2
Construction of moral norms and evaluations that 
inhibit certain forms of violence and the emotional 
impulses towards violence (e.g., revenge) (moral 
logic).
 y 2a. Articulation and performance of general 
moral norms and principles that problematise 
certain forms of violence, require violence to be 
justified or enable activists to forestall on entering 
the ‘tunnel of violence’ (e.g., the conception of 
violence as a tactic of last resort; positioning non-
retaliation as a virtue; emphasising values such as 
mercy and compassion).
 y 2b. Identification of some groups of actors as 
illegitimate targets for violence.
BRAKE 3
Self-identification as a group that is either non-
violent or uses only limited forms of violence (logic 
of ego maintenance).
 y 3a. Production of group narratives that emphasise 
non-violence or the limited use of violence either 
by themselves or by those they claim have inspired 
their movement.
 y 3b. Disassociation from more violent groups 
or factions and/or association with less violent 
groups or factions.
 y 3c. (The threat of) sanctions for activists who 
advocate or undertake violence beyond the 
established parameters of the group’s action 
repertoire, and/or opportunities to achieve intra-
group respect and prestige without undertaking or 
encouraging the use of violence at or beyond the 
parameters of the group’s action repertoire.
 y 3d. Circulation of limited expectations that they 
will be involved in greater levels of violence.
BRAKE 4
Boundary softening in relation to putative out-
groups (e.g., opponents, opponents’ perceived 
supporters, the general public or state actors) (logic 
of out-group definition).
 y 4a. Resistance to generalizations about their 
opponents.
 y 4b. Identification of segments of the public 
beyond their previously-imagined support base as 
potential converts to their cause.
 y 4c. Limited intra-movement pressure to ‘burn-
bridges’ with social contacts outside of the 
movement or outside of the radical flank of the 
movement.
 y 4d. Expressions of reluctance to conceive of the 
state security forces as ‘the enemy’.
BRAKE 5
Organisational developments that either (a) alter 
the moral and strategic equations in favour of non- 
or limited violence, (b) institutionalise less violent 
collective identities and/or processes of boundary 
softening, and/or (c) reduce the likelihood of 
unplanned violence (organisational logic).
 y 5a. Limited investment in capabilities to escalate 
violence, and/or development of capabilities to 
undertake strategies of action that either entail 
non- or limited violence or more controlled 
violence.
 y 5b. Foregrounding more modest or intermediate 
objectives and de-prioritising revolutionary goals.
 y 5c. Construction and maintenance of spaces 
in which a range of activists that includes and 
extends beyond the radical flank are able to freely 
discuss tactics and movement objectives.
 y 5d. Concerns among some group members that 
violent escalation will compromise their ability to 
shape the movement’s direction and/or negatively 
affect their position within it.
 y 5e. Concentration of energy on targeting 
movement rivals, leading to reduced capability 
to prosecute campaigns of violence against their 
external enemies.
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1.2 DISCUSSION AND 
CONCLUSIONS
While there was considerable cross-case variation 
in terms of the distribution and effectiveness of the 
internal brakes – as might be expected given the 
case studies selected – we were able to develop a 
typology that, across the three case studies and the 
wider reference literature, enabled us to describe and 
categorise the practices though which group members 
sought to establish and maintain the parameters of their 
own violence.
There are important limitations with regards to how 
this typology might be used. Foremost among these, 
it should be emphasised that the typology cannot be 
deployed as a straightforward ‘checklist’ with which to 
make inferences about the risk of violence. This in part 
is because the (increased) presence of internal brakes 
within any given case might be open to a number of 
possible interpretations: it might indicate a limited risk 
of violent escalation due to extensive intra-movement 
opposition to such escalation, but it might also indicate 
that there are increasingly active attempts within the 
movement to escalate violence, or simply that there are 
growing intra-movement tensions.
We believe however that this descriptive typology 
can provide a vocabulary with which researchers and 
analysts can begin to investigate and better understand 
important questions about how members of extremist 
groups contribute to establish and maintain the limits 
on their own violence. Furthermore, by organising 
such analysis around the underlying logics on which 
these brakes work, it can help us to understand how the 
brakes work, and when and how they might be more 
likely to fail. 
1.3 PROPOSED APPLICATIONS 
OF THIS RESEARCH
 y For academic researchers interested in the 
dynamics of conflict and political violence, we 
propose that this descriptive typology can be used 
to advance and stimulate research into processes 
of non- or limited escalation. While escalation and 
de-escalation have received considerable academic 
attention in recent years, non- or limited escalation 
has not. 
 y For security, intelligence and law enforcement 
practitioners working in areas of risk assessment, 
we propose that this typology can provide a further 
tool with which to identify indicators of the 
propensity towards and away from particular forms 
of violence by specific groups or sub-groups.
 y For security, intelligence and law enforcement 
practitioners undertaking interventions with 
extremist groups, we propose that this typology can 
be used to inform assessments of how externally 
applied counter-measures might interact with, and 
sometimes undermine, internal brakes.
Building on this typology, we believe that particularly 
productive avenues for further research and analysis are 
likely to relate to:
 y The conditions under which certain brakes, or 
configurations of brakes, are more or less likely to 
be effective.
 y How the patterns and functioning of internal 
brakes are affected by wider conflict dynamics and 
vice versa e.g., how they affect and how they are 
affected by interactions between group members 
and state security services, opposition groups etc.
 y How and why the distribution of brakes varies 
across groups and what, if anything, this tells us 
about their propensity for violence.
 y How the internal brakes on violent escalation 
operate at different points within waves or cycles 
of conflict.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Why do some ‘extremists’ or ‘extremist groups’2 choose 
not to engage in violence, or only in particular forms of 
violence? Why is it that even in deeply violent groups 
there are often thresholds of violence that members 
rarely if ever cross?
Part of the answer will lie in the counter-measures 
put in place by state and non-state actors, or in other 
external constraints, that inhibit the opportunities, 
capabilities and motivation of such groups to deploy 
violence. Yet the fact that few if any groups carry out as 
much violence as they are ostensibly capable of (Asal 
& Rethemeyer, 2008, p. 244),3 and the fact that there 
is often considerable within-group variation in terms 
of members’ engagement in or support for violence 
(Jaskoski et al., 2017; Knight et al., 2017; Perliger et 
al., 2016; Simcox & Dyer, 2013), indicates that in most 
cases external constraints comprise only part of the 
answer.
The premise of this project is that another part of the 
answer lies in what we call the internal brakes on violent 
escalation: the intra-group mechanisms through which 
group members themselves inhibit the adoption or 
diffusion of greater violence by other group members. 
Such internal brakes are often evident in detailed 
accounts of decision-making within groups, movements 
or more diffuse ‘scenes’ that use or flirt with violence, 
yet they are rarely examined systematically (Bjørgo & 
Gjelsvik, 2017; Cragin, 2014; Simi & Windisch, 2018). 
The aim of this project is to provide the basis for a more 
systematic understanding of the internal brakes on 
violent escalation. To do this, we develop a descriptive 
typology of these internal brakes, drawing on a review 
of relevant academic literatures and three case studies: 
the transnational and UK jihadi scene from 2005 to 
2016; the British extreme right during the 1990s, and 
2 For the purposes of this project, we us the term ‘extremist groups’ to refer to those groups in which a significant proportion of members have shown a willingness 
to deploy or support illegal strategies of action. We intentionally adopt a broad definition as our aim is to develop a typology with broad applicability across a 
wide variety of groups. We are aware that this definition might be problematic in non-democratic or narrowly-democratic states where the thresholds of illegality 
might be very low. 
3 More generally, violence is scarcer than we often imagine (Chermak, Freilich & Suttmoeller, 2013; LaFree et al., 2010; Simi & Windisch, 2018) and even where 
violence is undertaken it might only be seen by group members as a temporary strategy (Dudouet, 2012).
the animal liberation movement in the UK from the 
mid-1970s until the early 2000s (See Annexes A-C).
Our intention in developing this typology is not to 
downplay the importance of countermovements, 
state actors or the general public in shaping patterns 
of escalation, de-escalation and non-escalation. It is 
clear that the political context, the actions of counter-
movements and security forces, and the actions of 
a range of publics play a crucial role in shaping 
the tactical repertoires of extremist groups and of 
social movements more generally (Crenshaw, 1991; 
McAdam, 1983; Macklin & Busher, 2015; Matesan, 
2018; Oliver & Myers, 2002). Neither is it our intention 
to dichotomise ‘internal’ and ‘external’ brakes (see 
discussion of this point in Section 2). What this project 
does seek to do, however, is provide researchers and 
analysts with a vocabulary and a set of concepts that 
they can use to interrogate in a more systematic way 
how activists themselves contribute to the process 
of establishing and maintaining limits on their own 
violence. 
We believe that such analysis can have a number of 
benefits. For security, intelligence and law enforcement 
practitioners, our hope is that the typology will enable 
them to form a more complete understanding of the 
propensity towards and away from particular forms of 
violence by specific groups or sub-groups, and help 
them to assess how externally applied counter-measures 
might interact with, and sometimes undermine, internal 
brakes. 
For researchers and analysts, our hope is that the project 
will enable the development of formal hypotheses about 
these ‘internal brakes’ – how they work, where, when, 
why and at what point in conflict waves – a crucial step 
in gaining a deeper understanding about the patterns 
of terrorist or extremist activities. More generally, 
our hope is that this typology will further encourage 
and enable researchers, analysts, policy makers and 
practitioners to engage seriously with the phenomena 
of non-escalation.
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The report proceeds as follows: Section 2 defines 
‘internal brakes’ for the purposes of this project and 
sets out in more detail the scope of the project; Section 3 
describes the project’s methodology; Section 4 sets out 
the theoretical basis of the typology; Section 5 presents 
the typology; and Section 6 contains our conclusions. 
The three case studies are attached as annexes to the 
report.
READ MORE
You can download each of the three annexes individually, along with the Executive Summary. 
They can all be found here: www.crestresearch.ac.uk/internal-brakes
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2. DEFINITION 
OF ‘INTERNAL 
BRAKES’ AND 
PROJECT SCOPE
For the purpose of this project, we use ‘internal brakes’ 
to refer to the practices through which actors who are 
recognised as group members seek either: (a) to inhibit 
directly the adoption or diffusion of more violent 
tactics by other group members; or (b) foment strategic 
decisions and (sub)cultural practices the logical 
consequences of which are to inhibit the adoption or 
diffusion of more violent tactics. This definition has a 
number of implications for project focus and scope:
Our analytical focus is primarily on group-level (or 
sub-group level) processes rather than on individual 
psychological processes, albeit we recognise that group 
and individual level processes are deeply intertwined.4 
The principal reason for limiting the scope in this 
way relates to the issue of observability, which is of 
importance for the future usability of the typology. 
Conceiving of brakes as comprising interactions 
between group members means that in most cases they 
can be observed, at least in principle, unlike individual 
psychological inhibitors which, by their very nature, 
are often more opaque processes.
Patterns of escalation, non-escalation and de-
escalation, rather than the adoption of more, or less, 
extreme ideological positions, comprise the dependent 
variable. In other words, we are primarily concerned 
with advancing understanding of ‘action pyramid’ 
rather than the ‘opinion pyramid’ (McCauley & 
Moskalenko, 2017). While the two processes might 
often intersect, the relationship between them is more 
complex than is sometimes implied in policy, public 
and in some academic discourse, and it is therefore 
useful to distinguish between the two (Abrahms, 2011; 
Borum, 2011; McCauley & Moskalenko 2008, 2017). 
4 This is apparent in analyses of individual pathways away from violence (see Bjørgo, 2009; Jaskoski et al., 2017; Simi & Windisch, 2018).
5 It is possible that different forms of violence – e.g., interpersonal violence versus mass casualty attacks – might be associated with quite different social and 
emotional dynamics (Simi & Windisch, 2018).
The role of intra-group interactions in shaping the outer 
limits of violence is as of much interest to us as how 
intra-group interactions contribute to reduce the use of 
violence. Research into how violence ‘declines’, ‘ends’, 
‘subsides’ or ‘abates’ (see Becker, 2017; Crenshaw, 
1991; Cronin, 2011; Ross & Gurr, 1989) has provided 
some of the richest descriptions of internal brakes to 
date and some of the most promising insights into how 
they work or fail. The application of internal brakes is 
however often focused not on achieving de-escalation, 
but on the less ambitious aim of simply limiting 
escalation, sometimes even in the interest of sustaining 
violent campaigns in the long-term.      
We understand escalation as a process relative to the 
existing action repertoire of the group under analysis. 
Different extremist groups have different outer limits 
with regards the degrees and styles of violence that 
they are generally willing to use, and it is quite possible 
that the gradient of escalation varies depending on the 
nature of the tactical shift.5 For example, the relative 
scarcity of groups willing to deploy lethal force (Asal 
& Rethemeyer, 2008) would seem to indicate that in 
general the gradient of escalation – i.e., how easy or 
difficult it is to go from one level to the next – is greater 
in the shift from serious physical harm to lethal force 
than, say, from fist-fights to fights using non-bladed 
weapons. We conceive of both as escalation, however. 
Whether different braking mechanisms are used or are 
more prominent within cases characterised by lower 
or higher levels of violence is a question for empirical 
analysis; and whether it is possible to develop a 
descriptive typology that encompasses the internal 
brakes applied within groups with differing outer limits 
on ‘acceptable’ violence was one of the questions that 
we set out to explore through this project.
Defining group boundaries is notoriously difficult, 
particularly in the case of movements characterised by 
multiple and fluid systems of organisation and which 
are prone to frequent splintering, as is often the case 
in extremist movements or scenes. For the purpose of 
this project, we consider brakes ‘internal’ when they 
are applied by any actor within the broadly conceived 
movement. It is helpful however to think of ‘internal’ 
and ‘external’ in terms of degrees. Interactions within 
a clique are more ‘internal’ than interactions between 
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actors in different factions of the same social movement6 
organisation, which in turn are more ‘internal’ than 
interactions between actors in different groups within 
the wider movement. Put another way, the extent to 
which we might consider a brake ‘internal’ is a function 
of the extent to which the actor(s) applying the brake, 
Actor A, is recognised by the actor(s) to whom the 
brake is being applied, Actor B, as part of their group 
or movement.7
Brakes sometimes fail, partially or entirely. They might 
even produce escalation dynamics if, for example, 
they destabilise existing organisational systems. For 
the purpose of this project our primary focus is on 
describing the internal brakes that are applied within 
extremist groups, movements or scenes, rather than 
assessing their effectiveness. Some discussion of how 
internal brakes are undermined is included in the 
case studies, but here the focus is on the processes 
through which brakes are undermined, rather than on 
establishing or testing formal hypotheses about the 
conditions under which specific brakes are most likely 
to be effective.8
We do not include in this analysis developments within 
the movement culture that appear to limit violence in 
a way that it overwhelmingly incidental. There is for 
example some evidence, albeit much of it anecdotal, 
that patterns of violence are shaped by patterns of drug 
and alcohol consumption within movements (e.g., Simi 
& Windisch, 2018). Here, while we would count as an 
internal brake attempts to reduce alcohol consumption 
at marches if this was done in order to limit the 
amount of unplanned confrontation with opponents 
(e.g., Busher, 2016, p. 113), we would not include as 
an internal brake a growing predilection within the 
movement for drugs that tend to reduce appetite for 
confrontation (unless this shift was being promoted as 
part of a deliberate strategy to reduce confrontation).
6 The role of infiltrators provides an interesting example of the blurring between ‘external’ and ‘internal’. On the one hand, they are external actors. On the other 
hand, the fact that they are identified by group members as part of the group means that where they seek directly to inhibit violent escalation their actions function 
as internal brakes.
7 The role of infiltrators provides an interesting example of the blurring between ‘external’ and ‘internal’. On the one hand, they are external actors. On the other 
hand, the fact that they are identified by group members as part of the group means that where they seek directly to inhibit violent escalation their actions function 
as internal brakes.
8 Factors likely to be relevant to such hypotheses have been explored in the literature on the decline of terrorism. Cronin (2009), for instance, describes six 
scenarios where terrorism ends: loss of leadership; negotiated transition to peaceful politics; transition into other forms of violence and war-fighting; fulfilment 
of primary objectives; failure of primary objectives, marginalisation, isolation and irrelevance; physical destruction by state forces. One potentially productive 
avenue of investigation would be to examine how the internal brakes described within this project are applied and play out within Cronin’s ‘scenarios’ and inverse 
scenarios. Research into individual level processes of de-escalation and non-escalation are also likely to prove relevant to the development of such hypotheses, see 
e.g., Bjørgo & Horgan (2014); Cragin (2014). The literature on why mass-scale violence has not occurred even when conditions seem ripe or when armed groups 
dissolve or transform into different forms of political expression is also likely to be relevant for developing such hypotheses, see e.g.,  Chirot & McCauley (2006); 
more broadly still on the limits on violence by armed groups and war, see e.g., ICRC (2018).
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3. METHODOLOGY
The typology presented in this report is based on a 
review of relevant theoretical and empirical literatures 
and three case studies. To develop the typology we 
followed a three-phase process. 
In Phase 1 we undertook a survey of the literatures 
on social movements and contentious politics; 
terrorism studies; peace studies; and the sociological 
and psychological processes of violence. Within 
these literatures we identified publications that deal 
specifically with the inhibition or non-emergence of 
violence; that detail how violence ends or declines; 
and deal with intra-group processes within contexts 
of escalation, de-escalation and non-escalation. From 
this literature review, we generated an initial coding 
framework for the case studies.
In Phase 2, we developed and undertook an initial 
coding of the three case studies. This was done using 
the initial coding frame generated in Phase 1. It was 
also done by coding-up from the case studies i.e., by 
identifying and seeking to describe practices that could 
be described as ‘internal brakes’, and using this to 
critically interrogate the initial framework and generate 
additional codes. 
Phase 3 comprised an iterative process of typology 
development and refinement. Here, the case studies 
were used to further interrogate the emergent typology; 
the emergent typology and comparison across the three 
case studies were used to shape our interpretation 
of each case study; and further engagement with the 
theoretical literature was used to refine categories 
within the typology. The typology went through fifteen 
iterations in total.
9 Several other case studies were considered, including extreme left groups, environmentalist groups, anti-abortion groups, paramilitary groups in Northern Ire-
land, and the suffragists. All, doubtless, would provide useful insights. We assessed, however, that the three cases selected provided us with a good spread in terms 
of ideology and in terms of the scale and intensity of violence. They were also case studies for which we either already had or were aware that we could quickly 
gain access to extensive material with which to develop the case study.
3.1 CASE SELECTION, DATA 
AND ANALYSIS
Case study selection was based on a ‘most-different 
case comparative strategy’ (della Porta, 2013, pp. 25-
29), with the groups selected representing a diverse 
range of ideologies, actors, aims and action repertoires 
(see below).9 There were two main reasons for choosing 
such different cases. First, to enable us to interrogate 
the broad applicability of the typology. Second, and 
relating in particular to the selection of case studies 
with very different levels of violence, we were mindful 
of calls for research that broadened the variable beyond 
terroristic forms of violence (Freilich, Chermak, 
& Gruenewald, 2015), and concerns that ‘theories, 
derived largely from examples of groups that turned to 
violence, may tend generally to over-predict violence’ 
(Karagiannis & McCauley, 2006, p. 324).
The jihadi case provides an example of an ostensibly 
religious movement that promotes and applies lethal 
violence, albeit some actors within the movement 
engaged in efforts to manage the parameters of that 
violence. This case study has two empirical focal 
points. The first was on how actors within the UK 
(al-Muhajiroun and a network of friends convicted of 
planning acts of terrorism in 2016) responded to efforts 
to expand the scope of violence spearheaded by the so-
called Islamic State (IS). While al-Muhajiroun publicly 
embraced more radical forms of violence, within the 
network of friends some members began to question 
the validity and efficacy of tactics displayed by IS. 
This part of the case study uses secondary academic 
literature pertaining to al-Muhajiroun in the UK, and 
court transcripts of private discussions online involving 
members of the network of friends. 
Reflecting the transnational dimensions of the jihadi 
movement, the second empirical focal point of the 
case study comprised global debates within the jihadi 
milieu, with a focus on the al-Qaeda leadership’s efforts 
to instil caution about violent escalation during this 
period. This part of the case study is based on public 
statements (speeches, press releases and other media 
outreach) from the al-Qaeda leadership between 2001 
and 2016, and internal correspondence from within al-
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Qaeda’s inner circle dating from 2005, when concerns 
were expressed about the tactical direction taken by IS’s 
predecessor organisation, al-Qaeda in Iraq, and from 
the period immediately preceding the raid on Usama 
bin Ladin’s compound in Pakistan in May 2011. 
The extreme right case provides an example of 
mobilisation around a racial-nationalist ideology 
where, while there is significant interpersonal violence, 
lethal violence is rare and the period under analysis is 
characterised by a significant attempt to shift away from 
violence towards orthodox political campaigning. The 
specific empirical focus of the case is on the British 
National Party (BNP) during the 1990s as it strove 
to achieve electoral legitimacy whilst simultaneously 
struggling to contain the actions and growing influence 
of its own radical flank – Combat 18 (C18) – which 
the BNP itself had initially formed to defend the party 
from a direct action campaign against it by Anti-Fascist 
Action (AFA). 
While further escalation did take place within the radical 
flank, here too there were observable limits on violence, 
with actions that exceeded established parameters 
of ‘acceptable’ violence provoking intra-movement 
opposition, disillusionment and disengagement. Where 
higher levels of violence did take place, it was largely 
directed at targets within the movement and served to 
reduce the capacity of the group to prosecute violence 
against opponents.
The extreme right case is based upon a survey of 
the secondary academic literature, extreme right 
publications, activist memoirs, journalistic accounts 
of the groups in question, contemporary newspaper 
reports, television documentaries, and an interview 
with an anti-fascist activist (Respondent B1) active 
during the period. Efforts to secure an interview with 
a former C18 activist within the project’s timeframe 
proved unsuccessful.
The animal liberation movement case focuses on 
the radical flank of the wider animal rights movement, 
characterised by their willingness to use illegal forms of 
direct action in order to advance campaigns for animal 
rights. This case study provides an example of what 
might be termed a single issue movement. The evolution 
of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF) is central to this 
case study, as are the campaigns carried out under other 
organisational banners, such as the Animal Rights 
Militia and the Justice Department, which entailed 
escalation beyond established repertoires of action. 
What makes this case study interesting for our 
purposes is the apparent ambivalence of the case. 
While positioning itself as a non-violent movement and 
exhorting activists to take all reasonable measures to 
avoid harm to living beings, members of the movement 
have still perpetrated acts of violence, including 
serious property damage and intimidation, which have 
undoubtedly caused physical and psychological harm 
to both human and non-human animals. Yet escalation 
beyond the established tactical repertoire has been rare, 
even when state repression has significantly inhibited 
the availability of non- or less violent avenues for 
action (Ellefsen, 2016; Monaghan, 2013). 
The animal liberation case study is based on 
secondary academic literature, journalistic accounts 
of the movement, contemporary media reports, 
television documentaries, activist memoirs, movement 
publications, and interviews with two former animal 
liberation activists (Respondents C1 and C2) and an 
academic expert (Respondent C3).
3.2 TWO IMPORTANT 
LIMITATIONS AND 
CHALLENGES 
Two important limitations and challenges should be 
acknowledged. As set out above, the primary focus of this 
project has been on the development of the descriptive 
typology of internal brakes on violent escalation, 
rather than on making a substantial contribution to 
empirical knowledge and understanding of the case 
studies in and of themselves. This is reflected in the 
limited generation of new data e.g., through interviews 
or analysis of video footage. It is likely however that 
further interview data and analysis of video footage (or 
ethnographic observation or social media analysis were 
there an accessible contemporary case study) would 
have provided us with more opportunities to explore 
the application and operation of internal brakes. This 
is particularly the case in relation to what, in Section 4, 
we describe as the two inner levels of analysis: analysis 
of internal brakes during processes of action planning 
and within the contexts of actions, where our reliance 
primarily on secondary sources has meant that we have 
at times had limited material for analysis, and where it 
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is more difficult at times to distinguish straightforward 
recollections of events as they played out from attempts 
at post hoc justification for the courses of action 
pursued.
A second issue concerns interpretation of the data. 
Statements by activists in which they distance 
themselves from violence or encourage fellow activists 
to limit their use of violence usually play to more 
than one audience. It is often difficult to discern the 
primary intentions behind the statements that are 
made, and indeed the extent to which some statements 
are intended to be acted on directly by fellow activists 
at all. Violence might simply be denounced in order 
to reduce scrutiny from the state security forces, for 
example.10 
As noted above, there is also a temporal challenge 
with regards to interpretation. Actors re-construct and 
re-narrate past events partly as a function of present 
and future plans, often infusing their accounts of the 
past with their current beliefs and interests. How do 
we ensure, for example, that accounts of past events 
that describe apparent braking mechanisms are not 
simply post hoc rationalisations for what has happened, 
or attempts by activists to position themselves in the 
present as moral actors? While there is no easy solution 
to these interpretive challenges, we sought to mitigate 
them by ensuring that the case studies each span several 
years, draw on multiple and in most cases triangulated 
sources, and also sought as far as possible to identify 
data within each case study that corresponded to 
decision-making processes themselves, rather than 
relying only on subsequent explanations of decision-
making processes.
10 Similar issues arise in analyses of violent escalation. For example, it is often difficult to distinguish expressions of genuine intent to escalate violence from forms 
of ‘institutionalized bluster and threat’ (Collins, 2008, p. 348). 
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4. BUILDING 
THE TYPOLOGY: 
THREE BASIC 
THEORETICAL 
IDEAS
Drawing on the literature survey and the case studies, we 
developed the typology around three basic theoretical 
ideas: (1) that there are in most cases discernible 
logics to violence and non- or limited violence; (2) 
that braking processes can occur at greater or lesser 
proximity to the potential act of violence; and (3) that 
doing violence, in particular face-to-face violence, is 
not something that comes easily to most people. 
It is the first of these that is foregrounded in the typology 
that we present below, providing the underlying 
structure around which the typology is organised. 
Nonetheless, the other two basic theoretical ideas also 
inform the analysis and discussion and, as noted in 
the conclusion, would appear to have the potential to 
be developed further to produce a multi-dimensional 
typology. As such, in this section we elaborate briefly 
on each of these basic theoretical ideas.
4.1 THE LOGICS OF NON- OR 
LIMITED VIOLENCE
There are almost always discernible logics in decisions 
to use or not use, escalate or de-escalate violence. 
This is not to say that such decisions necessarily 
look ‘logical’ from the standpoint of an external 
observer – as Crenshaw (1996, p. 251) points out 
‘misperception’ and ‘misconception’ can play as much 
of a role in decision-making as ‘accurate appreciation 
of conditions’. Furthermore, the logics of violence 
and non-violence are unlikely to be consistent, even 
11 We take the position that ideology informs, and in turn adapts to, each of these logics, but does not comprise a distinct logic in and of itself. As such, we do not 
identify a specific internal brake relating to ideology. However, ideology and the way group members frame their struggle can clearly be seen to inform a number 
of the brakes and sub-brakes described below. We believe that this helps to inhibit over-reliance on a concept, ‘ideology’, which is often made to do a considerable 
amount of analytical work, and enables us to get closer to understanding the underlying social and psychological processes through which the brakes work. In 
other words, this is not to exclude ‘ideology’ from the analysis, but rather to include it in a way that we believe does not lead to an overdependence on ideology as 
an explanatory variable.
12 Dudouet (2012, 102).
within one organisation or campaign. Different actors 
within an organisation might have different ambitions 
and interests and might interpret differently the range 
of political opportunities as they unfold (e.g., della 
Porta & Tarrow, 1986). The logics of violence will also 
evolve over the course of the conflict. For example, 
‘[a]fter a campaign of terrorism starts, psychological 
pressures and organizational politics’ might ‘encourage 
the continuation of violence even if it becomes 
counterproductive in an instrumental sense’ (Crenshaw 
1996, p. 259). What is important for our purposes, 
however, is that there are discernible logics to the 
decisions made by actors within extremist groups about 
which tactics to use. The internal brakes on violent 
escalation work on these logics.
We identified five intersecting logics.11
Strategic logic relates to the basic question of ‘what 
works?’ or ‘how best can we achieve our objectives?’ 
This is perhaps the most prominent of the four types 
of logic within the academic literatures on decision-
making in radical, extremist or insurgent groups. As 
several contributors to these literatures point out, the 
prominence of such logic challenges assumptions 
sometimes made about the ideologically-driven nature 
of decision-making in such groups. Dudouet (2012, p. 
102), for example, notes that
Although rebel leaders are often perceived 
as stubborn and intransigent ideologues, all 
‘insider experts’ consulted for this research 
stressed the rationality of the decision-
making process, in which strategic or 
pragmatic leaders constantly reassess the 
ends and means of insurgency in the light of 
an evolving environment.12
Moral logic relates to questions about whether it is 
right to use violence, or particular forms of violence, 
against specific targets – what Matesan (2018) refers 
to as the ‘logics of appropriateness’. While much of 
the research on meso-level processes of the escalation 
and de-escalation of violence emphasises the strategic 
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logics that underpin such decisions, research into 
the experiences of those who have participated, or 
contemplated participation, in campaigns of violence, 
make clear that questions of appropriateness are also 
given considerable consideration.13 Such considerations 
can form significant barriers to violence and, where 
logics of appropriateness are broken, can also form 
a source of remorse and moral discomfort that might 
ultimately lead to disengagement with the group or 
scene in question (M. Collins, 2011; Crenshaw, 1996; 
Simi & Windisch, 2018).   
These moral logics sometimes align with strategic 
logics, particularly where utilitarian assessments 
are made about how violence or non-violence might 
contribute to campaign outcomes. However, moral 
logics can also contradict strategic logics. Where a group 
comes to equate more radical strategies of action with 
greater effectiveness, for example, moral qualms might 
lead group members to resist the temptation to use such 
violence even though they perceive it to be strategically 
expedient. Conversely, where group members continue 
to believe in the legitimacy of violence but assess that 
violence has become too costly or that there are non-
violent alternatives this might available give rise to 
situations in which groups ‘disengage from violence 
behaviourally’ but do not ‘denounce armed action or 
give up all military capabilities’ (Matesan, 2018, p. 10; 
see also Clements, 2015). 
As might be expected, there is some evidence that 
internal brakes are more likely to be effective and 
durable when the strategic and moral logics that 
underpin them are aligned (Ashour, 2008; Matesan, 
2018; Annex B, this report). This idea is also present in 
Schmid’s (2014) distinction between non-violent and 
‘not-yet-violent’ groups.
The logic of ego maintenance is one of two logics 
that relate to the processes of identity construction and 
negotiation that have been observed to be central to 
the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational aspects of 
mobilisation (Benford & Snow, 2000; Blee, 2012, pp. 
52-80; Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Snow & Byrd, 2007). 
The logic of ego-maintenance relates specifically to the 
13 Indeed, ‘virtuous violence’ theory (Fiske & Rai, 2015) proposes that most violence is ultimately done for moral reasons i.e., most violence is not due to a 
‘breakdown’ of morals but because it becomes, from the perspective of the perpetrator, morally appropriate, even necessary, to enable them to constitute or sustain 
critical relationships. Of relevance to our project, they also emphasise the importance of emergent group norms in this process: ‘People hurt and kill because they 
feel that they should; if their own primary reference groups make them feel they shouldn’t be violent, they won’t be’ (Fiske & Rai, 2015, p. 285, emphasis in the 
original).   
construction and maintenance of in-group identities 
– to the ‘who are we?’ and ‘who am I?’ questions. 
Where group members perceive themselves to be part 
of a group that uses only limited or no violence at that 
point in time, they are less likely to be drawn to, or 
even consider, violence even where there appears to 
be a realistic prospect that violence, can render some 
form of strategic gain (Busher, 2018; Wolfgang & 
Ferracuti, 1967). As Asal & Rethermeyer (2008, p. 
245) observe, ‘[s]ome organizations choose not to 
kill’ simply because ‘it does not fit with their view of 
themselves’. When a group’s behaviour does not align 
with members’ view of themselves, it is likely that some 
members will experience feelings of disappointment or 
disillusionment (e.g., Bjørgo, 2011; M. Collins, 2011). 
As such, the adoption of tactics from out-with of the 
group’s established tactical repertoire carries risk for 
the organisation and for those who instigate the tactical 
innovation.
Such processes of identity maintenance often coincide 
with moral logic. In most groups, members construct 
themselves as good or righteous people struggling 
for a noble cause (Jasper, 2007). Yet the logics of 
identity do not always coincide with moral logics in a 
straightforward way. For example, activists might have 
no moral objection to the use of a particular tactic, but 
nonetheless not consider it something that they would 
do, perhaps as a result of role specification within 
the wider movement. Identity maintenance might 
also forestall the requirement for moral reasoning: 
moral evaluations of certain courses of action become 
unnecessary when those courses of action are not 
(seriously) conceived of anyway.
The logic of out-group definition, relates to how 
group members answer the ‘who are they?’ questions. 
Boundary ‘activation’– the processes through which 
social interaction is focused around specific us-against-
them narratives – has repeatedly been observed to play 
a central role in shaping the evolution of conflict (Alimi 
et al., 2015; della Porta, 2013; Tilly, 2004). Where 
boundaries are activated and hardened, essentialised 
us-against-them categories and concomitant feelings 
of fear and hate can be used to justify and mobilise 
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violence against those defined as the Other, particularly 
where the Other can be constructed as an existential 
threat (Chirot & McCauley, 2006). Conversely, forms 
of boundary softening, complexification or suppression 
are likely to inhibit the use of violence (Chirot & 
McCauley, 2006; Fiske & Rai, 2015; Tilly, 2004; 
Wimmer, 2013). 
Processes of boundary hardening and softening both 
reflect and shape moral and strategic logics. For 
example, certain opponents might be identified as 
possible future allies, and therefore as unsuitable 
targets for violence, for what are initially strategic 
reasons. Subsequently however, as the decision not to 
target these actors is justified to group members the 
boundaries might be discursively transformed: as well 
as strategic reasons, those proposing that these hitherto 
opponents might comprise future allies might also 
emphasise characteristics that they have in common. 
In doing so, subsequent decisions not to target those 
opponents with violence might also work at least partly 
on moral logics or the ‘logics of appropriateness’.
Organisational logic refers to processes through 
which organisational developments condition decision-
making. Organisations acquire and generate their own 
logics which might constrain, channel or otherwise 
affect the choices of its members (see especially 
Crenshaw, 1991; Shapiro, 2013). While group 
members will almost always have some opportunities 
to pursue alternate strategic pathways,14 organisations 
are characterised by at least some degree of path 
dependency. As organisations, and the individuals 
that comprise them, plan and undertake actions, they 
develop relevant capabilities, forge collective identities, 
and acquire tactical habits and tastes, all of which 
contribute to make certain future courses of action more 
or less likely (Blee, 2012, pp. 35-37). For example, as a 
group invests in developing or maintaining capabilities, 
they are more likely to conceive of and deploy tactics 
that utilise those capabilities (Matesan, 2018), and 
where group protocols state that certain forms of action 
should not be used within a specific context, they are 
14 Even with terrorist groups it can be possible for them to ‘maintain their integrity and organizational continuity while abandoning terrorism’ (Crenshaw, 1996, 
p. 250).
less likely to be used even if group members perceive 
strategic advantages in using those forms of action.
Attention to how organisational developments 
condition decision-making can enable us to understand 
how strategic, moral, and identity-based logics can 
become institutionalised, and also how they can at 
times seemingly constrain the operation of other 
logics.  A classic example of the latter is provided by 
Allison’s (1969) ‘Conceptual models and the “Cuban 
Missile Crisis’”, which sets out how an organisation’s 
rehearsed standard operating procedures can result in 
inappropriate measures being adopted in non-standard 
situations.
4.2 THE PROXIMITY OR 
DISTANCE OF INTERNAL 
BRAKES TO THE ACT OF 
VIOLENCE
Internal brakes on violent escalation can be applied 
at a greater or lesser distance from the potential act of 
violence. To articulate this idea we draw on, and invert, 
the idea of the ‘structuration of violence’ used by 
Waddington, Jones & Critcher (1989) in their analysis 
of public disorder and ‘flashpoints’. We conceive of the 
brakes being applied at one of three levels of proximity 
to the potential act of violence (Figure 1):
A) The level of campaign planning, where activists are 
engaged in more general processes of issue definition, 
strategy development, positioning, alliance formation, 
recruitment and management;
B) The level of action planning, where activists are 
taking decisions about targets for a specific action, 
considering logistics, planning how they will manage 
the action, deciding whether or not to inform or engage 
with public authorities about their plans, ruling out 
certain courses of action and so forth;
C) The situational level, during the action, where 
the activists interact with one another either directly 
(talking to one another, giving instructions, disciplining 
18
building thE typology: thrEE baSic thEorEtical idEaS
THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION
one another etc.), or indirectly (communicating with 
one another symbolically, example setting etc.)
Braking processes can have their ‘origins’ at any of 
these three levels. We do not conceive of any of the 
three levels as comprising a ‘primary “location” of 
causality’ (Malthaner, 2017, p. 9; see also R. Collins, 
2008, pp. 360-369). While the plans for a specific action 
are likely to be shaped by strategic priorities defined by 
organisational leaders, direct or vicarious experience 
of action on the ground also impacts in multiple ways 
upon plans for subsequent actions and campaigns. This 
might be in the form of tactical lessons learned; moral 
intuitions that are brought into focus through activists’ 
experiences during and after the action; reflection on 
who did and who did not participate or collaborate 
in the action, and so forth. As Malthaner (2017, 
p. 8) notes with regards to processes of escalation, 
‘preceding confrontations reshape subsequent 
encounters in a pattern of adaptation resulting from 
past experiences.’ Indeed, initial motivations might 
even fade into the background over time as the conflict 
becomes increasingly focused on elements deeply 
rooted in the confrontation itself, such as humiliation, 
attempts to save face, or a desire for revenge (Crenshaw, 
1988; Scheff, 1994). This same argument applies to 
the dynamics of non-escalation, and is represented in 
Figure 1 through the arrows between the three levels.
As we developed the typology of the internal brakes on 
violent escalation, we were attentive to these multiple 
levels of proximity to the potential act of violence in two 
ways. First, in the case studies we have sought as far as 
possible to trace how brakes operate across and derive 
from practices at each of these levels. Second, since 
existing research that explores the multi-level dynamic 
of escalation indicates that the situational dynamics 
of violence can in some cases be ‘independent from 
(or even conflict […] with)’ processes at the campaign 
level (Malthaner, 2017, p. 7), we sought to interrogate 
how, if at all, the internal brakes on violent escalation 
manifest and operate differently across these three 
levels.
4.3 THE UNDERLYING 
DIFFICULTY OF DOING 
VIOLENCE
Contrary to a popular assumption, violence is not 
something that human beings generally find easy to 
do. Face-to-face violence appears to be particularly 
difficult to carry out. What Randall Collins (2008) calls 
‘confrontational tension and fear’ makes attempts to 
carry out such violence rare, and often characterised by 
  KEY
A. Campaign planning
B. Action planning
C. Situational level
Arrows indicate how decisions at one level 
of proximity to the act of violence affect 
decisions at other levels.
Figure 1. Three levels of proximity to the potential act of violence
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incompetence. Those who do carry out violence must 
find a pathway around such confrontational tension and 
fear (R. Collins, 2008; Nassauer, 2016).
Similarly, the adoption of lethal force has been observed 
to require forms of ‘moral disengagement’ that are 
difficult to achieve and sustain (Bandura, 1986), even 
in subcultures where inter-personal violence is not 
only accepted but a source of prestige and sometimes 
part of the attraction. Simi & Windisch, for example, 
in their analysis of why individuals within white 
supremacist subcultures in the USA do not to undertake 
greater violence, observe, ‘[c]ontrary to the common 
perception that extremists are “crazy” individuals 
determined to kill as many innocent bystanders as 
possible, our data suggest extremists struggle with the 
idea of taking another person’s life’ (2018, p. 14). One 
striking example from their research illustrates how, 
even where individuals might ostensibly be prepared 
for and be at the point of carrying out an attack, such 
psychological barriers to violence can still manifest:
I knew this would have been the largest act 
of its kind in U.S. history. That’s part of why 
I thought we were supposed to do it, because 
we knew that it would have an impact. I don’t 
think I realized how huge until I actually 
got into the church with the bomb, and saw 
the people, and saw the damage that could 
occur. It hadn’t hit me yet. But once it hit me, 
yeah, it hit me. Being that close, there was no 
denying my life changed at that point. In my 
heart, at that point, [my group] died. (Simi 
& Windisch, 2018, p. 14).
Recognising how difficult, or at least stressful, it is for 
humans to do violence to other humans is important 
as we consider how the internal brakes on violent 
escalation work. It is likely to be relatively rare to 
find individuals or groups that find it easy or morally 
unchallenging to undertake violence, particularly over 
a sustained period of time, unless there is a moral 
logic that enables them to construct that violence as 
appropriate, or even necessary (Fiske & Rai, 2015). As 
such, while violence might sometimes proceed from 
an apparent appetite or enthusiasm for violence (e.g., 
Meadowcroft & Morrow, 2017), we believe, following 
Randall Collins, that (a) this is most likely to be the case 
for certain relatively choreographed forms of violence, 
and (b) often violence might be better understood as 
proceeding from the inability of the actors involved to 
identify a pathway away from violence that would not 
entail a loss of face (R. Collins, 2008, especially 337-
369). 
This has important implications because it moves 
us beyond the standard concepts of ‘intent’ and 
‘capability’ usually used in terrorist threat assessments 
(see e.g., CSIS, 2018; Schuurman & Eijkman, 2015), 
to also think about the opportunities individuals or 
groups have to avoid or to exit the ‘tunnel of violence’ 
(R. Collins, 2013) and what those exit routes might 
look like.  
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5. A TYPOLOGY OF THE BRAKES ON 
VIOLENT ESCALATION
Building on Section 4, this section sets out the descriptive typology of internal brakes on violent escalation. The typology 
is based around five brakes each of which we conceive of as relating primarily to one of the logics of violence or limited 
violence set out in Section 4.1.
Table 1. The five internal brakes and associated logics
Brake Description Braking logic
1 Identification of non- or less violent strategies of action as being as or more 
effective than more violent alternatives.
Strategic
2 Construction of moral norms and evaluations that inhibit certain forms of 
violence and the emotional impulses towards violence (e.g., revenge).
Moral
3 Self-identification as a group that is either non-violent or uses only limited 
forms of violence.
Ego maintenance
4 Boundary softening in relation to putative out-groups (e.g., opponents, 
opponents’ perceived supporters, the general public or state actors).
Out-group definition
5 Organisational developments that either (a) alter the moral and strategic 
equations in favour of non- or limited violence, (b) institutionalise less 
violent collective identities and/or processes of boundary softening, and/or 
(c) reduce the likelihood of unplanned violence.
Organisational
Each of these brakes is in turn associated with a series of what we describe as sub-brakes. These are summarised in Table 
2, and explained in detail below.
Table 2. The internal brakes on violent escalation and associated sub-brakes
Brake 1: Identification of non- or less violent strategies of action as being as or more effective than more violent 
alternatives.
Su
b-
br
ak
es
1a. Expressions of scepticism about their ability to beat their opponents in a violent struggle, including concerns 
that greater militancy will increase backlash or repression from opponents or the state towards them and their 
supporters.
1b. Expressions of concern that violent escalation will undermine support for the group.
1c. Attempts to build or maintain ties with strategically useful allies who are not supportive of violent escalation.
1d. Identification of political opportunities that favour (re)adoption of non- or less violent strategies of action.
1e. Identification of non- or less violent strategies of action that are perceived to be effective, including identification 
of ‘sufficient’ levels of violence.
21
a typology of thE brakES on violEnt EScalation
BUSHER , HOLBROOK & MACKLIN
Brake 2. Construction of moral norms and evaluations that inhibit certain forms of violence and the emotional impulses 
towards violence (e.g., revenge)
Su
b-
br
ak
es
2a. Articulation and performance of general moral norms and principles that problematise certain forms of 
violence, require violence to be justified or enable activists to forestall on entering the ‘tunnel of violence’ (e.g., 
the conception of violence as a tactic of last resort; positioning non-retaliation as a virtue; emphasising values 
such as mercy and compassion).
2b. Identification of some groups of actors as illegitimate targets for violence.
Brake 3. Self-identification as a group that is either non-violent or uses only limited forms of violence.
Su
b-
br
ak
es
3a. Production of group narratives that emphasise non-violence or the limited use of violence either by themselves 
or by those they claim have inspired their movement.
3b. Disassociation from more violent groups or factions and/or association with less violent groups or factions.
3c. (The threat of) sanctions for activists who advocate or undertake violence beyond the established parameters of 
the group’s action repertoire, and/or opportunities to achieve intra-group respect and prestige without undertaking 
or encouraging the use of violence at or beyond the parameters of the group’s action repertoire.
3d. Circulation of limited expectations that they will be involved in greater levels of violence.
Brake 4. Boundary softening in relation to putative out-groups (e.g., opponents, opponents’ perceived 
supporters, the general public or state actors)
Su
b-
br
ak
es
4a. Resistance to generalizations about their opponents.
4b. Identification of segments of the public beyond their previously-imagined support base as potential converts 
to their cause.
4c. Limited intra-movement pressure to ‘burn-bridges’ with social contacts outside of the movement or outside 
of the radical flank of the movement.
4d. Expressions of reluctance to conceive of the state security forces as ‘the enemy’.
Brake 5. Organisational developments that either (a) alter the moral and strategic equations in favour of non- 
or limited violence, (b) institutionalise less violent collective identities and/or processes of boundary softening, 
and/or (c) reduce the likelihood of unplanned violence.
Su
b-
br
ak
es
5a. Limited investment in capabilities to escalate violence, and/or development of capabilities to undertake 
strategies of action that either entail non- or limited violence or more controlled violence.
5b. Foregrounding more modest or intermediate objectives and de-prioritising revolutionary goals.
5c. Construction and maintenance of spaces in which a range of activists that includes and extends beyond the 
radical flank are able to freely discuss tactics and movement objectives.
5d. Concerns among some group members that violent escalation will compromise their ability to shape the 
movement’s direction and/or negatively affect their position within it.
5e. Concentration of energy on targeting movement rivals, leading to reduced capability to prosecute campaigns 
of violence against their external enemies.
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5.1 BRAKE 1 
Identification of non- or less violent strategies of 
action as being as or more effective than more 
violent alternatives.
Brake 1 works on strategic logics, in which we include 
considerations both about anticipated campaign/
action success and about the potential personal costs 
of violent escalation. The application of this set of 
brakes can be about emphasising the effectiveness of 
less violent strategies of action15 or emphasising the 
limited effectiveness and/or potentially high costs of 
violent escalation. As violence is almost always used 
alongside other strategies of action, the application of 
these brakes often relates to concerns about how greater 
or more widespread violence might undermine the 
group’s ability to effectively carry out other activities 
and maintain relationships that are perceived to be 
important to the group’s pursuit of its goals (Kruglanski 
& Fishman, 2009, p. 37). Where this is the case, the 
idea of violence being ‘counter-productive’ might be 
deployed (see examples in each of Annexes A-C). 
Brake 1a
Expressions of scepticism about their ability to beat 
their opponents in a violent struggle, including 
concerns that greater militancy will increase 
backlash or repression from opponents or the state 
towards them and their supporters.
Physical violence is rarely undertaken by people who 
anticipate that they will lose (R. Collins, 2008).16 It 
is perhaps unsurprising therefore that one of the most 
prominent internal brakes relates to the prospect of 
losing at violence. This might be expressed in terms 
of failing to achieve organisational objectives, in terms 
of the potential personal costs of violent escalation for 
them as individuals or for their supporters (see Annexes 
A and C), or as a combination of both. Examples of 
brake 1a can be found during campaign planning, action 
planning and at the situational level. For example, 
former animal liberation activists (Respondents C1 
and C2) recalled how activists would often discourage 
violent escalation during an action by warning fellow 
15 Non-violent campaigns are often more successful than violent campaigns in achieving their political goals (Abrahms, 2006, 2011; Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008; 
Chenoweth & Schock, 2015) 
16 In some cases groups use violence to provoke a backlash from state actors and/or opponents with the intention of undermining the credibility of those actors in 
the eyes of the public. In such cases however those seeking to provoke a backlash usually anticipate that they will ultimately triumph. 
activists that they were ‘going to get nicked’ or that they 
were ‘going to get us all nicked’.
Scepticism about their ability to ‘win’ at violence 
can focus on the apparent capabilities of non-state 
opponents or on the prospect of state backlash and 
repression. One of the reasons why a substantial 
component of the British extreme right moved away 
from the use of violence in the 1990s was that it became 
clear that they were less effective at doing violence than 
their anti-fascist opponents (Annex B). Meanwhile, 
Simi & Windisch (2018, p. 8) note that one of the 
reasons why mass casualty violence is often seen as 
counter-productive by white nationalist activists in the 
USA is that it will attract ‘unwanted attention from law 
enforcement’. Such perceptions can be based on direct 
experiences, or vicarious experience as activists seek 
to draw lessons from the experiences of other groups 
(e.g., (McCauley 2008, p. 269).
Brake 1a can be temporary. In some cases groups 
might simply not see themselves as being ready to 
prosecute an effective campaign of violence. For 
example, opposition to the use of violence among Irish 
Republicans during the Irish liberation struggle in the 
1880s was based on the view that they were ill-prepared 
at that time for the backlash that they expected from 
the British, but did see violent struggle as a potentially 
viable strategy at some point in the future (Crenshaw, 
1996, p. 255). Similar arguments can be found within 
the jihadi case study in the context of discussions about 
target prioritisation (Annex A).
Brake 1b
Expressions of concern that violent escalation will 
undermine support for the group.
While some groups might use violence as a recruiting 
tool (Ligon et al., 2015; Meadowcroft & Morrow, 
2017), this usually works only to attract a relatively 
small number of militants. Yet most groups also 
require wider bases of support, at least some of whom 
are unlikely to support high levels of violence. As the 
Marxist revolutionary Carlos Marighella (1969, p. 60) 
observed: ‘One of the permanent concerns of the urban 
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guerrilla is his identification with popular causes to 
win public support.’ Emphasising the importance of 
achieving or sustaining support among these publics can 
be deployed as a brake on violent escalation, with the 
adoption of greater violence often presented as being 
counter-productive in efforts to build such support. 
For example, jihadi militants who had been involved in 
the civil war in Algeria (1991-2002) warned colleagues 
involved in more recent campaigns of the risk of 
losing public support through excessively violent 
tactics (Annex A). Similarly, in Northern Ireland, one 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) commander 
claimed that the leadership decided against planting 
car-bombs because the resultant loss of public support 
would have been ‘a political disaster for the aims of 
the struggle’ (quoted in Shapiro, 2013, p. 6). As Fiske 
& Rai (2015, p. 273) argue, ‘more often than not, 
violence in one relationship undermines or jeopardises 
most other relationships.’
When the imagined constituencies of potential 
support overlap with their opponents’ support base, 
brake 1b might be particularly effective because it 
disincentivises target widening to the enemies’ support 
base – something that might serve to inhibit dynamics 
of ‘cumulative extremism’ or ‘reciprocal radicalisation’ 
(Carter, 2017). Rosenhaft (1982, cited in Crenshaw, 
1996, p. 254), for example, argues that one of the 
reasons why the German Communist Party did not 
adopt terrorist strategies in the 1930s was that ‘they 
also hoped to attract some of the Nazi rank-and-file 
and feared that the use of terrorism would make this 
impossible.’ Here brake 1b intersects with brakes 4b 
and 4a).
Brake 1b is likely to be most effective when public 
opposition to violence is clearly stated (Matesan, 2018, 
p. 5; see also Kennedy, 2011). Brake 1b is arguably least 
likely to be in evidence or effective among groups that 
‘have no desire for an earthly constituency’ (Crenshaw, 
1988, pp. 15-16). However, it is worth noting that there 
are likely to be relatively few cases in which there is no 
desire for an earthly constituency. For example, even in 
the jihadi case study used in this project – seemingly 
an example of a group that might have limited interest 
in achieving an earthly constituency – concerns about 
17 For example, one of the reasons why the ANC rejected violence was because of concerns that neighbouring states would deny ANC activists sanctuary if they 
did not (Howe 1989, 174).
public support were in fact prominent in the strategic 
thinking of at least some within the al-Qaeda leadership.
Brake 1c
Attempts to build or maintain ties with strategically 
useful allies who are not supportive of violent 
escalation.
The reasons for pursuing or maintaining these ties 
might be varied, including tapping in to their resource 
or support base; achieving a veneer of respectability 
or using them to protect them politically, militarily or 
physically from their opponents.17 The extent to which 
this brake is effective is likely to depend at least partly 
on the extent to which the desired ally is willing to 
tolerate any further escalation of violence. 
In some cases, attempts to build such relationships 
can entail significant displays of commitment to limit 
or reduce violence. As part of their attempt to build 
international alliances ‘[t]he ANC even committed 
itself in 1980 to observe the Geneva Protocol relating to 
irregular warfare’ (Dudouet 2012, p. 99). Similarly, as 
part of their efforts to ‘garner support both internally and 
internationally … the KLA [Kosovo Liberation Army] 
issued an internal directive instructing its members to 
“commit liberation acts with a just character, and not 
attack socio-cultural monuments, civilian population 
and subjects of importance for the life of the people”’ 
(Dudouet 2012, p. 99).
Brake 1d 
Identification of political opportunities that favour 
(re)adoption of non- or less violent strategies of 
action.
Research on the dynamics of political violence indicates 
that diminished prospects for achieving successes 
in political arenas encourages the adoption of more 
violent strategies of action (Alimi et al., 2015, pp. 24-
58). Conversely, where activists identify the opening 
up of political opportunities this can alter the balance 
of intra-movement strategic and tactical debates in 
favour of prioritising strategies of action that use non- 
or limited violence. The animal liberation case study 
provides a case in point. Here, one of the factors that 
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appears to have contributed to a lull in violent action 
during the late 1990s was the circulation of perceptions 
within the animal liberation movement that the 
incoming/new Labour government would be more 
supportive of the cause of animal rights and would 
enact legislation to inhibit animal exploitation (Annex 
C). Similarly, in the early 1990s perception within the 
extreme right milieu of growing public support for 
overtly anti-immigration and anti-immigrant positions 
encouraged and enabled the BNP leadership to shift the 
focus of the organisation away from a march-and-grow 
strategy towards concerted electoral campaigning. 
While this brake is clearly conditioned by developments 
external to the group, what is important from the 
‘internal brakes’ perspective is the identification 
or construction of political opportunities by group 
members – how they ‘frame’ the emergent political 
opportunities (Benford & Snow, 2000). Brake 1d is 
identified primarily at the level of campaign planning.
Brake 1e 
Identification of non- or less violent strategies of 
action that are perceived to be effective, including 
identification of ‘sufficient’ levels of violence.
Activists’ identification of specific non- or less-violent 
strategies of action as ‘successful’ can serve to build 
support for such strategies and undermine support for 
violence (Matesan, 2018). For example, while part 
of the reason for the BNP’s innovation away from 
violence was the realisation that they were unable to 
‘out-violence’ their anti-fascist opponents, the ability 
of ‘modernisers’ to build support within the movement 
was enhanced by the identification of the potential 
of interventions such as their ‘Rights for Whites’ 
campaign to exploit perceived political opportunities 
(Copsey, 2011). 
Similarly, in the animal liberation movement in the early 
1980s, the perceived effectiveness of mass daytime 
‘invasions’ of laboratory, facilities in terms of building 
public support and intensifying legal and economic 
pressure on those laboratories quickly spawned similar 
actions across the country and a brief shift away from 
clandestine activities. The tactical shift was curtailed 
18 Some non-violent strategies, such as civil disobedience, might persist in the face of state repression for a time because they work in part by shaming those who 
undertake the repression, but such strategies are only likely to be effective within particular relational configurations (Fiske and Rai, 2015, pp. 278-281). 
however when such invasions resulted in mass arrests 
(Nagtzaam, 2017, p. 71).
A variation on this brake is the identification of what 
are deemed ‘sufficient’ levels of violence in order to 
achieve their objectives. For example, activists might 
identify that only a relatively low level of violence is 
required to disrupt an opponent’s event or to intimidate 
their opponents, and that incurring the risks of 
escalation beyond this level is unnecessary (e.g., Annex 
B). Such logic can contribute to the decision to abandon 
violence altogether if an organisation accomplishes its 
goals (Crenshaw, 1996; Cronin, 2011).
We would expect brake 1e to be less likely to be 
effective the lower the perceived availability of non-
violent avenues of dissent. As Piazza (2017, p. 102) 
observes, strategies of state repression that ‘close off’ 
such avenues of dissent are often associated with an 
‘increase [in] the amount of domestic terrorism a 
country faces’.18
Whereas brake 1d was identified primarily at the 
campaign planning level, brake 1e is found at all levels 
of proximity to the potential act of violence. 
5.2 BRAKE 2 
Construction of moral norms and evaluations that 
inhibit certain forms of violence and the emotional 
impulses towards violence (e.g., revenge).
Brake 2 and the associated sub-brakes work on moral 
logics or the ‘logic of appropriateness’ (Matesan, 2018, 
p. 6). Brake 2 manifests at the campaign and action 
planning levels and at the situational level. Moral 
positions might be set out formally in organisational 
communiqués, but are also produced less formally as 
group members forge and negotiate emergent group 
and sub-group norms.
One of the ways in which this brake is evident is 
through the expression of and reference to emotions, 
and in particular to what might be referred to as moral 
emotions (Jasper, 2011). At the levels of campaign 
planning and action planning, this can include 
expression of emotions such as shame, guilt and regret 
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relating to previous actions, providing an example of 
the sort of feedback loops described in Section 4.2.
Norms regarding non-violence or the limited use of 
violence are often conditional. As Karagiannis & 
McCauley (2006, p. 328) observe, ‘[h]istory records 
few groups with an unconditional commitment to non-
violence; most groups will justify violence under some 
circumstances.’ Fiske & Rai (2015, pp. 35-41) argue 
that in general violence is most often deemed justifiable 
when it is used for the purposes of defence, punishment 
and vengeance. The conditionality of these brakes and 
the potentially malleable nature of the moral reasoning 
that underpins them, is often made apparent when the 
strategic (brake 1) and organisational (brake 5) logics 
become more conducive to violence.
Brake 2a
Articulation and performance of general moral 
norms and principles that problematise certain 
forms of violence, require violence to be justified or 
enable activists to forestall on entering the ‘tunnel of 
violence’ e.g., the conception of violence as a tactic 
of last resort; positioning non-retaliation as a virtue; 
emphasising values such as mercy and compassion.
General moral norms that problematise violence 
or particular forms of violence are often ostensibly 
rooted in movement ‘ideologies’ or ‘worldviews’, and 
those who seek to apply such brakes will often make 
reference to basic ideological precepts. Karagiannis & 
McCauley (2006) for example describe how prominent 
actors within Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan used 
theological reasoning to resist the adoption of violence. 
Similarly, Taylor (1998, p. 2) describes how in radical 
environmentalist networks, activists’ general ‘moral 
perception of the kinship and sacred value of all life’ 
is used to suppress the adoption of violence against 
persons.
The moral norms are rarely unconditional, however. 
Indeed, one of the ways in which they often function 
is by setting out the conditions under which violence 
would be legitimate. To use the example of Hizb ut-
Tahrir in Uzbekistan again, Karagiannis & McCauley 
note that the theological reasoning used to inhibit 
the adoption of violence does not prohibit resistance 
against foreign invaders and entailed that the adoption 
of violence would be justified if it was ordered by the 
Caliph. One of the implications of this is that radical 
flank actors might seek to demonstrate how the 
conditions for legitimate violence have already been 
met. In the animal liberation case, for example, some 
radical flank actors sought to use forms of just-war 
theory to justify violent escalation (Annex C), while 
in the jihadi case study some militants claimed that 
the emergence of IS and its self-declared caliphate 
provided the structures through which a just war could 
legitimately be declared (Annex A).
General moral norms and principles also work by 
providing ways in which individuals or groups can 
avoid violence without losing face. For example, in a 
situation in which non-violence or non-retaliation can 
be conceived of as a virtue, or as the enactment of some 
higher principle, not responding to violence with greater 
violence can be constructed and experienced as a form 
of moral victory. Restraint might, for example, act as 
a symbol of movement and individual ‘discipline’ or 
might serve as a symbol of their ‘dignity’ in the face of 
what activists believe are the efforts of their opponents 
to humiliate them (Busher, Giurlando & Sullivan, 
2018). At the micro- or situational level, this can 
take the form of practices such as activists telling one 
another not to ‘stoop to the level’ of their opponents.
Brake 2b 
Identification of some groups of actors as 
illegitimate targets for violence.
The appropriateness or otherwise of violence always 
depends partly on who the targets are. Even in the cases 
of seemingly indiscriminate violence, the attackers 
usually provide some justification for the location and 
target of the attack.  Conversely, some groups of actors 
might be identified as illegitimate targets for violence. 
In 2013, for example, the current leader of al-Qaeda 
went so far as to draft a document titled ‘General 
guidelines for the work of a jihadi’ listing particular 
groups, including relatives of combatants, who could 
not be targeted (Annex A).
The identification of certain actors as being 
illegitimate targets can derive from evaluations about 
their culpability for the supposed problem – as with 
the concept of ‘innocents’. It can also derive from 
evaluations of whether or not they pose a threat (here 
brake 2b intersects with brake 2a and notions of mercy 
and compassion). There might also be categories of 
actors who are conceived of as being ‘off limits’ based 
26
a typology of thE brakES on violEnt EScalation
THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION
on general moral precepts e.g., that one shouldn’t 
attack ‘women or children’ (see Annex B), established 
conventions or legal distinction enshrined in 
international law e.g., prisoners of war, non-combatants 
etc. Therefore, the particular configuration of groups 
considered not to be deserving of violence will depend 
on a combination of ideology and risk analysis.
Where violence is done to what are deemed illegitimate 
targets, this can be particularly damaging to movement 
morale and cohesion, and might produce moments 
of cognitive dissonance that can lead to individual 
activists or groups of activists disengaging from the 
group. In the extreme right case study, for example, 
vicious attacks against women and against non-militant 
members of opposition movements, or against fellow 
activists, provoked moral crises among activists (Annex 
B). 
Actors who seek to broaden their targeting will usually 
seek to develop a justification for doing so. For example, 
jihadi militants have at various points in time sought to 
justify seemingly indiscriminate attacks with reference 
to scriptural evidence that the Prophet’s armies used 
weaponry and tactics that were—in principle—
indiscriminate within selected boundaries, such as 
siege engines, thus setting a legal precedent for their 
interpretation of modern equivalents; or by presenting 
civilians as combatants by proxy, by virtue of their 
status as tax-payers or citizens indirectly supportive of 
hostile regimes (Annex A).
5.3 BRAKE 3 
Self-identification as a group that is either non-
violent or uses only limited forms of violence.
Brake 3 works through the logics of ego maintenance. 
As described in Section 4.1, these might overlap with 
and sometimes combine moral and strategic logics. 
This is not always the case, however. Groups might not 
oppose violence in and of itself but at the same time 
not see themselves as an organisation that undertakes 
(higher levels of) violence. This might happen, for 
example, where there are processes of specialisation 
within the wider movement. Brake 3 might also be 
used to obviate the need for brakes 1 or 2: it might be 
less risky, or simply less time-consuming, to say ‘we 
don’t do things like that’ than it is to open up extensive 
conversations about the strategic pros and cons of 
violent escalation. 
While brake 3 is about ego maintenance, it can however 
still be temporary: a group might not see itself as 
engaging in violence at a particular point in time, but 
this need not necessarily preclude it from doing so 
in the future, under different circumstances. See, for 
example al-Muhajiroun’s eventual dismissal of the 
‘covenant of security’ it purported to respect within the 
UK (Annex A). Similarly, a group might not identify 
as a group that uses violence in the present, but still be 
proud of previous campaigns of violence.
Brake 3 can be found at all three levels of proximity 
to the potential act of violence. At the campaign 
planning level it might manifest as formal or quasi-
formal statements about the group’s identity and core 
values. At the action-planning level it might manifest as 
references by group members back to such statements, 
but also operates more informally through processes 
of socialisation and the everyday enactment of group 
identities (especially brakes 3c and 3d). 
When brake 3 is internalised, it is likely that group 
members will not even seriously consider escalating 
violence (e.g., brake 3d). This is why brake 3 is also 
closely associated with the fallout that we often observe 
when there is sudden escalation beyond established 
repertoires of action. Such events produce crises within 
activist communities because they undermine, even 
shatter, their sense of collective identity, provoking 
in some activists feelings of disillusionment and even 
disgust. When the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (IS), 
for instance, undertook large-scale violence against 
Muslims, based in part on sectarian reasoning and its 
willingness to ‘excommunicate’ allegedly insincere 
believers, this enraged, shocked or confused other 
jihadi militants, both local and transnational (Annex 
A). 
In each of the case studies, brake 3 comes to particular 
prominence when activists are seeking to distance 
themselves from other groups with which they are 
being compared by opponents, government, the media 
or within other public discourse.
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Brake 3a 
Production of group narratives that emphasise 
non-violence or the limited use of violence either by 
themselves or by those they claim have inspired their 
movement.
There are two basic ways in which activists produce 
group narratives that emphasise their identity as a group 
committed to non- or limited forms of violence. The 
first of these is to emphasise non-violence or restraint 
in accounts of their own actions. Here, incidents in 
which activists could have done greater violence, but 
chose not to, were of particular rhetorical value. For 
instance al-Zawahiri used his eulogy of his predecessor 
as leader of al-Qaeda, Usama bin Ladin, to emphasise 
how merciful the latter had been, sparing the lives 
of enemy combatants whom he could easily have 
ambushed (al-Zawahiri, 2011). Similarly, in the animal 
liberation case, activists’ accounts of laboratory raids 
often emphasised how they had taken care to minimise 
the risk of harm to human or non-human animals (e.g., 
Mann, 2007, p. 626). Whilst such accounts are directed 
partly at external audiences, they also serve movement 
socialisation processes, shaping emergent ideas about 
what is ‘appropriate’ and what is ‘good’. Such stories 
of restraint are likely to circulate both in formal or 
semi-formal accounts of the movement (memoirs, 
newsletters, communiqués etc.) and through more 
informal channels such as movement gossip.
The second way in which activists produce group 
narratives that emphasise their identity as a group 
committed to non- or limited forms of violence is 
by situating their struggle within a longer historical 
tradition of non- or limited-violence, tracing the 
lineage of their campaign back to groups or individuals 
who espoused non-violence or only espoused the use 
of violence under very specific conditions. In the 
animal liberation movement, for example, claims and 
calls to uphold principles of non-violence were often 
made by invoking figures associated explicitly with 
non-violence, such as Ghandi and Martin Luther King 
Jr, as sources of inspiration for the movement (Annex 
C). Similarly, in the late 1990s and early 2000s Hizb 
ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan sought to inhibit activists’ 
adoption of violence by conceiving of their struggle 
at that time as an imitation of the second phase of 
the progress of the Prophet Muhammad – the phase 
of Islamisation – which, according to their particular 
historic interpretation, precludes the use of violence 
unless it is in defence of Muslim lands (Karagiannis & 
McCauley, 2006, pp. 325-9). 
Activists who seek to steer the group towards greater 
use of violence might challenge such versions of the 
movement’s historical narrative through construction 
of an alternate narrative based around different historic 
reference points. For example, within the animal 
liberation movement, radical flank actors attacked 
what they saw as their fellow activists’ reverence for 
Ghandi and instead emphasised historical parallels 
with movements such as the suffragists, who did deploy 
violence, albeit only within a limited repertoire. 
Once group narratives of non-violence or limited 
violence have been significantly compromised it 
can be a long and difficult process to reconstruct 
such narratives. Kaplan (1995, p. 128) describes for 
instance how the killing of Dr David Gunn in 1993 by 
Michael Griffin ‘made a decisive break with the pro-
life rescue movement's 20‐year history of non-violent 
protest against abortion in America. That act opened 
the floodgates to other violent attacks on doctors, and 
brought to public notice a violent splinter sect of the 
larger millenarian subculture dedicated to the “rescue” 
of the unborn.’
Brake 3b 
Disassociation from more violent groups or factions 
and/or association with less violent groups or 
factions.
Association and disassociation with other groups 
and/or subcultures is a central part of how any group 
defines and understands itself (Berbrier, 2002). The 
motivations for such processes often combine strategic 
and moral considerations. The outcomes however can 
have significant implications for activists’ self-image, 
particularly as such association and disassociation 
becomes culturally embedded within group practices 
(Busher, 2018). By extension, they can also serve as 
an important brake on violent escalation by in effect 
committing activists to pursue strategies of action 
that support their attempts to distance themselves 
from or approximate themselves to other groups or 
factions (Chermak, Freilich & Suttmoeller, 2013). This 
brake is perhaps most apparent where activists define 
themselves in contrast to other more violent groups or 
factions. This places pressure on activists to articulate 
and demonstrate how they are distinct from the group 
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with which they are disassociating, often through the 
condemnation of their violence. This is evident in each 
of the case studies. 
Within a group or movement, members of one faction 
might also disassociate from or threaten to disassociate 
themselves from other factions that they believe are 
using or are planning to use greater or new forms 
of violence. This is most likely to be effective as a 
brake when it also works on emergent concerns about 
building and sustaining support (brake 1b) e.g., when 
those threatening to disassociate themselves from the 
group might take with them a significant support base.
Processes of association and disassociation can 
happen gradually as group members find themselves 
becoming ideologically and strategically aligned with 
different actors over time. High profile events often 
provide a focal point for such processes, however. For 
example, in the aftermath of terrorist attacks, such 
attacks are often condemned by groups that otherwise 
share ostensibly similar ideologies and goals. See for 
example the condemnation of the attacks on New 
York and Washington of September 11, 2001, by 
Jalaluddin Patel, then leader of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Great 
Britain (Karagiannis & McCauley, 2006, p. 235) or the 
condemnation of Anders Behring Breivik by English 
Defence League activists in the wake of his attacks 
(Busher, 2016, pp. 106, 159). While their opponents 
in particular are liable to question whether such acts 
of disassociation are made in good faith, they can 
nonetheless shape activists’ understandings of the 
parameters of legitimate force and serve as important 
symbols in the subsequent evolution of the group’s 
self-image.     
Similarly, processes of association or comparison 
with groups characterised by less violence can serve 
to orientate group norms towards less use of violence. 
Where such association is made with specific groups, 
Brake 3b overlaps with brake 1c. Group members might 
also associate with more general or abstract categories. 
For example, Busher (2016, pp. 113-114) describes 
how EDL activists’ identification as ‘ordinary English 
people’ placed an onus on activists to conduct their 
protests in what they considered to be a respectable 
manner, and Simi & Windisch (2018, p. 15) describe 
19 E.g., reprimands, demotion, limiting their opportunities for future promotion, questioning their moral fibre, exclusion from future activities or decision-making 
processes etc.
how the adoption of mass casualty violence by white 
nationalist actors was partly inhibited by the disjuncture 
between their own identification as fundamentally 
‘normal’ people and their perception of mass casualty 
violence as ‘sociopathic’.
Brake 3c 
(The threat of) sanctions for activists who advocate 
or undertake violence beyond the established 
parameters of the group’s action repertoire, and/
or opportunities to achieve intra-group respect and 
prestige without undertaking or encouraging the 
use of violence at or beyond the parameters of the 
group’s action repertoire.
The application of social sanctions19 and rewards play 
a fundamental role in shaping understanding of what is 
and what is not acceptable within a given (set of) social 
contexts (Mead, 1934). This basic theoretical insight is 
highly relevant to understanding how the social limits 
on violence are established and maintained. Where 
violence is a source of social prestige, individuals are 
more likely to engage in and make a show of engaging 
in violence (Fiske & Rai, 2015, p. 285; Jaskoski et al., 
2017, p. 11). Conversely, where violence attracts social 
sanctions, particularly from their peers, individuals are 
likely to minimise their use of violence.  
Sanctioning group members who exceed established 
parameters of acceptable violence both disincentivises 
breach of those norms and helps to reinforce those 
norms – thereby serving to establish and maintain 
‘codes’ of (limited or non-) violence (Copes et al., 
2013). Similarly, promoting or demonstrating in other 
ways respect for individuals who advocate for more 
moderate tactical approaches can send powerful signals 
to group members about the value placed on such 
approaches, and undermine the emergence of a social 
hierarchy that privileges (higher levels of) violence 
over other strategies of action.
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Brake 3d 
Circulation of limited expectations that they will be 
involved in greater levels of violence.
People are less likely to undertake violence if they expect 
to lose; they are more likely to expect to lose if they are 
ill-prepared for violence; and they are more likely to be 
ill-prepared for violence if they do not expect violence 
or do not expect it to exceed certain parameters upheld 
during previous encounters. Conversely, where people 
anticipate violence they are more likely to prepare for it 
and more likely to identify in the actions of others what 
they perceive to be signs of forthcoming confrontation 
(Malthaner, 2017).
In the extreme right case, even on the radical flank, 
there was an expectation that violent confrontation with 
anti-fascist opponents would involve a ‘tear up’ but 
nobody would be killed (Lowles, 2014, p. 18). In the 
animal liberation case this brake can be seen operating 
in the way that hunt saboteurs anticipated and prepared 
for different levels of violent confrontation across 
different local hunts based on previous encounters with 
hunt supporters and the intra-movement circulation of 
anecdotes about these encounters.
Brake 3d highlights the importance of feedback 
loops across different levels of proximity to the 
potential act of violence. Where group members 
have only experienced a limited degree of violence in 
confrontations with opponents and state security forces, 
they are less likely to expect greater levels of violence 
at subsequent encounters and are therefore less likely to 
prepare for greater levels of violence. In doing so they 
in turn inhibit the range of violence that they are able 
to perform during their next encounters. It also makes 
them less likely to perceive in the actions of their 
opponents or the state security forces signs of greater 
violence to come. Intra-group conversations also shape 
expectations about the amount of violence that they are 
likely to encounter during forthcoming actions, largely 
as a function of how their plans for those events are 
developed: e.g., discussions about whether they will 
seek to provoke greater levels of violence; retaliate if 
20 While violence is sometimes carried out against the nominal in-group, this is usually done explicitly as punishment as part of the disciplinary process, and those 
carrying out the violence will usually be at pains to make clear why those on the receiving end of violence constituted, at least temporarily, part of an out-group 
e.g., of traitors, or of those who had let the group down or put its mission in danger. 
provoked; how many of them will be attending; who 
will be attending, and so forth
5.4 BRAKE 4
Boundary softening in relation to putative out-
groups (e.g., opponents, opponents’ perceived 
supporters, the general public or state actors).
Brake 4 works on the logic of out-group definition. 
We understand ‘boundary softening’ to comprise 
the inverse of the processes of boundary activation 
and boundary hardening, which are often associated 
with dynamics of radicalisation (Tilly, 2003, 2004). 
Whereas boundary activation entails the focus of 
interactions around and increasingly narrow range of 
us-against-them narratives, boundary softening entails 
an increasingly complex and nuanced understanding 
of identity and the breaking down of clear distinctions 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’ such that, ultimately, ‘there is 
no clear definition of an “other” that cannot or should 
not be converted to the cause’ (Asal & Rethemeyer, 
2008, p. 248). Boundary softening can leave group 
members comparatively more open to engagement or 
dialogue with opponents, state actors and the sections 
of the public that they might previously have considered 
only as a pool of latent support for their opponents. 
Boundary softening might also make them less inclined 
to target such actors with violence either due to strategic 
calculations (brake 1) or because it would compromise 
the logic of appropriateness (brake 2).20 
Processes of boundary softening might be observed 
within the strategic or moral debates taking place at 
campaign or action-planning levels. They might also 
emerge through activists lived experience and their 
interactions with people outside their group. For 
example, through their interactions with opponents, 
activists might come to differentiate between different 
sets of opponents and/or state actors, and might even 
come to identify points of common ground between 
themselves and some of their opponents. As such, brake 
4 can emerge at any of the three levels of proximity to 
the potential act of violence.
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Brake 4a 
Resistance to generalizations about their opponents.
The de-humanization and essentialisation of one’s 
enemies have been identified as important enablers 
of violence (Leader Maynard & Benesch, 2016; 
Chirot & McCauley, 2006, pp. 81-87). By resisting 
generalizations about their opponents, group members 
can hinder such processes, giving rise to more nuanced 
assessments about the effectiveness or appropriateness 
of violence, in turn creating opportunities for the 
application of brakes 1b, 1c, 1e and, in particular, 2b. 
In the jihadi case, for example, al-Qaeda leaders’ 
challenging of straightforward sectarian categorisation 
of legitimate targets (al-Zawahiri, 2005; Rahman, 2005) 
created a requirement for further moral and strategic 
deliberation regarding targeting. In the extreme right 
case, distinctions made by some activists between far 
left militants and far left newspaper sellers precipitated 
a moral crisis for individuals after they attacked some 
of the latter (Lowles, 2014, p. 69). In the animal 
liberation movement, resistance to generalization about 
opponents is institutionalised as part of the ALF Credo. 
In some cases activists might even identify potential 
future allies among their ostensive opponents, thereby 
further disincentivising violence against those actors 
or those closely associated with them. Karagannis 
& McCauley (2006, p. 236), for example, describe 
how Hizb ut-Tahrir in Uzbekistan ‘concentrated its 
propaganda against President Karimov, while avoiding 
any extensive criticism against the armed forces’ and in 
doing so ensured that ‘a window of opportunity stays 
open for the group to approach members of the armed 
forces at a later stage’. 
Resisting generalizations about their opponents can 
also serve to make group members less likely to see 
their opponents as an existential threat because it 
makes them less likely to overestimate their opponents’ 
ability to harm them: where one perceives opponents 
to comprise multiple groups with competing interests 
and dispositions one is more likely to perceive ways 
in which they might be undermined or defeated. This 
can reduce the prevalence and intensity of the type of 
existential fears within the group that might be used to 
mobilise violence, and again create opportunities for 
the application of brakes such as 1e and 2b.
Brake 4b
Identification of segments of the public beyond 
their previously-imagined support base as potential 
converts to their cause.
Where activists identify segments of the public beyond 
their established support base as potential supporters, 
they are less likely to target them with violence. As Asal 
and Rethemeyer (2008, p. 248) explain, ‘[i]f members 
of the general population are viewed as potential 
converts to the cause … then the organization will have 
an incentive to be discriminating in its killing. If there 
is a clear dividing line between members and “others” 
… then ideologically there is no reason to discriminate 
when killing’. 
This brake intersects with brake 1b. As discussed 
there, it is likely to be particularly effective when there 
is substantial overlap between the perceived support 
base of the group and the perceived support base of 
their opponents. When this is the case, targeting the 
opponents’ supporters would also entail targeting 
their own potential community of supporters, and so 
would carry high strategic, and potentially also moral, 
costs (Stanton, 2015, p. 899), thereby also creating 
opportunities for the application of brake 2b. 
Brake 4b can emerge from activists’ assessment of 
empirical evidence or a priori from the categories 
through which they conceive of the world and their place 
within it. The extent to which group members do or do 
not conceive of sharp boundaries between themselves 
and the general public is likely to reflect the extent to 
which they find their views and the interpretive frames 
through which they understand the world articulated 
within more nominally mainstream discourses (Asal & 
Rethemeyer, 2008, p. 248; Kaplan 1995). 
In some cases such boundary softening between 
activists or militants and the ‘masses’ might also derive 
from fundamental philosophical principles e.g., about 
the importance of movements being inclusive or being 
led by ‘the people’ (Crenshaw, 1996, p. 252). Where 
this is the case, a shift towards vanguardism and the 
formation of militant cells can potentially expose the 
radical flank leaders to criticism from within the wider 
movement as they can be construed as failing to uphold 
the underlying principles of the movement, thereby 
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creating opportunities for the application of brakes 3 
and 2.
Brake 4c
Limited intra-movement pressure to ‘burn-bridges’ 
with social contacts outside of the movement or 
outside of the radical flank of the movement.
In most radical social movements, as with religious 
movements and sects, it is common for new recruits to 
loosen social ties with contacts outside the movement 
to some degree (Bjørgo, 1998, 2009; Lofland & Stark, 
1965; Wasmund, 1986). The greater the degree of 
loosening or cutting ties – of ‘burning bridges’ – with 
contacts external to the group the greater members’ 
social and emotional dependencies on the group will 
be. This can facilitate processes of intense socialisation 
(Bjørgo, 2009; Simi & Windisch, 2018, p. 11), 
increasing the degree to which their interpretation of 
the world around them will be shaped by the group; 
reducing personal obligations outside the group that 
could serve to undermine commitment to the group; 
and reducing the threat of being apprehended – all of 
which can favour violent escalation.
Limiting intra-movement pressure to burn bridges 
can inhibit these processes, curtailing ‘the distorting 
influences of isolation’ (Ackerman, 2003, p. 145). 
For example, where group members are not put under 
pressure to sever external ties they are more likely to 
be exposed to the opinions and, often, the critiques 
of the wider communities from which the group 
draws its support. 21 Knight et al., (2017, p. 8) provide 
some evidence for the importance of the maintenance 
of these ties, noting that within their sample ‘[s]
ignificantly more V[iolent] E[xtremists] [than non-
violent extremists] had deliberately disconnected from 
certain others.’ 
Groups are less likely to apply substantial pressure on 
members to loosen or sever their external ties when 
they do not identify as being strongly distinct from 
the broader communities from which they draw their 
support, or when they do not perceive a substantial 
infiltration risk.22
21 Kennedy (2011) highlights how strong ties outside of gang networks can be used to reduce gang violence, and Fiske & Rai (2015, pp. 269-275) also emphasise 
the importance of ‘cross-cutting ties’ in constraining conflict more generally.  
22 Conversely, bridge-burning is usually particularly intense in clandestine groups (della Porta, 2013).
Brake 4d
Expressions of reluctance to conceive of the state 
security forces as ‘the enemy’.
One of the arenas out of which radicalisation dynamics 
can emerge is the relationships between activists 
and state security forces (Alimi et al., 2015; Asal, 
Schulzke & Pate, 2017). Particularly under conditions 
of significant repression by the state, activists might 
come to see the state and the state security forces as 
opponents (della Porta, 1995; Earl & Soule, 2010).
This dynamic can be inhibited where there is an 
expressed reluctance within the group for such a shift 
to occur. Such reluctance might relate to strategic 
logics. Confrontation with state security forces carries 
substantial risks both in terms of attracting repression 
(relating to brake 1a) and undermining public support 
(relating to brake 1b) – in most liberal democracies 
confrontation with the state security services is likely 
to result in significant reputational damage among 
moderates and the general public. 
Reluctance to conceive of the state security forces as the 
enemy might also have ideological roots in some cases. 
For example, within much of the European extreme 
right, perception of the security forces as the enemy 
has been inhibited by perceptions of their underlying 
structural legitimacy. Even when state security forces 
are perceived to be acting unfairly, this is sometimes 
bracketed out by conceiving of individual members 
as acting out of duty, or even compulsion, rather than 
ideological conviction (Busher, 2013). Such ideological 
positions make it broadly inappropriate to target state 
security forces (brake 2b).
5.5 BRAKE 5
Organisational developments that either (a) alter 
the moral and strategic equations in favour of non- 
or limited violence, (b) institutionalise less violent 
collective identities and/or processes of boundary 
softening, and/or (c) reduce the likelihood of 
unplanned violence.
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Brake 5 works on organisational logics. As set out 
in the title of this brake, it relates to organisational 
developments that alter moral and/or strategic 
equations, institutionalise developments pertinent to 
brakes 3 and 4, or reduce the likelihood of unplanned 
or uncontrolled violence.
The effectiveness of brakes 5a-5d are all likely to be 
associated with the effectiveness of organisational 
leadership. We would expect brakes 5a-5d to be less 
effective in organisations experiencing ‘leadership 
deficits’ (Abrahms & Potter, 2015), or where groups 
explicitly adopted strategies of leaderless resistance 
(Chermak et al., 2013).
Brake 5a
Limited investment in capabilities to escalate 
violence, and/or development of capabilities to 
undertake strategies of action that either entail non- 
or limited violence or more controlled violence.
Brake 5a interacts with a number of other brakes. 
Perhaps most clearly, it works with brake 1e: where 
groups continue to invest in or seek to enhance their 
capabilities to undertake non-violent actions or actions 
that use only limited violence, then those actions are 
more likely to be carried out effectively, and group 
members are more likely to perceive themselves capable 
of carrying out such strategies of action.
Brake 5a can also work with brake 3 and with other 
elements of brake 1. As highlighted above, violence 
usually comprises only part of an organisation’s tactical 
repertoire. Continuing to invest in the development of 
capabilities to undertake non-violent actions or use 
only limited violence can inhibit shifts towards a group 
identity in which violence is more prominent. This in 
turn places pressure on group members to ensure that 
other areas of activity are not compromised by the 
violence of radical flank actors, and serves to bolster 
the position of more tactically moderate actors within 
the movement (brake 3c). For example, for the ANC 
the armed struggle was, between 1961 and 1990, 
conceived of as just one of four ‘pillars of struggle’, 
thereby ensuring that the use of targeted violence was 
not placed above other strategies of action (Dudouet, 
2012).
While investment in violent and non-violent capabilities 
are not necessarily a zero-sum game, in some cases 
investment in strategies of action requiring non or 
limited violence does lead the group, whether by design 
or default, simply not to be ‘particularly competent’ 
at practicing violence or escalating it further (Asal & 
Rethemeyer, 2008, p. 245). 
Groups that either seek not to use violence during their 
actions or who seek to use only limited or controlled 
violence might also develop capabilities that enable 
them to manage or control violence. Violence at 
demonstrations, for example, often occurs when 
activists suddenly have somebody in front of them that 
they can inflict violence upon as a result of a perceived 
vulnerability i.e., the sudden breaking down of a line, 
someone (an opponent, a police officer) falling down etc. 
leading people to rush forward and release their tension 
and apprehension through violence (Nassauer, 2016, p. 
515) – an instance of what Randall Collins (2008, 83-
133) calls ‘forward panic’. Groups might seek to reduce 
the likelihood of such unplanned violence in a number 
of ways, including by putting event stewards in place; 
appointing individuals to liaise with the police before 
and during the event; monitoring alcohol and drug use 
among activists; or by training activists not to ‘over-
react’ during periods of provocation (by opponents 
or state security forces) or panic (e.g., Busher, 2013; 
Waddington et al., 1989). 
In some cases an increased ability to control their 
violence can entail an apparent paradox: groups can 
reduce the amount of violence they carry out against 
civilians or non-combatants by developing capabilities 
that enable them to carry out more targeted and 
effective violence against their opponents. In Asal et 
al’s analysis of the impact of technical expertise with 
regards to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on 
patterns of violence carried out the Provisional IRA 
(PIRA), they find for example that ‘technical expertise 
within a brigade allows for careful IED usage, which 
significantly minimizes civilian casualties (a specific 
strategic goal of PIRA) while increasing the ability to 
kill more high value targets with IEDs’ (2015, p. 401).
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Brake 5b
Foregrounding more modest or intermediate 
objectives and de-prioritising revolutionary goals.
It is clear that revolutionary or ‘anti-system’ goals 
or frames do not always result in violence. Framing 
theory suggests however that ‘militant and anti-system 
frames’ can lend themselves to violent escalation 
(Karagiannis & McCauley, 2006, p. 324) because 
they encourage boundary hardening, encourage actors 
considered part of ‘the system’ to be conceptualised 
as part of ‘the problem’, and are well suited to the 
formulation of claims that the ends justify the means 
(thereby undermining the potential effectiveness of 
brake 2). 
Conversely, the de-prioritisation of revolutionary 
goals and the foregrounding of more modest or 
intermediate objectives (reduced migration rather 
than forced repatriation; improved conditions for 
farmed animals rather than the complete abolition of 
animal farming; winning elections; getting a particular 
mosque/synagogue/laboratory closed down etc) can 
inhibit violent escalation by, for example, making 
groups more likely to seek to operate within, even if 
ultimately aiming to transform, existing legal and 
political systems (thereby creating opportunities for the 
application of brake 4d), or making groups more likely 
to contemplate forging alliances of convenience with 
other groups with whom they might not previously 
have collaborated (thereby creating opportunities for 
the application of Brakes 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e, 3b, 3c, 4a and 
4b).23
Such foregrounding of more modest or intermediate 
objectives might be inspired, at least initially, by 
pragmatic evaluation of the strategic opportunities 
available, as exemplified by the BNP’s shift towards 
electoral politics in the 1990s (Annex B). It might 
also be associated with processes of ideological 
restructuring. In Nepal, for example, a ‘major 
ideological shift around 2001’ resulted in Maoists 
moving from a position of ‘seeking a communist 
one-party system to embracing competitive multi-
party democracy’, which ‘reoriented their programme 
towards introducing a new constitution, electing a 
new constituent assembly, and establishing a republic’ 
(Dudouet, 2012, p. 102).
23 Such combinations of brakes might have contributed to the pattern of violence observed by Chermak et al., (2013, p. 207) in which ‘Groups that focused on 
local issues were significantly less likely to be involved in violence compared to groups that had a broader, national agenda’.
Brake 5c
Construction and maintenance of spaces in which a 
range of activists that includes and extends beyond 
the radical flank are able to freely discuss tactics and 
movement objectives.
Spaces such as discussion boards, forums, magazines, 
meetings etc that enable free and open discussion 
among a rage of activists that includes but extends 
beyond the radical flank can help to anchor radical 
flank actors into wider movement cultures. Critically, 
they can also expose them to reticence within the wider 
movement about violent escalation. In some cases this 
can foment the kind of ‘prolific intra-movement debate’ 
and ‘a culture of discourse’ that, Ackerman (2003, p. 
145) argues, ‘can blunt or stall any momentum towards 
violence within the movement.’ 
It is likely that this brake will be more effective the 
greater the extent to which these spaces allow for 
critical and open discussion of tactics, and the greater 
the extent to which they attract activists from across 
the movement (i.e., they do not exclude or only attract 
activists from the radical flank).   
Such spaces might not be created with the objective of 
inhibiting violent escalation. In the case of the animal 
liberation movement, for example, Arkangel magazine 
was established by some of the more tactically radical 
members of the movement ostensibly as a means of 
achieving greater cross-movement unity. However, 
more moderate activists repeatedly used (and were 
allowed to use) the publication to challenge the adoption 
of more violent strategies of action and to criticise 
these tactics when they were deployed. In doing so they 
helped to maintain group norms that cast such tactics 
as illegitimate or inappropriate, relating back to aspects 
of brakes 2 and 3.
We might expect such spaces to be more commonly 
generated and maintained where activists perceive 
themselves to have wider constituencies with which 
to engage, implying potential synergies between this 
brake and brakes 1b, 4b and 4c.
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Brake 5d
Concerns among some group members that violent 
escalation will compromise their ability to shape the 
movement’s direction and/or negatively affect their 
position within it.
Any significant change in action repertoire has the 
potential to alter intra-movement relations. Movement 
elites in particular might seek to resist violent 
escalation if they perceive that escalation is likely to 
undermine either their position within or their ability 
to shape the movement (Crenshaw, 1996, pp. 255-257). 
In the extreme right case study, the BNP leadership 
identified that their investment in violent capabilities 
via the initial formation of C18 had not only tarnished 
their political capital but disrupted their organization 
and weakened their own ability to control their party. 
Having belatedly learned this lesson, Tyndall and his 
lieutenants made no further effort to re-invest in the 
party’s physical capabilities (Annex B).
Brake 5e
Concentration of energy on targeting movement 
rivals, leading to reduced capability to prosecute 
campaigns of violence against their external 
enemies.
Intra-movement rivalries are a common feature of most 
movements. In some cases such rivalries can give rise 
to radicalisation dynamics where competing factions 
become engaged in processes of outbidding (e.g., De 
Fazio, 2014). In some cases however they can act as a 
brake on violent escalation because the concentration 
of their energies upon internal movement rivals reduces 
the capacity and commitment of activists to focus their 
violence and aggression against external enemies (Simi 
& Windisch, 2018, p. 13). 
In the UK context, despite its pretensions as a 
revolutionary national socialist group, Combat 18 
became increasingly consumed by internal feuding 
and score settling, its violence increasingly directed at 
internal targets rather than external enemies, leading to 
a fratricidal murder and the group itself falling apart 
(Annex B). 
One question for future consideration concerns the 
conditions under which this type of intra-movement 
conflict saps energy and when it gives rise to outbidding 
dynamics.
35
concluSionS
BUSHER , HOLBROOK & MACKLIN
6. CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this project was to develop a 
descriptive typology of the internal brakes on violent 
escalation, that is, of the mechanisms through which 
group members seek to establish and maintain limits 
on their own violence and that of their fellow activists. 
In particular, we wanted to assess the possibility of 
developing a typology that can be used across a range 
of movements grounded in different ideologies and 
deploying different tactical repertoires, with varying 
degrees of violence.
We assess that it is possible to develop such a typology. 
As might be expected, we found that the distribution 
and prominence of brakes varied both across and 
within the three primary case studies used to develop 
and test the typology. For example, in the jihadi case 
study, concerns about public support (brake 1b) and 
constructions of morality (brake 2) are particularly 
prominent. In the extreme right case study, while moral 
brakes (brake 2) are not absent, here it is the logics 
of effectiveness (brake 1) that are more in evidence, 
particularly with regards to the BNP’s tactical 
innovation away from violence. In the case of the 
animal liberation movement, identification as a group 
that uses non-violent tactics or only limited forms of 
violence (brake 3) is more prominent than it is in either 
of the other case studies, although in the other case 
studies it is noteworthy that brake 3 comes temporarily 
to prominence at points when other more tactically 
extreme groups/individuals emerge from within the 
wider movements with which they are associated and 
actors within those groups experience greater pressure 
to differentiate themselves from more violent groups or 
factions. 
What is important for our purposes however is that 
(a) even within the radical flanks of the deeply violent 
jihadi and extreme right movements studied as part of 
this project (Annexes A and B, respectively), we were 
able to find instances of group members seeking to set 
and maintain parameters of ‘legitimate’ violence, and 
(b) across the three case studies and across the wider 
literature surveyed, we were able to identify broadly 
similar mechanisms being used in attempts to inhibit 
escalation of violence beyond established parameters. 
We found that a viable way of describing and 
categorising these brakes was to base their description 
and organisation in the underlying logics on which 
they operate: strategic logic, moral logic, the logic of 
ego maintenance, the logic of out-group definition, 
and organisational logic. We found that structuring 
the typology in this way offers a number of benefits: 
(a) it enables us to capture all of the practices that we 
identified as comprising examples of ‘internal brakes’ 
while limiting both the number of and overlap between 
categories; (b) it encourages a deep analysis of how the 
brakes work rather than simply describing the practices 
through which brakes are applied; and (c) in doing so it 
enables and stimulates analysis of how different brakes 
interact with one another (both in terms of potential 
synergies and mutual reinforcement, and in terms of 
contradiction).    
How then might this typology be used to support and 
strengthen academic and practitioner analyses of the 
dynamics of violence involving extremist groups? 
Deploying this typology is not without its challenges, 
above and beyond basic issues about access to data. 
First, it is important to emphasise that this typology 
should not be treated as a checklist. Rather, careful 
consideration is required about what the presence 
and/or prominence of these brakes within any given 
case study indicates. For example, does evidence of 
intense application of internal brakes indicate that 
violent escalation is unlikely to take place, or does it 
indicate that the action repertoire of the group under 
analysis is unstable and subject to extensive intra-
group contestation, or might it indicate that there is an 
emergent split taking place within a movement? All of 
these interpretations would appear to be viable.
Second, and as noted above, it can sometimes be 
difficult to decipher the intention behind the actions 
and comments that we might identify as an internal 
brake. To what extent are they, for example, simply 
performances of respectability intended to achieve a 
strategic advantage? To what extent would statements 
about the use only of limited forms of violence be 
backed up with sanctions in the case of somebody 
exceeding those limits? To what extent are the limits 
placed on violence within one group only put in place 
because they expect that an ally will do the violence 
for them? As such, any attempt to explore the internal 
brakes on violent escalation is likely to require well-
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contextualised analysis of data from multiple sources 
in order to limit the risk of arriving at the wrong 
conclusions.
Third, as with any analysis of processes of escalation, 
de-escalation and non-escalation, it is clear that we 
must be attentive to potential differences between 
how decisions are taken in the moment and post hoc 
rationalisations and justifications. The choice of and 
weight placed upon data sources should reflect this.  
And fourth, it is possible that some of the internal brakes 
are more likely to be evident in particular forms of 
communication than others e.g., on more or less closed 
forums, online or offline etc. It is possible in other 
words that the type of brakes being applied might partly 
be a function of the means of communication being 
employed. This could have significant implications for 
our ability to carry out cross-case comparisons or to 
assess how internal brakes within one movement have 
changed over time and what that actually means in 
practice, particularly if we do not have access to similar 
source materials across the different cases/periods.  
Each of these issues require careful consideration. 
Nonetheless, we believe that the descriptive typology 
set out above can provide a valuable vocabulary with 
which to undertake more systematic analyses of how 
actors within groups that engage in the use of illegal 
and/or violent strategies of action contribute to shape 
the parameters of their own violence. 
For academic researchers interested in the dynamics of 
conflict and political violence, it would appear to hold 
considerable potential for advancing and stimulating 
research into the as yet largely neglected issue of non- 
or limited escalation or of non- or limited radicalisation. 
For security, intelligence and law enforcement 
practitioners working on risk assessments, it might 
provide a further tool with which to identify indicators 
of the propensity towards and away from particular 
forms of violence by specific groups. And for security, 
intelligence and law enforcement practitioners 
undertaking interventions with extremist groups, it 
might be used to inform assessments of how externally 
applied counter-measures might interact with, and 
sometimes undermine, internal brakes.
We believe that the following questions are likely to 
provide particularly productive avenues of enquiry:
 y What are the conditions under which certain 
brakes, or configurations of brakes, are more or 
less likely to be effective?
 y How are the patterns and functioning of internal 
brakes affected by wider conflict dynamics and 
vice versa e.g., how do they affect and how are they 
affected by interactions between group members 
and state security services, opposition groups etc.?
 y How and why does the distribution of brakes vary 
across different groups and what, if anything, can 
this tell us about their propensity for violence?
 y How do the internal brakes on violent escalation 
operate at different points within waves or cycles 
of conflict.
Finally, there are a number of ways in which the 
typology itself might be developed going forward. One 
of the most obvious of these is to develop an additional 
dimension of the typology relating to the three levels of 
proximity to the potential act of violence: the campaign 
planning, action planning and situational levels. This 
could be used, for example, to facilitate more detailed 
description and analysis of internal brakes within 
specific case studies or as a tool to enhance cross-case 
comparisons.
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ANNEX A: TRANS-NATIONAL AND 
BRITISH JIHADI GROUPS FROM 2001 TO 2016
1. INTRODUCTION
The contemporary jihadi movement consists of a 
disparate set of actors who seek to employ what they 
see as religiously sanctioned lethal violence to defend, 
protect and promote what is regarded as sacred, to 
topple an existing order they perceive to be unjust 
and to replace it with a new social, legal and political 
construct which in their view reflects what the first 
generation of believers intended (Wagemakers, 2012; 
Lahoud, 2005; Hegghammer, 2011).
To many observers this particular realm, epitomised by 
acts of mass-scale indiscriminate violence and terrorist 
outfits such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(IS), is largely characterised by a seemingly limitless 
desire to kill, destroy and spread terror. Yet within this 
movement, there is entrenched disagreement about the 
extent, scope and nature of the violence that can and 
should be employed. Debates rage regarding the overall 
concentration of political activism more broadly and 
the interpretation and contemporary implementation 
of scriptural evidence that is used to legitimise 
violent means (Brown, 2007, pp. 8-9; Meijer, 2009; 
Wiktorowicz, 2005).
This case study will explore elements of the 
transnational discourse and local manifestations of 
jihadism within the UK, recognising that these are 
intertwined. The former concentrates on public and 
(at the time) private output from the leadership of al-
Qaeda. This organisation was chosen both because a 
large amount of data shedding light on its approach 
to violence is now available and because its leaders 
have had to confront questions about the appropriate 
levels of violence during several key junctures during 
its history, most recently with the rise of IS in Iraq and 
Syria. The public-facing part of this output stretches 
back to 2001, when al-Qaeda targeted the US using 
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hijacked planes. That year, memoirs from the group’s 
deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Knights under the Banner 
of the Prophet, leaked to the press. In them, the veteran 
jihadi reflected upon his experiences in Egypt where he 
had led a militant group before he decided to embrace 
transnational militancy, expressing regrets about some 
of the consequences for his violence. 
The internal discourse studied also includes letters 
written by al-Qaeda’s inner circle to the leader of its 
Iraq franchise, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, in 2005 warning 
him of the consequences of advocating excessive and 
sectarian slaughter. Zarqawi since developed his group 
into the organisational and ideological foundations of 
IS, the tactics of which have provoked debates among 
British jihadis locally. The remainder of internal 
documents scrutinised for this study were captured in 
May 2011 when US special forces stormed Osama bin 
Ladin’s compound in Pakistan. These revealed the al-
Qaeda leadership’s concerns regarding the tactics by so-
called affiliate organisations, including those operating 
in North Africa, as well as the actions of allied outfits 
such as groups identifying with the Pakistani Taliban. 
The letters were since translated and published by the 
US government. 
Actors more specifically associated with the United 
Kingdom are also scrutinised in order to gauge how more 
localised groups and cohorts reacted to developments 
on the global stage, especially the emergence of IS.24 
The UK provides the context for the other case studies 
scrutinised: the animal liberation movement and the 
extreme right, but has also seen the evolution of jihadi 
groups and cohorts involved in violence at home and 
abroad. These cohorts are both formal and informal. 
The current case study explores communication among 
individuals involved in an informal social network 
who were seeking to plan attacks in the UK, for which 
they were convicted in 2016. Members of this network 
discussed the purpose of their activism and their 
position within a wider milieu, including IS, via the 
encrypted social networking platform ‘Telegram’ and 
these deliberations are examined here.25
Whilst this group was actively supporting and 
participating in dedicated attack planning involving 
targets in the London area, members nonetheless 
24  For jihadi militancy in particular, an exploration of ‘internal brakes’ locally requires a broader assessment of transnational debates that have shaped the glob-
al discourse, since these are intertwined. Local activism does not exist in isolation of these broader debates. 
25  The transcripts of this correspondence were included in the court papers for their trial and made available following conviction
expressed some doubts about their participation in 
political violence and some of the expressions of violent 
Islamism that they had witnessed. These references are 
scrutinised below.
The case study also considers the approach of al-
Muhajiroun, a radical Islamist collective set up by 
Omar Bakri Mohammed which existed in different 
guises between 1996 and 2016, when key members 
were convicted for promoting terrorism. Al-Muhajiroun 
has played a prominent role on the UK radical Islamist 
scene. In relation to internal brakes, however, it is an 
especially intriguing example since it demonstrates 
how different types of brakes that appeared to be in 
place were gradually removed. I explore this element in 
more detail below.
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1.1 TIMELINE
Important debates in this case study about the need 
to resist adoption of greater violence for a variety of 
reasons have taken place on a global, strategic, stage 
that have impacted activism more locally. Local 
actors, in turn, do not exist within their own political 
or ideological vacuum. They identify with these 
transnational, movement-centric currents and seek 
to conform to the framework that they have created. 
The way to do justice to these debates, therefore, is to 
incorporate insights from local and global actors.
In order to provide necessary context and chronology in 
the briefest way possible to such a complex environment, 
the following figure 2 (below) plots key events relating 
to these interweaving stories on a timeline. 
This sequence includes key milestones in the 
evolution of al-Qaeda, the proliferation of its affiliate 
organisations and the emergence of IS. The timeline 
also pinpoints key events more specific to the UK scene 
that are relevant to the current case study.
2. AL-MUHAJIROUN 
AND THE REMOVAL 
OF BRAKES
Al-Muhajiroun (AM) represents a case where a social 
collective evolved from an indirect association with 
violent action to unambiguous endorsement of the most 
extreme forms of terrorist violence. It also represents a 
case whereby outer-tier members and associates became 
involved in terrorist activity whilst leadership largely 
managed to keep its distance and freedom to operate 
by remaining just within legal boundaries. Whilst 
organisational manifestations of the grouping, going 
by a variety of different names, were proscribed on 
numerous occasions, the collective managed to persist 
from 1996 till 2016 without key members ever being 
convicted for their association with terrorist activities. 
This changed in 2014 when leaders of AM endorsed 
IS and openly welcomed its authority over others. 
They were eventually convicted for inviting support 
for terrorism in 2016. The case of AM thus offers an 
interesting example worthy of further examination in 
relation to ways in which brakes did not take hold as the 
movement evolved. 
Figure 2. Timeline of key events.
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The operating principle of AM was to endorse 
campaigns of violence within a wider repertoire of 
radical action and provocation whilst avoiding direct 
association with those campaigns in order to avoid 
conviction. 
Speaking after the 2016 trial a senior police officer 
commented:
These men have stayed just within the law 
for many years, but there is no-one within 
the counter-terrorism world that has any 
doubts of the influence that they have had, 
the hate they have spread and the people 
that they have encouraged to join terrorist 
organisations. Over and over again we have 
seen people on trial for the most serious 
offences who have attended lectures or 
speeches given by these men (BBC, 2016).
AM was established as an independent group in 1996 
after its founder Omar Bakri Mohammed split from the 
UK chapter of the Islamist umbrella organisation Hizb 
ut-Tahrir (HuT) which he had led since 1986 (Klausen 
et al, 2012, p. 38). Under Omar Bakri’s leadership, 
AM assumed a more radical and provocative stance 
compared to HuT, advocating the creation of an Islamic 
state through armed uprising. Members underwent 
rigorous religious training and attended extensive 
seminars led by Omar Bakri and his aides. They 
organised provocative demonstrations to court media 
attention and used their heightened publicity to spread 
the group’s message via proselytising stalls and other 
outreach efforts. Followers were told to support jihad 
against infidels in Muslim lands and promote lethal 
violence as part of a broader political toolkit to achieve 
change (ibid).
Omar Bakri welcomed al-Qaeda’s double bomb attack 
in East Africa in 1998 (Wiktorowicz and Kaltenhaler, 
2006, p. 314; Connor, 2005, p. 121) and openly 
endorsed Osama bin Laden (Connor, 2005, p. 122). 
After the 9/11 attacks, AM co-sponsored a conference 
titled ‘A towering day in history’ at Finsbury Park 
Mosque and planned a subsequent event celebrating 
the ‘magnificent 19’, referring to the perpetrators who 
carried out the attacks (Wiktorowicz and Kaltenhaler, 
2006, p. 303).
Yet AM’s mission was still to retain its freedom to 
provoke without crossing the line where its leaders 
might risk facing prosecution. Omar Bakri had become 
a legal resident of the UK in 1993 and applied for 
citizenship on a number of occasions and clearly 
had every desire to remain in Britain (Connor, 2005, 
pp. 121-122). Whilst endorsing violence, therefore, 
the message the AM leadership communicated to its 
followers was ambiguous. The option was left open 
for AM leaders to argue that any association with 
individuals who identified with the group who had 
gone on to carry out acts of violence, whilst celebrated, 
was not a direct result of the group’s activism, which 
had a more multifaceted agenda. There was also at a 
strategic level absence of investment in violence per 
se, with emphasis placed on raising the organisation’s 
public profie (ibid). Other ‘brakes’ on violence could 
also be discerned at this stage in AM’s evolution.
After the outrage caused by its celebration of the 9/11 
attacks, AM leaders tried to stave off some of the 
harshest criticism by promoting the idea that a ‘covenant 
of security’ existed between Muslims in Britain and the 
state whereby the latter’s provision of services and a 
formal right to remain in the country meant that attacks 
could not be carried out on British soil for those who 
had entered into such arrangements with the authorities 
(ibid, pp. 126-127). The idea was ostensibly based on 
the group’s interpretation of scriptural evidence and 
the Prophet Mohammed’s experiences in dealing with 
non-Muslim tribes in Arabia, and had been employed 
by jihadists in the UK throughout the 1990s in order to 
fend off scrutiny that might jeopardise their existence 
(Peter and Ortega, 2014, p. 173). AM’s promotion 
of the ‘covenant’ did not equate to a renunciation of 
violence, which was still welcomed and supported 
abroad. Rather it articulated the stance that limited 
targeting would be a more feasible strategy for the time 
being. This mechanism is captured in the discussion 
below.
Indeed, by early 2005, and as the pressure on his group 
mounted, Omar Bakri began covertly and overtly to 
convey to his supporters his view that the covenant was 
broken and followers were now in the state of war with 
the UK. As Connor argues, (2005, p. 127), the fact that 
Omar Bakri no longer had an official organisation to 
protect, he abandoned the pragmatism of his covenant 
theory in favour of a more radical position. Omar Bakri 
left for Lebanon following the 7 July London bombings 
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in 2005 and British authorities prevented him from re-
entering the UK. AM limped on under different aliases, 
which were quickly proscribed by the Home Secretary, 
yet managed to maintain the organising principles of 
the original group. Anjem Choudary, Omar Bakri’s 
disciple and a trained lawyer, largely took over as 
leader of this collective and excelled at attracting media 
attention both in the UK and the USA through stunts 
and pronouncements that were largely focused on the 
envisaged establishment of an Islamic state (Kenney 
et al, 2013; Klausen et al, 2012). Yet rhetoric aside, 
including some thinly veiled if carefully articulated 
endorsements of violence, he never committed the 
group to any concrete measures to achieve this goal. 
This meant that any government attempts to proscribe 
various organisational manifestations of the collective 
were based on this rhetorical and provocative dimension 
of its output, rather than any more tangible association 
with violence. In November 2011, for instance, the 
Home Secretary ordered a ban on ‘Muslims Against 
Crusaders’, one iteration of the AM cohort, due to its 
supposed plans to organise a protest during Armistice 
Day commemorations. (Klausen et al, 2012, p. 50).
AM’s cautious approach to political violence, whereby 
they promoted and celebrated attacks while ensuring 
that this did not threaten the ability of leadership to 
operate,  makes it all the more intriguing that group 
leaders, including Choudary, decided after a meeting 
in June 2014 to declare their allegiance to IS (which 
then referred to itself as the ‘Islamic State’). Such 
overt recognition of one of the most notorious 
terrorist organisations of the time would undoubtedly 
risk far greater legal sanction, including through 
existing legislation concerning support for terrorist 
organisations, than the group had faced thus far. 
This begs the question, why were these caveats on the 
use of violence abandoned? There is no clear answer 
to this question, but three key interrelated factors seem 
particularly relevant. 
First, the decision came at the time when scores of 
people, including AM followers, had already pledged 
their allegiance to IS and travelled to Syria (BBC, 
2013; BBC, 2017). AM’s central message had always 
been to strive towards a hypothetical creation of an 
Islamic State. Now that many of its potential followers, 
radicals in the UK, had found an entity that had put 
these thoughts into practice, the AM leaders risked 
losing what little appeal, reach and purpose they had 
left. 
Second, researchers have always described AM as a 
multi-layered entity with several concentric circles of 
membership, with an inner core of dedicated followers 
and an outer layer of individuals inspired by some of 
its teachings (Kenney et al, 2013; Wiktorowicz and 
Kaltenhaler, 2006). With the establishment of IS’s 
‘caliphate’ and the fact that numerous individuals 
had ‘migrated’ (al-muhajiroun in Arabic refers to the 
migrants who left Mecca for Medina with the Prophet 
Mohammed) from the UK to Syria and Iraq, the inner 
circle within AM risked being overtaken by an outer 
circle ready to observe far greater commitment to a 
cause that the inner circle purported to promote. 
Third, given that the AM’s leadership modus operandi 
consisted largely of courting controversy to attract 
attention in the press, perhaps the rise of IS and the 
attention it received in the world’s media had made 
attracting headlines and media coverage through 
street demonstrations and publicity stunts harder to 
accomplish. 
The emergence of IS thus created a predicament for 
AM and its leadership. Choudary and other key figures 
in the group may well have decided that the least bad 
option amid this new reality was to risk crossing legal 
boundaries by endorsing the terrorist organisation, 
perhaps hoping that some notoriety and capacity to be 
heard would be retained following release from prison 
after the likely convictions that awaited them.
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3. INTERNAL 
BRAKES IN 
TRANS-NATIONAL 
AND BRITISH 
JIHADI GROUPS
3.1 BRAKE 1
Identification of non- or less violent strategies of 
action as being as or more effective than more 
violent alternatives.
Most of the brakes uncovered in material reviewed 
for the Islamist case study related in some way to 
strategic logics. This is partly due to the nature of 
data examined, which consisted to a large degree of 
senior leadership communication, public and private, 
about ways in which to shape the movement. But 
this prevalence of strategic issues also reflected the 
prominence of key debates within this milieu about the 
organisation of Islamist militancy more broadly. In this 
regard, questions were asked about ways in which to 
ensure militancy remained sustainable, about ways in 
which target prioritisation reflected strategic interests, 
and how the wider support of identified constituencies 
could be encouraged and retained. 
Brake 1a
Expressions of scepticism about their ability to beat 
their opponents in a violent struggle, including 
concerns that greater militancy will increase 
backlash or repression from opponents or the state 
towards them and their supporters.
Al-Qaeda’s leaders frequently alluded to the need to 
provoke an overreaction from its adversaries in order 
to rally support for armed confrontation against them. 
Such provocation was seen as part of its strategy. 
Yet at the same time, a delicate balance needed to 
exist between tactics that attracted the right sort of 
attention, without risking the operational viability of 
the organisation.
Al-Qaeda’s leaders spoke of strategic boundaries 
that needed to be respected in order to retain a level 
of fluidity and flexibility that that was needed for 
survival. This, in part, reflected their own experiences 
as leaders of al-Qaeda and other militant groups. Bin 
Ladin and other senior leaders, for example, came 
under considerable criticism for having overstepped 
the mark with the 9/11 attacks which prompted a war 
in Afghanistan that removed its safe haven (Lia, 2009).
These same leaders, in turn, later admonished the 
head of their Iraq franchise for expanding operations 
to Jordan, where his attacks resulted in a major 
government crackdown on Islamist groups in that 
country (and provoked a public outrage, see brake 1b) 
(Rahman, 2005).
Questions about the effectiveness of particular forms of 
violence sometimes involved efforts to resist a backlash 
from opponents that would adversely affect the interests 
of the movement. Al-Qaeda’s internal documentation 
revealed how leaders warned affiliates to refrain 
from escalating violence until they were prepared to 
deal with the consequences. Writing to his deputy in 
Yemen, bin Laden cautioned al-Qaeda’s affiliate in 
the region that “blood should not be shed unless we 
have evidence to show that the elements of success to 
establish the Islamic State [concept, not group]” (bin 
Laden, 2010b). This more cautionary approach to state-
building differentiates al-Qaeda from IS which ignored 
warnings about expanding and solidifying and the 
inevitable response such manoeuvres would provoke.   
Whilst these discussions were mostly concentrated 
in the outer circle of our framework, some of this 
correspondence could be placed closer to the middle, 
action planning, circle as specific advice was handed 
down to regional commanders in the Middle East and 
North Africa to ensure actions were in proportion with 
affiliates’ ability to deal with their consequences (Abu 
Yahya, 2009).
Target prioritisation also featured at this strategic level. 
Al-Qaeda spearheaded a policy that involved cutting 
off the “head of the snake” (al-Zawahiri, 2014).Bin 
Ladin laid out this strategic emphasis in a letter to one 
of his deputies using a different analogy:
The Ummah’s enemies today are like a 
wicked tree. The trunk of this tree is the US. 
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The diameter of this trunk is 50 centimetres. 
The branches of this tree are many and vary 
in size. The branches include NATO and 
many other organizations in the area. We 
want to bring this tree down by sawing it 
while our abilities and energy are limited. 
Our correct way to bring it down is to 
focus our saw on its American trunk. If we 
focus at the depth of the American trunk 
until we reach 30 centimetres, and then the 
opportunity presents itself for us to saw the 
British branch, we should not do so, as long 
as we have the ability to saw the American 
trunk. This would be distracting to our 
efforts and energy. If sawing continued into 
the depth of the American trunk until it falls, 
the rest will fall. (Bin Laden, 2010a).
Describing these strategic emphases as internally 
imposed limitations on the use of violence is perhaps 
inaccurate, but they nonetheless constitute efforts to 
channel force in particular ways in order to maximise 
its impact, thus avoiding a certain list of targets. 
On the UK scene, AM’s promotion of a ‘covenant of 
security’ may be seen in a similar way. This strategy 
was not underpinned by any moral concerns—indeed 
violence against a variety of targets was still celebrated 
abroad—but rather an effort to secure operational 
freedom for the group.
Brake 1b
Expressions of concern that violent escalation will 
undermine support for the group.
Sustaining public support for revolutionary change 
emerged as a central and prominent theme in the 
current case study. This involved concerns about 
acknowledging the parameters of violent action that 
appeared acceptable to perceived constituents, both as 
a general principle and as an imperative learnt from 
past mistakes.  
Leaders of al-Qaeda made several references to the 
importance of public opinion and their fear that 
certain tactics and types of violence might alienate 
key members of those publics whose support would 
be needed to sustain campaigns of militancy. There 
was acute realisation, especially in more recent public 
output, that some aligned militant groups had far 
exceeded what was considered appropriate form of 
resistance. “We would like to advise our brothers that in 
order to succeed any armed opposition must mobilise 
public support. Experience has shown that without this 
support combat does not turn into victory or success”, 
Ayman al-Zawahiri warned in a statement aired in 
April 2014 (As-Sahab, 2014).
A decade earlier, he tried to caution Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, then leader of al-Qaeda’s franchise in Iraq, 
against alienating the public by pursuing a campaign 
of sectarian targeting. Support from the masses was the 
“strongest weapon” the militants could wield, Zawahiri 
argued, and any action that they did not “understand or 
approve” would thus need to be avoided (al-Zawahiri, 
2005a). Another al-Qaeda commander issued a similar 
warning to Zarqawi, reflecting upon his experience 
from the civil war in Algeria:
Ask me whatever you like about Algeria 
between 1994 and 1995, when [the 
movement] was at the height of its power and 
capabilities, and was on the verge of taking 
over the government. […]. However, they 
destroyed themselves with their own hands, 
with their lack of reason, delusions, their 
ignoring of people, their alienation of them 
through oppression, deviance, and severity, 
coupled with a lack of kindness, sympathy, 
and friendliness. Their enemy did not defeat 
them, but rather they defeated themselves, 
were consumed and fell. (Rahman, 2005). 
Following a coordinated suicide bomb attack targeting 
hotels in Amman, Jordan, in November 2005 which 
Zarqawi ordered, Rahman (a.k.a. `Atiyatullah al-Libi) 
wrote to Zarqawi, urging him to refrain from such 
violence, not out of moral outrage but out of concern 
that the widespread public condemnation that resulted 
would jeopardise the movement’s ability to operate 
and become entrenched in the region (Rahman, 2005). 
Whilst the hotels were frequented by westerners, the 
attackers killed mostly Muslims, including scores of 
Jordanians attending a wedding party. People gathered 
in the streets following the attacks, chanting "burn in 
hell, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi!” and the public outrage led 
to the adoption of far more stringent counterterrorism 
policies within Jordan (BBC, 2005). 
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Zarqawi’s movement, as noted, eventually morphed 
into IS following outbreak of civil war in Syria. Several 
jihadi leaders have subsequently made similar analogies 
with loss of support for militants in Algeria, predicting 
the ultimate implosion of IS as their grassroots 
following evaporates due to the group’s violent excess. 
There have been other efforts to learn from past mistakes 
and feed these lessons back to affect the trajectory of 
the movement. Zawahiri reflected in his 2001 memoirs 
how his militant outfit in Egypt suffered widespread 
condemnation when it carried out an attack targeting 
an official which resulted in the death of a young girl 
who attended a nearby school (al-Zawahiri, 2001). 
Strategists’ concerns about limiting ‘collateral damage’ 
thus feature in this discourse too. Seized documents 
from bin Ladin’s Pakistan compound revealed how 
reflections from past mistakes were fed to the senior 
command which was concerned that botched targeting 
by affiliates was harming the appeal of their ‘brand’ 
(see e.g., Abu Basir, 2010).
Al-Qaeda’s existence stretches back to the end of the 
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. The attitude of senior 
leaders towards violence has thus evolved over a 
considerable length of time, resulting in further lessons 
being drawn to shape the movement. Encouragement 
for further or escalated violence has, in some cases 
been replaced with cautionary advice instead. 
In 2004, for instance, Zawahiri published a book titled 
The Scent of Paradise, extolling the virtues of suicide 
bombings, which he called ‘martyrdom operations’. 
Nine years later, after a deluge of suicide bombings 
had resulted in scores of civilian deaths, especially in 
Muslim countries, Zawahiri published a second edition 
of his book with a new introduction where he wrote:
this increase in martyrdom operations has 
been accompanied by some deviation and 
exaggeration which must be corrected and 
admitted to; some of the operations were 
undertaken under circumstances that did 
not justify sacrifice of the life of a Jihadist 
martyr; at times there were no precautions 
taken to try and protect innocent lives and at 
other times the target was the wrong one or at 
other times it was not in the general interest 
to undertake such an operation either due 
to the bigger damage it would have caused 
or because the general public would not 
understand its reasons and so they would not 
sympathise with the Jihadists which is our 
greatest victory (al-Zawahiri, 2013a).
Here, concern about public acceptance (brake 1b) is 
combined with moral norms about the moral limits 
of violence in terms of appropriate targeting (brake 
2b). Zawahiri’s hope was that these cautionary lessons 
would help generate a framework for militancy that 
would respect the perceived limits of the constituency’s 
appetite for violence, thus ensuring the sustainability 
of the revolutionary movement.  These concerns are 
primarily focused on ‘what works’ rather than ‘what 
is inherently right’, though these moral considerations 
(brake 2) certainly influence the former too. 
Brake 1c
Attempts to build or maintain ties with strategically 
useful allies who are not supportive of violent 
escalation.
No examples identified in this case study.
Brake 1d
Identification of political opportunities that favour 
(re)adoption of non- or less violent strategies of 
action.
No examples identified in this case study.
Brake 1e
Identification of non- or less violent strategies of 
actions that are perceived to be effective, including 
identification of ‘sufficient’ levels of violence.
Jihadi leaders’ attitudes towards non- or less 
violent campaigns, especially protests and street 
demonstrations have varied in the discourse assessed 
for this case study. Zawahiri, for instance, appeared on 
occasion to mock those who flocked to the streets to 
protest, rather than taking up arms. “Reform will never 
be realized through endless talk and chatter about the 
corruptions of America, or through hoarse shouting 
at demonstrations”, he noted in his first interview 
with al-Qaeda’s premier propaganda outlet, As-Sahab 
(Zawahiri, 2005b). Later, though, he called on all 
Muslims to “exploit all methods of popular protest, like 
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demonstrations, sit-ins, strikes, refusing to pay taxes, 
preventing cooperation with the security forces, refusing 
to provide the Crusaders with fuel, hitting traders who 
supply the Crusader forces, boycotting Crusader and 
Jewish products, and other ways of popular protest” 
(Zawahiri, 2006). During and following the Arab 
Spring uprisings in the Middle East, moreover, such 
calls for participation in public demonstrations became 
even more explicit, though they did not translate into 
organisational shifts or reprioritisation within al-Qaeda 
itself.
Bin Ladin, similarly called on citizens of Saudi Arabia 
to “stage public demonstrations and exercise civil 
disobedience until the overthrow of the traitorous 
governments” (bin Ladin, 2002). Al-Muhajiroun, as 
noted, recognised the value of street demonstrations 
and static protests too and even suggested these would 
bring rewards similar to those granted to warriors in 
battle.
3.2 BRAKE 2
Construction of moral norms and evaluations that 
inhibit (certain forms of) violence and the emotional 
impulses towards violence (e.g., revenge).
Moral restrictions and inhibitions on the escalation of 
violence were threads running throughout the material 
studied for this case. These were often woven together 
with other mechanisms that emerged and are delineated 
here, especially strategic concerns about the limits 
of public acceptance of violent means and the risk 
of provoking moral outrage within the constituency 
through badly executed or excessive violence (see 
above on brake 1b) that might, in turn, harden the state’s 
response (brake 1a). Debates about ‘just’ violence and 
targeting in particular separated groups like al-Qaeda 
from even more extreme organisations such as IS. Al-
Qaeda’s leaders made the case that targeting people 
due to their essence of being—such as the fact that they 
were Shia Muslims—was inherently wrong. 
Targeting had to be limited to particular actions 
perceived as hostile, though these could be stretched 
to include payment of taxes in the West, or working 
for government departments in Muslim-majority 
countries. Closer to action planning, in turn, doubts 
emerged among movement members about IS and its 
graphic display of violence and beheadings, which 
appeared to provoke shock and revulsion.   
Brake 2a
Articulation and performance of general moral 
norms and principles that problematise certain 
forms of violence, require violence to be justified or 
enable activists to forestall on entering the ‘tunnel of 
violence’ (e.g., the conception of violence as a tactic 
of last resort; positioning non-retaliation as a virtue; 
emphasising values such as mercy and compassion).
Actors on both the campaign planning and attack 
planning stages of our analytical schema (Figure 
1 in main body of the report) raised concerns about 
what was ‘right’ and morally correct without specific 
reference to any practical constraints that might emerge 
as a result of breaching moral codes. On the outer, 
campaign-planning level, these were frequently dressed 
in religious language and concerned the need to respect 
sharia law as a fundamental source of the movement’s 
legitimacy. In this regard, moral inhibitions were closely 
related to the group’s self-description of its mode of 
activism (see brake 3 in the next section). Concerns 
voiced closer to attack planning revealed more personal 
doubt about the paths chosen and the type of activism 
that would ultimately be accepted within the moral 
framework adopted. 
At the level of campaign planning, detailed 
communiqués were released denoting, effectively, 
the ‘laws of war’ that needed to be respected and the 
consequences, including compensation, if those laws 
were violated (bin Laden, 2007). Zawahiri addressed 
the topic in several statements, most notably and 
explicitly in 2013 when he issued his ‘General 
guidelines for the work of a jihadi’. Here he warned 
that certain forms of targeting were prohibited with 
reference to his interpretation of scripture. Following 
the logic of reciprocity, a prominent emotion used to 
legitimise killings in al-Qaeda’s discourse, violence, 
Zawahiri argued, would thus be limited to those groups 
whose participation—however remotely—in acts of 
aggression against perceived constituencies could be 
established (see brake 2b).
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Acts of terrorism, in turn, were presented as reactionary 
and defensive. People could not be wantonly killed 
simply by association with ideas or religious sects, 
irrespective of how erroneous they might be seen to be. 
Whilst the alleged heresy of the Shia, Sufis, Christians, 
Hindus and others ought, in Zawahiri’s mind, to be 
challenged, these groups could not be subjected to 
indiscriminate violence simply because of the way they 
chose to worship. Only those who were “engaged in the 
fight” could be targeted, Zawahiri argued (Zawahiri, 
2013b). This approach is radically different from the 
position adopted by IS and its followers where sectarian 
and confessional targeting, encased in dehumanising 
justificatory rhetoric, is openly promoted and practiced. 
Internal documents, by extension, reveal the al-Qaeda 
leadership’s concern that affiliates and allies were 
not operating within the boundaries of permissible 
combat (unknown author, unknown date). In a letter 
to a sub-commander from 2010, for instance, bin 
Ladin, expressed his objection to the fact that Faysal 
Shahzad, who attempted to detonate a car bomb in 
Times Square that same year, had proceeded with 
attack planning despite being granted US citizenship. 
His oath of allegiance to the United States meant that 
he had accepted and entered into a covenant with his 
host country which he was not permitted to break. “We 
do not want the Mujahidin to be accused of breaking a 
covenant”, bin Ladin warned (Bin Ladin, 2010c).
Closer to the action planning scope of our analysis, 
where members of a UK cohort involved in attack 
planning conversed on Telegram, specific concerns 
emerged about jihadi militants who were seen to have 
gone ‘too far’ and breached moral codes which these 
individuals felt needed to be respected. At one point 
a member warned that the beheadings carried out by 
IS in Iraq and Syria were “completely contradictory 
to the Sunnah”, the way of the Prophet. Beheading 
people “in this crazy manner” and “parading them” 
was not normal. “Having little kids hold their heads is 
not normal”, “taking pictures with [their] heads isn’t 
normal”, he exclaimed. Other members of the group 
conceded: “Yeah beheading needs to be addressed”, 
one of them commented (HM Courts and Tribunals 
Service, 2016). 
As a result of IS’s excess, therefore, there was doubt 
about its legitimacy within this group. Some pointed 
out that scholars, including those who identified with 
the jihadi militants, disapproved of the group and its 
declaration of a ‘Caliphate’. Others suggested that its 
leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was not the universal 
commander of Muslims that he purported to have 
become. 
Brake 2b
Identification of some groups of actors as 
illegitimate targets for violence.
As moral reasons were given for proportionality in 
infliction of violence and legitimacy featured strongly in 
activist self-depictions (brake 2), the logical extension 
of these arguments was delineating groups that were 
seen has having limited culpability for the grievances 
that were being addressed. 
Internal documents from the Abbottabad compound, 
for instance, revealed how the al-Qaeda leadership was 
keen to protect those westerners who had expressed 
sympathy with the group’s cause and warned other 
jihadi militants to ensure they would not be targeted 
(bin Laden, 2011). 
Zawahiri’s ‘General Guidelines’, cited above, set 
out moralistic reasons for discriminate violence and 
identified swathes of people, divided by sect, religion, 
nationality and other criteria, who, it was argued, could 
not be targeted without reference to specific actions, 
since their association with legitimate targets was too 
peripheral or the degree to which they could be held 
accountable was too remote. This, we should be clear, 
has not been a static topic as far as al-Qaeda’s discourse 
is concerned. Zawahiri and others within the group’s 
leadership, expended considerable effort to justify an 
expansion in targeting that included vast swathes of 
the public, including tax payers in the West, who in 
turn were killed in indiscriminate attacks which the 
leadership orchestrated and sponsored. 
Latterly, however, the focus, partly with the rise of IS, 
has been on limiting violence and identifying groups 
of people who cannot or should not be targeted. Much 
rests on notions of intent. Sectarianism, as noted, did 
not dictate al-Qaeda’s targeting principles, for example. 
There was concern, at the campaign planning level 
of our analysis, of the ‘innocent’—both Muslim (in-
group) and non-Muslim (out-group)—and regret about 
‘collateral’ damage, as noted above, was referenced 
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and revisited in the public discourse to shape the future 
trajectory of the movement. 
Similar caveats shaped both public and private 
correspondence from the al-Qaeda leadership, where 
effort was made to direct local campaigns of violence 
spearheaded by affiliates and allies. “Beware of killing 
innocent people”, bin Ladin warned in a statement 
addressed to militants in Iraq in 2004 (bin Ladin, 
2004b). Similar concerns had been voiced internally 
and communicated within the movement, as letters 
captured from bin Ladin’s compound later revealed, 
especially concerning the targeting of Muslims—
irrespective of sect or denomination—in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan by forces identifying with the Taliban (bin 
Ladin, 2010d).
In a few public statements, meanwhile, especially 
during the polarising rhetoric surrounding the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003, al-Qaeda sought to make it clear that 
not all governments were culpable for the in-group’s 
grievance. In October 2004, for instance, bin Ladin 
issued a statement titled ‘Letter to the Americans’ 
where he dismissed George W. Bush’s charge that al-
Qaeda was against freedom and universally recognised 
notions of liberty. If this was the case, bin Ladin 
asked, why did al-Qaeda not attack Sweden, a neutral 
country? (bin Ladin, 2004a). The point, again, was that 
culpability could be traced to specific harmful actions 
of targets, not their essence of being.
3.3 BRAKE 3
Self-identification as a group that is either non-
violent or uses only limited forms of violence.
Identity logics incorporated both elements of strategic 
and moral logics in the way in which group members 
sought to present themselves and their activism. 
Combatants were presented as merciful or respectful of 
codes of conducts, such as covenants of security, whilst 
rewards for alternative (non-violent) forms of activism 
were recognised. At the same time, some activists 
sought to distance themselves from or criticise actors 
who were seen to have displayed excessive violence 
that could not be justified. 
Brake 3a
Production of group narratives that emphasise 
non-violence or the limited use of violence either by 
themselves or by those they claim have inspired their 
movement.
As noted above, legitimacy and proportionality 
(including notions of reciprocity) was key to the way in 
which al-Qaeda’s leaders could present their group as 
occupying the moral high ground, leading an uprising 
against forces that were fundamentally unjust and 
immoral. Such justifications were also central in their 
public outreach efforts, ‘selling’ their mode of combat 
to the perceived constituents.
This projection of al-Qaeda operatives as morally 
superior actors uncovered some implicit brakes to 
violent escalation as a result, especially through 
reflections and accounts about the movement’s activism 
that were articulated to illustrate the permissible scope 
of combat. 
In his eulogy for bin Ladin, for instance, Zawahiri 
reflected how his predecessor as leader of al-Qaeda 
had apparently respected a ceasefire with enemy forces 
seeking to occupy the Tora Bora mountain range in 
Afghanistan, and even ordered his men to desist from 
exploiting opportunities to ambush the enemy when 
they presented themselves.
Osama bin Ladin (may God have compassion 
on him) cared about complying with what he 
agreed to. In Tora Bora, after agreeing to 
ceasefire, about a hundred of the hypocrites 
fell in[to] the ambush of the mujahidin. He 
just needed to order the mujahidin to open 
fire on them and kill them, but Sheikh Osama 
bin Ladin ordered his brothers to let them 
out of the ambush and to not shoot a single 
bullet. After agreeing to a ceasefire, some 
of the mujahidin attacked the hypocrite’s 
position and took some spoils. The Sheikh 
[Osama] ordered them to return what they 
took (Zawahiri, 2011a).
Brake 3b
Disassociation from more violent groups or factions 
and/or association with less violent groups or 
factions.
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The excesses displayed by Zarqawi’s Iraqi franchise, 
as noted above, caused such concern within al-Qaeda’s 
leadership circles that they reached out to him both 
publicly and privately, seeking to convince him to 
rein in his violence, especially in terms of sectarian 
targeting. Captured documents from the Abbottabad 
compound also revealed bin Ladin’s concern about his 
group’s association with networks such as the Pakistani 
Taliban who had orchestrated indiscriminate attacks 
against civilians in Pakistan.
With the rise of IS, Zawahiri and others, moreover, 
have condemned the former as a splinter organisation 
that displayed excessive violence that was not in 
proportion or responsive to the nature of the threat they 
were facing. 
At a more local level, closer to involvement in nascent 
acts of violence, we see in the Telegram debates 
among the UK youths, that there was discomfort about 
the excesses of IS, as noted above, which provoked 
discussion about groups that were more justified in 
their actions, as I discuss in more detail in the section 
on allies, below. 
Brake 3c
(The threat of) sanctions for activists who advocate 
or undertake violence beyond the established 
parameters of the group’s action repertoire, and/
or opportunities to achieve intra-group respect and 
prestige without undertaking or encouraging the 
use of violence at or beyond the parameters of the 
group’s action repertoire.
In terms of prestige positions, AM leaders celebrated 
‘jihad of the tongue’, i.e., proselytising, and ‘jihad of 
the sword’, meaning violence, as part of its activism 
and encouraged—even demanded of— followers 
to become involved in such activities. Crucially, 
they argued that individuals who supported militant 
campaigns at home, either vocally or financially, would 
reap the same rewards as those who travelled abroad to 
fight, as discussed. Street protests, it was argued, were 
also part of this armed struggle since they served to 
demoralise the enemy (see brake 1e) (Mohammed, no 
date). Furthermore, followers were invited to “motivate 
people for the jihad verbally and through the internet” 
and appreciate such communicative acts as part of the 
broader activist experience (In Connor, 2005: 123). In 
terms of sanctions, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, as noted 
above, was reprimanded on repeated occasions for 
his sectarian killings and large-scale bomb attacks 
that resulted in Muslim deaths, both since these were 
inherently wrong (moral logics) and counterproductive 
(strategic logics).
Brake 3d
Circulation of limited expectations that they will be 
involved in greater levels of violence.
No examples identified in this case study.
3.4 BRAKE 4
Boundary softening in relation to putative out-
groups (e.g., opponents, opponents’ perceived 
supporters, the general public or state actors).
Logics of identity concerning relations with external 
actors were much less prominent in the material studied 
than identity logics concerned with ego maintenance. 
Still, efforts at the level of campaign planning within 
al-Qaeda especially, were made to define and redefine 
non-Muslim populations as non-hostile entities and 
even, in some cases, as potential allies.  
Brake 4a
Resistance to generalizations about their opponents.
Sectarianism offers an example of al-Qaeda’s outlook 
being far less based on generalizations and notions 
of alleged inherent qualities compared to the stance 
adopted by IS and its followers. Shia Muslims in al-
Qaeda’s rhetoric, are—holistically—depicted as 
ignorant and misguided, whilst justifications for their 
targeting are based on more tangible acts which in turn 
justify a response in kind.
Given al-Qaeda’s preference for presenting violence in 
defensive terms, as a reaction to a set of circumstances 
and processes put in place by adversaries, whilst their 
approach to state building and societal creation has 
at least some elements of inclusivity, dehumanising 
references are not nearly as common in its rhetorical 
output compared to other jihadi actors more aligned 
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with IS and its thinking.26 References to adversaries, as 
noted above, have not been static in al-Qaeda’s discourse 
over time, and perhaps bear closer resemblance to a 
spectrum rather than clear or stable characterisations. 
References to Christians are especially ambiguous. 
Whilst Zawahiri has condemned vast swathes of Coptic 
Egyptians and even though al-Qaeda has repeatedly 
denounced the Pope and other Christian figures, some 
references to followers of the Christian faith describe 
misguided human beings, rather than inherently impure, 
subhuman or polluting beings, which means they are 
not seen as priority targets. References to other faiths 
in this discourse, meanwhile, especially Judaism, are 
invariably derogatory in the extreme. In an extensive 
essay, published in 2008 as a rebuttal of a former 
Egyptian militant’s criticism of al-Qaeda, Zawahiri for 
instance accepted that not all Christians were equal, and 
that some had resisted an alleged alliance between Jews 
and Crusaders, whilst seeking to mend relationships 
among Arabs (Zawahiri, 2008). Zawahiri reiterated 
this point in several statements addressing Egyptians 
in the aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’ uprisings that 
spread from Tunisia in late 2010 and again as leader 
of al-Qaeda after the rise of IS, which has embarked 
on a far more widespread campaign against Arabs 
whose religious interpretations differ from their own 
(Zawahiri, 2011b).
Brake 4b
Identification of segments of the public beyond 
their previously-imagined support base as potential 
converts to their cause.
Despite its self-depiction as a vanguard fighting 
on behalf of religious believers, al-Qaeda’s public 
communiqués have also appealed to the “world’s weak 
and oppressed”, irrespective of faith, and also, on 
occasions, contained explicit invitations to Islam, thus 
presenting conversion as part of their benchmark of 
success (Zawahiri, 2007). This reflected the ideals and 
myths of ancient Muslim military campaigns, which 
al-Qaeda and other contemporary jihadists purported 
to recreate. Moral boundaries of legitimate combat, 
therefore, were inherently tied to the groups’ self-
identification. 
26  Zarqawi, IS’ ideological forefather, for instance, was far more explicit in his calls to target Shia Muslims in Iraq directly, referring to them in derogatory terms, 
than al-Qaeda’s leaders. Zawahiri, then deputy commander of al-Qaeda, admonished his erstwhile subordinate in Iraq for this prioritisation, warning him that 
wholesale targeting of Shia communities in Iraq was both counterproductive and lacking in historical precedent, an essential marker of the apparent legitimacy of 
contemporary Islamist militant campaigns that were presented as following the Prophet’s example. See Zawahiri (2005).
Brake 4c
Limited intra-movement pressure to ‘burn-bridges’ 
with social contacts outside of the movement or 
outside of the radical flank of the movement. 
No examples identified in this case study.
Brake 4d
Expressions of reluctance to conceive of the state 
security forces as ‘the enemy’.
No examples identified in this case study.
3.5 BRAKE 5
Organisational developments that either (a) alter 
the moral and strategic equations in favour of non- 
or limited violence, (b) institutionalise less violent 
collective identities and/or processes of boundary 
softening, and/or (c) reduce the likelihood of 
unplanned violence. 
Fairly little evidence concerning organisational 
logics was found in the material studied, with the 
exception of examples at the action planning stage 
whereby individuals came to the realisation that their 
preparedness for violent activism—ideological as 
much as physical—was insufficient or needed to be 
addressed. 
Brake 5a
Limited investment in capabilities to escalate 
violence, and/or development of capabilities to 
undertake strategies of action that either entail non- 
or limited violence or more controlled violence.
Limited capabilities emerged particularly on the 
second—action planning—circle of our inquiry. Two 
themes from the Telegram chat group conversations in 
this regard seemed particularly relevant: one concerned 
an ambiguity about roles and how activism could be 
channelled and fulfilled, and the other concerned 
general lack of preparation for violent activism.
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The former is related to muddled conceptualisations of 
‘fighter’ put forward by AM and similar organisations, 
where, at times, it was suggested that those who 
protested, or voiced support for activism online or 
through other channels of communication, were 
militants in their own right, and could even reap similar 
esoteric rewards (see brake 3c). In the Telegram group, 
one key member, as mentioned above, claimed that 
he had pledged allegiance to the leader of IS, Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi. He did not, however, associate any 
immediate obligations with this role and claimed he 
could continue his studies as long as they fell within 
what was sanctioned by IS. As this group of youths 
inched closer to putting their plans in action to carry 
out acts of violence on the streets of London, doubts 
emerged among members about their knowledge 
and preparation. One member complained that they 
had talked about jihad so much they had neglected 
other aspects of their faith and failed to gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of their religion. Gaining 
knowledge, it was felt, would be a prerequisite to further 
involvement in activist roles, in order for these efforts 
to remain sincere.  
Lack of capabilities, of course, can greatly limit the 
impact of violence and inhibit its escalation, even if key 
participants are willing to do so. It is hard to trace al-
Qaeda’s relative inaction on the global stage in recent 
years to any particular causal elements, though lack of 
resources, networks and other capabilities would seem 
to have played a role. 
On a more granular level, moreover, we see resource 
deficits playing out in different ways. Whilst jihadists 
have demonstrated how easy it is to carry out a 
violent attack, using knives or vehicles for example, 
the Telegram conversations reveal concern about less 
tangible capabilities, including cognitive dimensions 
whereby insufficient preparedness includes a lack 
of understanding of the theological context of 
battle. Gaining such knowledge is seen as a sign of 
commitment, and by extension, of having the right 
intensions before participating in violence.
Brake 5b
Foregrounding more modest or intermediate 
objectives and de-prioritising revolutionary goals.
No examples identified in this case study.
Brake 5c
Construction and maintenance of spaces in which a 
range of activists that includes and extends beyond 
the radical flank are able to freely discuss tactics and 
movement objectives.
No examples identified in this case study.
Brake 5d
Concerns among some group members that violent 
escalation will compromise their ability to shape the 
direction of the movement and/or negatively affect 
their position within the movement.
No examples identified in this case study.
Brake 5e
Concentration of energy on targeting movement 
rivals, leading to reduced capability to prosecute 
campaigns of violence against their external 
enemies.
Internal quarrelling, debates, even admonishment of 
members of the in-group featured in the examples 
cited above. Whilst in these cases, this may not have 
amounted to debilitating feuds that ultimately sapped 
any capacity for violence, or directed it inwards, such 
dynamics clearly exist within the wider jihadi universe. 
The dramatic rift on a strategic level between al-Qaeda 
and IS, the latter emerging as an autonomous entity 
after splitting from al-Qaeda, has sent shockwaves 
throughout this universe, with sympathisers and fans 
online expressing confused loyalties, debating merits 
of both camps or calling for unity among fighting 
‘vanguards’. These sentiments all featured on the 
Telegram chat logs analysed here.
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4. SUMMARY
This case study incorporated transnational actors 
seeking to develop or sustain campaigns of jihadi 
militancy globally, as well as local actors—both 
established and informal—who operated within the 
UK. 
These two geographic perspectives were combined 
because the debates, doubts and approaches to violence 
within this ideological context are intertwined: local 
actors respond to developments within the transnational 
jihadi movement which in turn seeks to adapt to new 
local realities. 
The most significant development within this milieu 
in recent years is undoubtedly the emergence of IS 
as a terrorist entity fighting in local wars in Syria 
and Iraq as well as sponsoring militant campaigns 
and attacks abroad. IS has displayed and promoted a 
level of violence that exceeds the established norms 
of this radical flank: both in terms of the breadth of 
targeting, based on sectarian justifications and large-
scale denunciation of Muslims, and the nature of the 
tactics employed. 
This rise of a new and more aggressive terrorist entity 
has provoked different reactions among other players 
in this field with implications for our understanding of 
internal brakes. 
This case study has illustrated how al-Muhajiroun, 
traditionally cautious in its promotion of militancy, 
became more overt in its support for terrorism and 
embraced IS and its methods, whilst IS’s competitor 
on the global stage, al-Qaeda, emphasised the need for 
restraint and to respect limitations on the use of force, 
for strategic and moral reasons. 
We also catch a glimpse of the impact the rise of IS has 
had on the grassroots through examination of private 
discussions within an informal network of British 
youths seeking to become involved in violence. 
Whilst some members of this group expressed their 
support for IS others recoiled when they viewed some 
of their more graphic media content and expressed 
their dismay that violent tactics had been used against 
individuals they deemed innocent. 
The rise of IS thus serves as an illustrative example of 
the way in which new developments within a particular 
radical flank can play out differently among actors 
with respect to attitudes towards violence, including 
prospects of its enhanced or diminished scope.
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ANNEX B:  
THE BRITISH EXTREME RIGHT IN THE 1990S
1. INTRODUCTION
Following its disastrous showing in the 1979 general 
election, the National Front (NF), the principal engine 
of anti-immigration agitation during the 1970s, 
collapsed, imploding amidst personal recrimination 
and factional struggle. NF chairman, John Tyndall, 
a hard line national socialist activist demanded 
autocratic control from the party’s National Directorate 
as the only means of arresting the party’s ongoing 
disintegration. When the National Directorate refused, 
Tyndall resigned in high dudgeon and in April 1982 
founded the British National Party (BNP), a small 
national socialist organization that styled itself as 
the last bastion of racial rectitude in a profane and 
culturally decadent world. Tyndall ruled the BNP as 
his personal fiefdom in accordance with the strictures 
of the führerprinzip. Following the NF’s strategy, the 
BNP staged numerous provocative marches designed 
to win both publicity, recruits, and ultimately power, 
with the aim of replacing democratic government with 
authoritarian dictatorship. In reality, however, for the 
majority of the 1980s the BNP was a marginal group, 
operating more as a ‘street gang’ than a fully-fledged 
political party. Tyndall’s authority as leader rested, 
in part at least, upon his political past as a racial 
revolutionary, his activities during the 1960s earning 
him convictions for paramilitary activity and firearms 
offences as well as assaulting a police officer, the latter 
particularly jarring for him given his subsequent efforts 
to cultivate a more orthodox ‘patriotic’ demeanour. 
The extreme right was not the only ideological 
tendency to undergo a political transformation after 
1979. Following the collapse of the NF, the Trotskyist 
Socialist Workers Party (SWP) took the decision 
to wind-down the Anti-Nazi League (ANL). It also 
undertook to decommission the ‘squads’ – cadres of 
activists whom it had utilized to defend ANL activities 
from attack. Superfluous to its newly emergent political 
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priorities, the SWP expelled numerous ‘squadists’ 
from the party altogether (Renton, 2006, pp. 169-173). 
Without a political home, many of these, predominantly 
working class, activists bandied together to found a new 
group in late 1981, Red Action (RA). These activists 
represented a section of the SWP ‘who refused to 
accept that electoral performance was the only indices 
by which to measure fascist activity or success, and 
who therefore advocated a more proactive response to 
fascists, most of whom were intent on returning to a 
strategy of street level rebellion’ (Hayes, 2014, p. 230). 
Initially RA had been content to confront extreme right 
activists on a ‘pragmatic basis’. This changed in June 
1984, however, after a contingent of skinheads attacked 
an open-air concert in Jubilee Gardens organized by the 
Labour-controlled Greater London Council to protest 
Conservative cuts and unemployment. Thereafter, RA 
began developing its own ‘mobile combat unit’ that 
moved beyond defending left-wing events and meetings 
to undertake offensive violence against the extreme 
right (Hayes, 2014, p. 231). 
The following year, on 28 July 1985, RA became one 
of the core components of Anti-Fascist Action (AFA), 
a broader alliance of militant and moderate left-wing 
groups who coalesced around the principal of opposing 
a resurgent extreme right-wing street movement. 
Tensions between the “liberal” and “militant” wings of 
the organization led to the group splitting in 1989. It was 
relaunched shortly thereafter by several ideologically 
disparate left-wing and anarchist groups, all unified 
by a single objective: militant physical and ideological 
opposition to the extreme right (Hayes, 2014, pp. 237-
38). 
From 1985 onwards, AFA and the extreme right activists 
were embroiled in numerous violent encounters at a 
variety of venues up and down the country for over a 
decade. Initially, AFA had attacked skinheads associated 
with the remnants of the NF before moving to target the 
Blood & Honour nazi music network through a series 
of violent confrontations at the rendezvous points for its 
gigs in Hyde Park (May 1989) and at Waterloo Station 
(September 1992). AFA activists also targeted shops 
in central London that served as outlets for extreme 
right-wing merchandise, which further undermined the 
network’s capacity to function. 
27 Spearhead, May 1989.
Despite a repertoire of violence that could include the 
use of bottles, bats, iron bars, chains, and CS gas, against 
their opponents, anti-fascist activists and extreme right 
activists generally demurred from upgrading to guns, 
though C18 reportedly used firearms to threaten and 
intimidate internal rivals. Use of knives was a more 
notable feature of extreme right violence, anti-fascist 
activists highlighted. The choice of weapons, which 
helped enshrine the ‘normal’ and indeed expected 
parameters of violence, was underpinned both by 
moral objections to killing and political calculations 
as to the level of violence required to close down an 
extreme right meeting or march, which stopped short 
of lethality. 
These concerns, combined with conceptions of 
activist risk (i.e., arrest and imprisonment), and the 
internalization of developments in the legislative and 
policing environment which severely limited ‘casual’ 
opportunities to engage in lethal violence, served to 
inhibit lethality. 
There were outliers where actions exceeded these 
norms. Persons unknown firebombed the home of 
Leicestershire BNP organizer John Peacock in 1989.27 
In November 1990, a crude explosive device was sent 
to an AFA meeting in Whitechapel (Birchall, 2010, p. 
209). During 1992 unknown perpetrators committed 
arson attacks against several left-wing premises in 
London (i.e., the Morning Star offices in April and 
May) and the West Midlands (i.e., the Democratic 
Left in August and the Sandwell Unemployment and 
Community Resource Centre in November). However, 
these remained relatively isolated events and did not 
give rise to sustained campaigns of violence marked by 
tactical escalation.
For numerous reasons, in the midst of this ongoing 
pattern of violent interaction, leading BNP organisers 
began questioning the utility of violence as a strategy 
for advancing their political aims. In 1990 the BNP 
had begun to concentrate its limited resources on its’ 
nascent ‘Rights for Whites’ campaign in London’s 
east End – a slogan adopted by the NF in the 1970s 
but used by the BNP ‘to neutralize the Nazi “smear” 
through local contact and thereby establish the BNP as 
a legitimate defender of local white residents’ (Copsey, 
2008, p. 57). The launch of the ‘Rights for Whites’ 
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campaign dovetailed with a series of promising local 
election results in Tower Hamlets during the course of 
that year which culminated, ultimately, with the party 
winning a local council seat on the Isle of Dogs in 
September 1993. 
Such results engendered a transformation in how the 
BNP practiced politics. Following an encouraging 
20% of the poll in a local by-election in Millwall, and 
reflecting the evolving reality on the ground, Tyndall 
issued a memorandum to party organisers stressing 
the need for a new (community-orientated) approach 
that would enable the BNP to distance itself from 
‘street-gang politics’ and ‘stake its claim in the serious 
political arena’. AFA responded to this by focusing 
increasingly upon countering BNP activities leading 
to an intensification of violent street conflict. The 
political progress of the BNP in London’s east End 
also led the SWP to relaunch the ANL whilst another 
group, the Anti-Racist Alliance, also emerged during 
this period. AFA perceived that these groups aimed 
simply to ‘protest’ rather than ‘stop’ the extreme right. 
Its response, argues Copsey, ‘was to differentiate itself 
from this competition by further emphasizing its 
physical mettle’ (Copsey, 2011, p. 128). 
AFA’s ongoing campaign led the BNP to upgrade its 
own tactical response to AFA’s assault upon the group. 
In late 1992 the BNP formed its own ‘Steward’s Group’ 
to protect its meetings and leadership as well as to meet 
the anti-fascist challenge offensively too. Those who 
comprised the BNP Stewards’ Group soon adopted the 
name Combat 18 (C18), its numerology signifying their 
ideological proclivities: 1 = A. 8 = 8. AH = Adolf Hitler. 
Initially at least C18 was controlled by the BNP through 
their Chief Steward Derek Beackon, a malleable figure 
dependent for direction upon the local BNP leadership. 
C18 quickly began operating autonomously of the 
BNP, however. Its emergence coincided with a ‘crisis 
of authority’ in Tyndall’s leadership. Following the 
‘false dawn’ of the BNP electoral victory on the Isle of 
Dogs – the seat was lost several months later – younger 
militants in particular, whose hopes had perhaps been 
raised by the initial victory, became disillusioned with 
Tyndall’s leadership, some rejecting ‘politics’ as a 
waste of time. This added to the allure of C18, which 
was styling itself as a revolutionary vanguard preparing 
for an inevitable ‘race war’. 
28 British Nationalist, March 1994.
C18’s emergence, and its subsequent history, implies 
a weakening or undermining of the internal brakes on 
violent escalation amongst a section of extreme right 
activists during this period. As the two groups began 
pulling apart BNP leaders made overtures to C18, 
hoping to restore their control over the party’s wayward 
progeny. Increasingly, however, local BNP organisers 
identified C18’s violent activities as detrimental to 
the party’s electoral ambitions, and to the party itself, 
which was beginning to hemorrhage younger activists to 
C18. Tensions increased as C18 abrogated to itself the 
right to ‘punish’ several key BNP organisers associated 
with the party’s increasingly influential ‘modernizing’ 
faction for a range of perceived transgressions. As the 
breach widened, C18 refused to protect the BNP from 
anti-fascist militants e.g., once, when AFA attacked 
BNP activists, one militant appealed to C18 activists 
drinking in a nearby pub for help. ‘The BNP can go and 
fuck themselves,’ came the reply, to laughter. ‘They 
said that they didn’t need us, well that’s fine by us. Fuck 
off and tell them that’ (Lowles, 2014, p. 54). 
Ultimately, however, C18’s departure from the BNP’s 
direct political orbit helped the party prioritise its 
electoral strategy, putting it on the path away from 
violent street conflict. The BNP organisers’ conference 
on 29 January 1994 unveiled a new ‘hearts and minds’ 
strategy based upon local community politicking. 
This strategic reorientation implicitly recognised 
that the traditional ‘march and grow’ strategy, 
predicated upon controlling the streets as a precursor 
to wielding political power, had not only failed, it had 
been counterproductive to its political goals. Richard 
Edmonds, himself recently jailed for violence disorder, 
counselled activists in the run-up to the local elections 
that: ‘Now that the BNP was enjoying much higher 
levels of support, it was important to behave in a 
responsible and restrained manner, to prove that the 
BNP was a serious political party worthy of electoral 
support’28. This new direction was publicly unveiled at 
a press conference in April, announcing there would 
be ‘no more marches, meetings, punch-ups.’ BNP 
organizer Tony Lecomber subsequently acknowledged 
that one of the reasons for abandoning confrontational 
street politics ‘was because it hindered our political 
progress, and that was the only thing holding our 
extreme opponents together… not that such brawls 
were of the party’s making, but the party invariably 
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got the blame… and it harmed us politically. Which is 
primarily why the party has left that sorry excuse for 
politics behind for good.’29 
There were dissenting voices with regards to this 
strategy. Even during the midst of the ‘Rights for 
Whites’ campaign the party newspaper asserted ‘a party 
like the BNP must first win power on the streets if it is 
to achieve power at the ballot box’.30 Tyndall himself, 
whilst recognizing the political expediency of his 
party’s new approach, was never really convinced that 
marches and demonstrations were ‘politically counter-
productive’.31 Future BNP chairman Nick Griffin also 
lambasted the ‘over-moderation’ of BNP modernisers 
– whose approach implied a challenge to Tyndall’s 
authority – and declared that it was more important for 
the BNP ‘to control the streets of a city than its council 
chamber’.32
Continued clashes between anti-fascists and extreme 
right militants throughout this period served to 
obscure the fact that from 1994 onwards the BNP was 
beginning to de-escalate its violence and to develop 
a new ostensibly non-violent tactical repertoire. This 
reflected, in part, a tactical recognition that it could 
not compete with its opponents on the streets. Indeed, 
despite efforts by the BNP leadership to pivot away 
from street confrontation, if anything the violence 
intensified in the short term since party activities 
remained the focus for ‘direct action’ anti-fascism. 
Indeed, AFA continued its unwavering campaign ‘to 
destroy all semblance of fascist presence in public 
spaces – pubs, clubs, halls, streets – and to clear fascists 
out of working class areas’ (Hayes, 2014, p. 238). In 
April 1994, a parcel bomb sent to the BNP headquarters 
by persons unknown injured the BNP activist who 
opened it. That same month its Newnham election 
candidate lost an eye when AFA attacked him whilst he 
was out canvassing. The following month anti-fascist 
activists attacked BNP press officer Michael Newland 
in his home.33 The following summer the BNP head of 
administration had his home raided by a gang of men 
who stole three computers.34 
29 Spearhead, December 1997.
30 British Nationalist, January 1993.
31 Spearhead, September 1999.
32 Spearhead, February 1996.
33 Spearhead, May 1994 and Spearhead, June 1994.
34 Spearhead, August 1995.
This ongoing campaign of sustained violence 
against BNP activists had a profound psychological 
impact upon the extreme right. As one AFA militant 
observed: ‘By the end of 1994 you could really see 
the difference. AFA turned their perception of the Left 
from a laughing stock into a serious and somewhat 
sinister inevitability’ (Birchall, 2010, p. 309). The 
impact of being regularly ‘out violenced’ by AFA left 
an ‘indelible mark’ (Copsey, 2011, p. 128) and was an 
important factor in cementing the BNP’s decision to 
remove itself from the arena of violent contestation. 
This tactical revision also reflected the party’s strategic 
understanding of the political opportunity represented 
by the ‘white backlash’ against ‘multiculturalism’ 
within 'white working class' enclaves, which it believed 
it could exploit if only it could successfully reposition 
itself. Removing itself from the immediate sphere of 
violent political contestation (i.e., street activity) also 
deprived anti-fascists of the opportunity for direct 
action against the BNP. ‘This would drain AFA of its 
lifeblood,’ noted historian Nigel Copsey, ‘while also 
denying the “controlled media” the opportunity to hold 
the BNP responsible for violent disorder’ (Copsey, 
2011, p. 129). 
The decision to recalibrate the party’s political priorities 
and ergo the tactical repertoire employed to realise 
these goals did not reap immediate dividends, however. 
The party had already lost its seat in Tower Hamlets 
and within four years, its electoral support within the 
borough had slumped (Copsey, 2008, p. 51). This 
decline was attributable, at least partly, to the ongoing 
ructions with C18 which drained the party’s electoral 
campaign of momentum, undercutting the political 
dividend that its strategists had believed would accrue 
to the party if it absented itself from street violence. 
During the course of 1994, the escalating violence 
attributed to C18 certainly served to tarnish the 
rebranding efforts of its political parent. In December 
1994, Gerry Gable, editor of the anti-fascist Searchlight 
magazine, received a letter bomb. The following 
month C18 activists firebombed the home of an ANL 
activist in Gravesend, Kent. Police raids on the homes 
of several C18 militants that month led them to seize 
bomb-making manuals, instruction books for snipers, 
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and documents highlighting the group’s surveillance 
of targets including journalists who had worked on a 
World in Action expose of its activities. It is impossible 
to know how serious the intentions of this group were 
but police raids ended the possibility for action. 
In seeking to counter C18’s influence amongst the BNP 
rank-and-file, Tyndall had to tread a fine line between 
his own desire for political legitimacy and alienating 
those younger militants who provided the party with its 
physical muscle. Having failed to negotiate the group’s 
return to the fold Tyndall attempted to reassert his 
authority, and therefore apply a brake on the milieu’s 
drift towards violent escalation, by proscribing C18 
in December 1995. In practice, however, Tyndall 
encountered difficulties enforcing his writ. Many BNP 
activists simply ignored the prohibition, reflecting a 
crisis in Tyndall’s authority. 
After physically demarcating the boundaries between 
the two groups, Tyndall turned to re-establishing his 
own authority and the party’s hardline ideological 
reputation. C18’s militant example had tarnished both. 
In doing so, Tyndall again had to tread the tightrope 
between excusing violence and simultaneously 
restraining its possibility. The challenge and promise 
of reconciling these two countervailing tendencies, 
militancy and moderation, was particularly evident 
during the 1995 BNP annual rally. Tyndall’s guest 
speaker, invited for his symbolic value, was William 
Pierce, leader of the National Alliance (NA) the most 
prominent national socialist group in the United States. 
Pierce was infamous as the author of The Turner 
Diaries, a fictionalized account of revolutionary race 
war that had inspired numerous militants on their path 
to committing acts of racial violence and terrorism. 
Importantly, however, Tyndall sought to co-opt Pierce’s 
status not his strategies, which he did not believe were 
applicable in a British context. 
Though C18 enjoyed an exaggerated reputation 
regarding its capabilities, the group’s violent 
‘revolutionary’ potential dissipated, reflecting its 
immersion in other conflicts beyond the purely 
political. Having sought to build bridges with Loyalist 
paramilitaries, C18 leaders quickly lost their initial 
interest in the Northern Irish conflict, activists focusing 
more on football violence. Several leading C18 figures 
became consumed by settling scores with anti-racist 
football fans at Chelsea and, thereafter, with internal 
rivals who objected to its takeover of the profitable 
Blood & Honour nazi music network. Increasingly 
entrained upon its internal rather than external 
opponents, internal power struggles consumed 
C18. Indeed, when Will Browning’s faction of C18 
embarked upon a terrorist campaign, which involved 
a Danish activist sending a series of letter bombs to 
England, several of the devices were sent to internal 
rivals or racial targets rather than political enemies 
like AFA. Acrimonious personal, political, and tactical 
disputes reached their murderous denouement in 1997 
when the C18 leader, Charlie Sargent and another 
activist Martin Cross, killed a fellow member, Chris 
Castle, a close friend of Sargent’s factional rival, Will 
Browning. Rather than leading to a spiral of violence, 
however, the ‘moral shock’ that the murder generated 
within the milieu served as a brake upon further 
violence as seasoned activists, disillusioned by the 
experience, walked away from the endeavor causing it 
to break-up.   
The most obvious example of the internal brakes upon 
violence appearing to fail occurred two years later. In 
April 1999 David Copeland, a former BNP member 
who had drifted out of the party and into the National 
Socialist Movement (NSM), a group that had evolved 
from C18, embarked upon a terrorist campaign in 
central London. For thirteen days, between 17 and 
30 April, Copeland conducted a nail bomb campaign 
against London’s black, Asian, and LGBT communities 
in Brixton, Brick Lane and Soho. His final attack upon 
the Admiral Duncan pub in Soho killed three people 
including a pregnant woman and her unborn child. 
Copeland had hoped that his terrorist campaign would 
trigger a ‘race war’ that would propel the BNP to 
victory. 
That Copeland acted alone signals his isolation from 
some of the broader moral and strategic norms that 
predominated within the milieu. Though he had been 
a part of the wider ‘movement’ Copeland was more of 
an isolated outlier rather than an integrated insider and 
was out-of-step with BNP electoral strategy even whilst 
he perceived his actions to be aiding it. Even those on 
the movement’s militant flank ideologically attuned 
to Copeland’s racist, insurrectionary fantasy made no 
effort to emulate his violence. In fact, several of its 
leading ideologues condemned Copeland’s violence, 
albeit for a variety of different moral and tactical reasons 
than those activists aligned with the BNP. Rather than 
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offering a defiant justification for Copeland’s terrorism 
even the NSM, which had given rhetorical support for 
the type of action he had undertaken, disbanded shortly 
after the moment police identified him as a suspect. 
Whilst the radical flank of the movement often acted 
to frustrate the application of internal brakes upon 
violence that the BNP were attempting to apply in 
order to advance their political goals through the ballot 
box, it also had its own direct and indirect mechanisms 
for limiting violence, which are discussed in greater 
detail below. Whilst numerous instances of these 
internal brakes weakening or failing to be applied 
successfully can be found, ultimately, the BNP was 
successful in repositioning itself outside of violent 
street contestation, though in some respects this appears 
to have been a result of happenstance rather than cold 
political calculation. After all, the de-escalation and 
non-escalation of political violence takes place within 
a broader relational field that is beyond the scope of this 
case study to address. That said Tyndall’s overarching 
decision to commit the party to an electoral strategy 
during the early 1990s leading to its ‘modernisation’ 
and, ultimately, to the transformation of its fortunes 
during the 2000s would not otherwise have been 
possible had party leaders not attempted to negotiate 
and apply a range of moral, strategic and tactical limits 
on violent escalation. 
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2. INTERNAL 
BRAKES ON 
VIOLENCE 
WITHIN THE 
BRITISH 
EXTREME RIGHT
2.1 BRAKE 1
Identification of non- or less violent strategies of 
action as being as or more effective than more 
violent alternatives.
Brake 1a
Expressions of scepticism about their ability to beat 
their opponents in a violent struggle, including 
concerns that greater militancy will increase 
backlash or repression from opponents or the state 
towards them and their supporters.
Extreme right testimonies frequently recognize that 
with regards the planning and implementation of 
violence, they lacked the capacity to out-violence their 
opponents on the streets. AFA’s ‘practised caution’ and 
‘fastidious attention to detail’ (Birchall, 2010, p. 277) 
when it came to planning violent actions application of 
violence outranked that of the extreme right. ‘We didn’t 
have the cunning or precision planning and execution 
of the red hit-squads, who seemed to emerge from the 
shadows like magicians with large smiles and iron bars,’ 
remarked former NF activist Matthew Collins (2011, p. 
42). ‘The worst of the lot, total scum. When you bump 
into them, you know it’s a fight for survival,’ was how 
another activist described Red Action (Searchlight, 
1993, p. 21). 
Other accounts highlight that at the action planning 
level they lacked the political discipline to do so. C18 
leader Steve Sargent highlighted the role of pub-culture 
as an inhibiting factor with regards the preparedness and 
professionalisation of political violence. ‘We never had 
spotters, the Reds did but we didn’t,’ Sargent remarked. 
‘We always lagged behind in things like intelligence. 
The Reds were always better at that sort of thing. More 
to the point, no-one wanted to be out of the pub. Who 
wants to stand around on a street corner looking for 
Reds when you could be beering it up’ (Lowles, 2014, 
p. 17). Such observations about how high levels of 
alcohol use inhibited their ability to undertake more 
organized violence have a parallel with Simi and 
Windisch’s observation about how drug and alcohol 
use among white nationalists in the USA has hindered 
possible transition from street violence towards mass 
casualty terrorism (as opposed to the role of alcohol as 
a facilitator of opportunistic, racist violence) (Simi & 
Windisch, 2018, pp. 10-11).   
Such realistic appraisals of their capabilities were 
partly informed by the fact that some activists simply 
did not identify as ‘revolutionaries’, linking to brake 3. 
Regarding his own party, the NF, one former activist 
recalled: 
We had a lot of tough talkers, lunatics and 
hard nuts but we hardly ran large-scale 
terrorist operations. We took, on the whole, 
a voyeuristic and occasionally helpful 
interest in our colleagues’ violent terrorism 
and occasionally the odd idiot got himself 
caught playing with a gun in his bedroom 
or back garden, but we were responsible for 
little more state subversion than perhaps a 
gang of third division football hooligans. 
We were criminally inclined pub brawlers 
and occasional drunken racist attackers, but 
it was not as if we had organised the Poll 
Tax riots or London bombing campaigns 
like some of our opponents on the Left 
had. Politically, we were little more than a 
poorly organised pressure valve built around 
obsessive personality cults. (Collins, 2011, 
p. 237). 
Some NF activists were also aware that the shrinking 
size of their organization, which diminished as the 
fortunes of the BNP and C18 increased, reduced 
their own capacity for increased violent militancy. 
‘The NF was no longer big enough, strong enough or 
capable enough to pull off such stunts… Without even 
the numbers for a punch up the entire day had been 
a disaster,’ noted the same activist following a failed 
demonstration in Rochdale in 1989 (Collins, 2011, p. 
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68). This assessment of the group’s capabilities led 
to a wider recognition that in comparison to the more 
ideologically militant BNP, the NF lacked even the 
basic resources ‘to go into areas where some minor 
tensions existed and use them to their advantage’ 
(Collins, 2011, p. 95).  
The belief that increased militancy will increase the 
risk of a backlash or repression from the state towards 
them or their supporters has also served as a powerful 
inhibitor on the escalation of extreme right violence. 
Whilst conspiratorial anti-Semitic politics can have a 
radicalising impact, they could also act as a brake on 
action; exerting a dampening effect, tactically, because 
the paranoia they were capable of producing amongst 
adherents could cause a paralysing effect upon militant 
action. 
This is observable, for instance, in conspiratorial 
interpretations of Searchlight. The investigative anti-
fascist magazine ‘cast a huge shadow over everybody’s 
confidence,’ noted Collins. ‘Even in meetings attended 
by very few people there was a suspicion that even among 
our closet and most trusted comrades one of us was 
“selling out”’ (Collins, 2011, p. 189). Those activists 
favouring a militant response against the magazine 
and its staff remained hesitant for fear that ‘Mossad’ 
– the Israeli secret service – would institute lethal 
retaliation against them.35 On one occasion when C18 
leader Will Browning planned to attack Gerry Gable, 
the Searchlight’s editor, with a hammer, he ‘didn’t have 
the opportunity to use it as he was convinced that the 
two men [Gable’s minders] were carrying weapons of 
their own.’ Browning’s own paranoia appears to have 
contributed to his inaction on this occasion (Lowles, 
2014, p. 142). 
Fear of arrest and incarceration also caused C18 
activists to self-censor on occasion. Whilst preparing 
the third issue of Combat 18, an 88-page racist and anti-
Semitic tirade containing bomb-making instructions 
and a hit list providing readers with the names of left-
wing activists Will Browning had written ‘Kill ‘em 
all’ next to them. ‘The original draft had included the 
names and addresses of 300 MPs, something Charlie 
Sargent had removed in a fit of panic’ (Lowles, 2014, 
p. 121). Similar articulations of risk were evident in 
the aftermath of a (failed) C18 letter bomb campaign 
35 Respondent B1, anti-fascist activist expert interview. 
in 1997 when activists were already feeling the 
pressure from the authorities. When the C18 leader 
Will Browning began planning another bombing 
campaign in 1998, he travelled with another activist to 
visit Germany to discuss the idea; his fellow activists 
were ‘unhappy’ with the idea believing that C18 ‘had 
attracted too much attention for them to get away with 
it. Much better, they argued, to lie low for now. Though 
unconvinced, Browning was forced to accept’ (Lowles, 
2014, p. 305). 
Even within the radical flank, leading activists 
understood that violence alone would not win the day, 
not least because groups like C18 and the NSM lacked 
the capability to enact an enduring violent campaign, 
at least for the time-being. David Myatt, a leading 
‘theoretician’ involved in both groups, recorded, 
In article after article, in letter after letter, 
in discussion after discussion, I warned of 
the danger and urged people to uphold the 
values of honour, loyalty and duty. I also 
urged them to consider that the best way 
forward was a proper National-Socialist 
organization and to forget plans and talk of 
an imminent armed insurrection, for - as I 
had discovered from practical experience 
the time was not yet right for such plans: we 
needed the people first, properly motivated, 
in their thousands, and we had but dozens. 
(Myatt, 2013).
Brake 1b
Expressions of concern that violent escalation will 
undermine support for the group.
The comparative success of the BNP ‘Rights for 
Whites’ campaign from 1990 onwards fed back into 
the application of brake 1b at the campaign planning 
level. BNP ‘modernisers’ were increasingly aware that 
the party’s reputation for violent activism and racist 
politicking might be detrimental to its future progress, 
repelling those East End voters who, they recognized, 
might be receptive to its anti-immigration platform but 
not the aura of violence and thuggery that surrounded 
its activities. Aware that its reputation as a violent street 
gang put a ceiling upon the level of support it might win 
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at the ballot box the party invested in trying to build 
what has been called a ‘reputational shield’ (Ivarsflaten, 
2006) to insulate it against accusations of racism and 
violence in order to help it reach out to the wider 
public. To this end the BNP propaganda handbook, 
Spreading the Word, sought to provide activists with 
the arguments and skills necessary for persuading the 
public of the righteousness of its cause, linking to brake 
5a, which relates to building capabilities that involve 
non-violence or limited violence.  
Brake 1c
Attempts to build or maintain ties with strategically 
useful allies who are not supportive of violent 
escalation.
There was only limited evidence of this in the 
extreme right case study. The NF chairman Ian 
Anderson – though less so his activists – was keen 
to build strategically usefully alliances with right-
wing conservatives and to do so sought to redefine 
his party as a more respectable ‘anti-immigration’ 
party rather than a violent skinhead movement during 
this period.  There is no evidence that this strategy 
met with any particular success. This aspiration 
presumably influenced Anderson’s determination 
to uphold a ‘non-confrontation policy’ so as not to 
alienate those allies he perceived might find his ‘anti-
immigration’ stance appealing but would be repelled 
by violence. Whilst this served to an extent as a brake 
upon violent escalation within the NF, the party’s 
perceived ‘lack of confrontational ambition’ (Collins, 
2011, p. 200) displaced a section of its activist base 
into the movement’s radical flank (i.e., C18), which, 
by comparison, was uninterested in building links with 
allies who were less supportive of violent escalation. 
Both here and with regards the BNP above, the 
presence of radical flank actors made it difficult to 
apply brakes because those drawn to violence had an 
outlet for such actions. 
Brake 1d
Identification of political opportunities that favour 
(re)adoption of non- or less violent strategies of 
action. 
36 Spearhead, August 1983.
37 http://www.spearhead.com/0209-ib.html [Accessed 24 January 2012]. 
During the 1980s, it seemed that political opportunities 
for the extreme right were decreasing, as immigration 
slid down the list of ‘salient public concerns’. When 
Margaret Thatcher gained power in 1979, 16% of the 
populace considered the issue important. When she 
was re-elected in 1983 this figure had slumped to just 
3% and even when John Major was elected in 1992 the 
figure had only risen to 5% (Goodwin, 2010, p. 42). 
Following Margaret Thatcher’s re-election in 1983 
extreme right ideologue Colin Jordan perceived that 
the electoral route to power was no longer an option, 
and began advocating for the adoption of various forms 
of leaderless resistance or cellular activity. It is worth 
noting however that whilst such violent stratagems are 
common intellectual currency on the extreme right, this 
does not mean that they will automatically be adopted 
(Dobratz & Waldner, 2012, pp. 49-66). Indeed, having 
debated Jordan’s strategies, Tyndall agreed that an 
electoral route to power was closed, but rejected the 
adoption of violent anti-State militancy, opting instead 
to invest in developing the movement, sitting things out 
until political climate became more favourable.36 
The 1990s appeared to herald new political 
opportunities, however. Locally, in London’s East 
End, the ‘white backlash’ against ‘multiculturalism’ 
was beginning to suggest to party strategists that there 
might be a way forward. The pages of Spearhead and 
British Nationalist, the BNP ideological journal and 
the party’s newspaper respectively, actively identified 
this as representing a political opportunity. A series 
of promising by-election results in the area reinforced 
this belief. The BNP’s victory in the Isle of Dogs in 
Tower Hamlets in September 1993 enshrined within 
the party’s leadership cadre the idea that the type of 
electoral politicking implied by its ‘Rights for Whites’ 
campaign could reap reward, encouraging them to 
invest party resources in this direction which led away 
from rather than towards violence. 
The adoption of non-violent strategies was a matter 
of political possibility rather than morality, however. 
Tyndall rejected the idea of armed insurgency for 
numerous reasons not least of which was that it 
would not succeed in Britain (as he knew from prior 
experience).37 This did not mean that he rejected 
violence out of hand. He acknowledged that it could be 
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valid as a tactic within other national contexts. Indeed, 
when debating the violent strategies of William Pierce, 
leader of the National Alliance in the United States, 
Tyndall denied his strategies were applicable to Britain 
but conceded that ‘were I in Dr. Pierce’s shoes I may 
well favour doing exactly what he is doing’ (Tyndall, 
1994).
Brake 1e
Identification of non- or less violent strategies of 
actions that are perceived to be effective, including 
identification of ‘sufficient’ levels of violence beyond 
which further escalation is deemed unnecessary.
The BNP ‘Rights for Whites’ campaign is a case in 
point and has been discussed in detail above. Initially 
considerable violence marked the BNP campaign (i.e., 
Weavers Field) but as the strategy began to win electoral 
support and its potential became evident – not least 
through increased votes and membership enquiries – 
party activists internalised the need to move away from 
violence, forcing their political opponents to follow 
suit since the former arenas for political contestation 
were being curtailed. Whilst the detail of this strategy 
is beyond the scope of this case study, its overarching 
impact contributed to a further de-escalation of violent 
street conflict. However, it might also be noted that 
Derek Beackon’s election in September 1993 only 
provided the BNP with a model of ‘success’ that acted 
as a brake on violent escalation within the milieu for a 
short period of time. When Beackon lost his seat the 
following year a growing number of activists drifted 
into C18, which rejected public support as a measure 
of ‘success’. 
Anti-fascists and the extreme right alike also 
made political calculations, underpinned by moral 
objections to killing and personal codes of honour 
as well as the ‘routine’ nature of street fighting itself, 
that the escalation of violence to greater levels was 
simply unnecessary when it came to closing down an 
opponents’ march or meeting. Quite simply this was 
achievable without resort to lethal methods. 
38 Copes, Hochstetler & Forsyth (2003, pp. 761-794) elaborate upon ‘a code of violence as part of a system of order and honor as articulated by a network of 
White, working-class males in a southern U.S. city who participate in bar fights.’ Their findings suggest ‘the code these men use prohibits predatory violence, puts 
exclusive limitations on situations that warrant violence, and constrains the level of violence in a fight.’ 
2.2 BRAKE 2
Construction of moral norms and evaluations that 
inhibit certain forms of violence and the emotional 
impulses towards violence (e.g., revenge).
Brake 2a
Articulation and performance of general moral 
norms and principles that problematise certain 
forms of violence, require violence to be justified or 
enable activists to forestall on entering the ‘tunnel of 
violence’ (e.g., the conception of violence as a tactic 
of last resort; positioning non-retaliation as a virtue; 
emphasising values such as mercy and compassion).
Moral norms mitigating against the application of 
greater levels of violence, or the use of a particular 
form of violence, emerged throughout the case study. 
Studies of extreme right-wing violence have highlighted 
that many activists adhered to a broad set of moral 
‘norms’ and ‘codes’ that dictated their targets, choice 
of weapons, and the level of violence that was either 
warranted and indeed justified. As Simi and Windisch 
(2018) have highlighted elsewhere, the general moral 
norms and principles that problematised certain forms 
of violence are similar to those governing bar room 
brawling or fighting on football terrace, both of which 
extreme right activists are familiar with.38 Memoirs 
and journalistic accounts of extreme right violence 
highlight that even the most violent activists functioned 
in accordance with personal moral codes, however 
erratic these sometimes were. One NF organizer 
with a reputation for violence was described as, ‘the 
sort of bloke who would help an old lady across the 
road, turn the corner and punch somebody else to the 
ground’ (Collins, 2011, p. 40). Similarly, one leading 
C18 activist was observed to possess ‘a rigid, though 
unconventional, sense of honour’ (Lowles, 2014, p. 
51).  
These moral injunctions against a certain form of 
violent escalation or the manner in which it was carried 
out was evident in reaction of Tony Williams, leader of 
the National Socialist Movement, to the London nail 
bomb attacks in April 1999 which were, it transpired, 
carried out by one of its activists, David Copeland. 
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Williams, who quickly dissolved his group, intimated 
that Copeland’s terrorist campaign was “un-Aryan” 
(and hence dishonourable) because of the manner in 
which Copeland had undertaken his indiscriminate 
terrorist campaign, embarked upon without warning 
and with no accompanying list of demands (Lowles & 
McLagan, 2000, p. 221). Thus, even when brakes fail, 
the subsequent reaction to their failure feeds back into 
the moral prohibitions of certain forms of violence (i.e., 
that an action was wrong) and such events become part 
of a process through which barriers and boundaries are 
reasserted to uphold the original prohibition. This links 
in part to brake 3 and notions of group identity (i.e., 
‘we don’t do things like that’) – though if Copeland’s 
victims had been perceived to be ‘guilty’ then such 
statements might have been different. Sections of C18 
certainly valorised his actions regardless.   
Indeed, brake 2a was most clearly observable on 
occasions where it was breached, during and after 
violent encounters or attacks which activists perceived 
to have gone too far, often, though not always, in the 
heat of the moment (i.e., in the inner circle of analysis). 
Recording his involvement in football violence one 
extreme right activist recalled, ‘At one point, I was 
fighting two Millwall blokes when one of our mob 
stuck a screwdriver into the cheek of one of them. Fuck 
that; I didn’t mind having a punch-up, but this was over 
the top’ (Portinari, 2016, pp. 25-26). 
Brake 2b
Identification of some groups of actors as 
illegitimate targets for violence.
Whilst caution should be exercised regarding the 
uncritical acceptance of self-justificatory narratives 
by extreme right activists, which position themselves 
as moral political actors whilst distancing themselves 
from racist thuggery, there is nonetheless a category 
of extreme right actor who, despite their ideologically 
enshrined racism, did not regard ethnic minorities as 
legitimate targets for violence in most circumstances. 
Whilst reviled and dehumanized in equal measure, 
ideologically, immigrants and ethnic minority 
communities during the 1990s were regarded by groups 
like the BNP as the largely unconscious tools of a wider 
Jewish-controlled plot to undermine the racial fibre 
of white European nations. In this sense, they were a 
second order target. The real enemy were the Jews and 
the liberal/left establishment. 
At the campaign planning level of analysis, this was 
reflected in the criticisms by national socialist ideologues 
of David Copeland’s 1999 bombing campaign. Colin 
Jordan for instance objected to the ‘wanton barbarity’ 
of Copeland’s actions for several reasons. Foremost was 
his argument that Copeland had targeted an ‘innocent’ 
category of people (i.e., the general public) who had 
limited culpability for the problems he believed to be 
ranged against race and nation: 
Had Copeland directed his attention to some 
prime culprits of the system of genocide 
and repression, and focused his punishment 
on them alone, one could certainly have 
felt that they had brought it on themselves 
by their wickedness against our race and 
nation, and in what amounts to a war waged 
by them against us had been fairly and 
properly punished. As it has been with this 
misdirected mayhem, prime culprits had 
gone unscathed, and we have been damaged 
along with Copeland’s victims. Altogether a 
bad business.’ (Frost, 2014, p. 311). 
This identification of legitimate and illegitimate targets 
can also be seen within action planning and situational 
levels. There is evidence that a minority of activists 
divided their racial and political opponents into different 
categories, some more deserving of violence than 
others. BNP activist Tim Hepple recalled witnessing 
an attack on a mixed race couple unfortunate enough 
to pass too close to forty BNP activists following an 
anti-racist demonstration in the area. Whilst this attack 
‘nearly made me sick on the spot’ because it was both 
‘unnecessary and unprovoked’ Hepple displayed no 
such aversion when recalling a ‘vicious beating’ doled 
out to a left-wing activist he and his colleagues caught 
tearing down BNP posters. 
I didn’t feel much emotion. It was just 
another attack in many ways and did not, 
for me at least, have the connotations or 
unprovoked qualities of Thomson’s attack 
on the black and white couple I related 
earlier. It struck me on the way home that 
night that I had become quite immune to 
violence, particularly against left-wingers. 
I was in no way prepared to attack ethnic 
minorities for any reason, and all the attacks 
I got involved in were against brain dead 
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Marxists like the SWP who need to have 
some tactical sense knocked into them.’  
(Searchlight, 1993, pp. 21).
For other activists the type of left-wing activist targeted 
for violence also made a difference. Eddie Whicker, 
an NF activist involved with C18 activities was never 
‘entirely comfortable’ with the level of violence 
the group employed, despite his own reputation for 
violence. ‘After participating in the attack on left-wing 
paper sellers on Brick Lane, he threw up down a side 
alley.’ This emotionally and physically visceral reaction 
to the level of violence used against a target (i.e., left-
wing paper sellers rather than AFA militants) who were 
unable to defend themselves ‘went too far’ Whicker 
later told a fellow activist (Lowles, 2014, p. 69). 
Within the moral vocabulary of the extreme right, 
attacks on women were also constructed as beyond 
the pale since they conflicted with basic paradigms 
about what constituted manhood and masculinity, 
though observance of such norms was uneven, to say 
the least. The impact of breaching this moral ‘norm’ 
can be seen clearly in the individual reactions of 
Matthew Collins who took part in a BNP-organised 
attack upon a community meeting at Welling Library, 
south London, in June 1989, which hospitalized 
seventeen people, the majority women. For Collins, an 
NF activist who joined the BNP attack, the event was 
pivotal. ‘Afterwards I agreed with [NF organizer Terry] 
Blackham that we would never mention what happened 
in Welling Library that night’. ‘It physically shook him, 
which, with hindsight, I find hard to believe. At the 
time, however, I thought we were both going to be sick 
immediately after we left the library…’ (Collins, 2011, 
p. 51). 
The emotional impact of participating in such an action 
engendered a complex feedback loop for Collins, 
affecting his subsequent trajectory as a committed 
extreme right militant. Participation in the assault 
caused a deep sense of shame that conflicted with his 
self-identity (thus linking this brake to brake 3): ‘I was 
a fucking coward to have done such a thing,’ he added 
upon further reflection. ‘I began to realise that this was 
what race wars were about, the innocent attacked and 
their dignity destroyed. If my mother had known, she 
would have disowned me on the spot.’ In his case, these 
feelings did not dissipate. ‘Still Welling Library played 
on my mind… Did we really attack a meeting of women 
and gleefully report and celebrate it?’ Guilt contributed 
to propelling Collins out of the movement and led him 
to cooperate with the anti-fascist Searchlight magazine 
against his former colleagues. Whilst feelings of shame, 
guilt, and remorse, fed back into Collins subsequent 
behaviour, the moral brakes that had begun to assert 
themselves following the Welling Library attack were 
not applicable to all forms of violent conduct. Writing 
of one subsequent violent encounter, Collins recalled 
‘Sure I had days where I was wracked with guilt and 
self-pity, but this is what I did and this is what I was 
part of. I know it was wrong, but there really didn’t 
seem to be anything else and my head was buzzing with 
the thrill of being a pimply politician for one half of 
my day and part of a vicious gang of thugs the next’ 
(Collins, 2011, pp. 55, 75, 151, 155 and 175-176). The 
latter comment also highlights how moral brakes on 
violence are undermined: violence can simply be too 
exciting to give up, at least in the short term. 
Whilst attack planning did not preclude escalating 
their violent repertoires to encompass arson attacks 
against their opponents, within the moment of action 
moral norms often sharply reasserted themselves 
when it became apparent that their activities might 
result in the death of someone unconnected to their 
political grievance. Recalling his involvement on a 
recce of a building they regarded as a front for Irish 
Republicanism, one activist noted that until that point 
no one had contemplated that people might be living 
above the offices. When they did suddenly saw someone 
in one of the rooms above the building: 
You could have cut the atmosphere with a 
knife and there was clearly a great deal of 
unease among everyone. This was definitely 
not what had been on the agenda and anger 
had very nearly led to the potential murder 
of an innocent woman and her family… If 
nothing else, it gave people time to consider 
the consequences of what their actions could 
potentially lead to. Bluntly put, it became 
a case of: if you’re going to do a big lump 
of bird, you might as well make the targets 
worthwhile ones. (Portinari, 2016, p. 96). 
In the case of C18, the ‘moral shock’ experienced by 
members of the core group after the killing of Chris 
Castle in 1997, which was related in the introduction, 
was also related to categories of underserving victims 
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of violence. It was not simply fear for their personal 
well-being that led activists to drift away from the 
group. They also believed it to be wrong to be killing 
people in your own group for ostensibly petty personal 
reasons.
2.3 BRAKE 3
Self-identification as a group that is either non-
violent or uses only limited forms of violence. 
Brake 3a
Production of group narratives that emphasise 
non-violence or the limited use of violence either by 
themselves or by those they claim have inspired their 
movement.
Extreme right wing groups during this period represented 
a form of pariah politics, marginalized politically and 
culturally. Given a historical and ideological lineage 
that traces, ultimately, to the interwar politics of Nazism 
and Fascism this case study did not uncover widespread 
narratives of movement histories that connected them 
to non-violent movements or movements that advocated 
limited forms of violence or the use of violence as a 
last resort. Though it is slightly beyond the time frame 
of this case study, in the early 2000s BNP ideologues 
began reinventing their political past, highlighting past 
political models of electoral ‘success’ to justify their 
current ‘modernisation’ strategies and to disconnect 
the party from anti-Semitism, racism and violence. In 
re-narrating their past they sought not only to bolster 
their quest for political legitimacy but also discredit 
figures like Tyndall, by then viewed as an unwelcome 
encumbrance to further electoral progress (Macklin, 
2011, pp. 19-37). 
Where movement narratives addressed violence directly 
it was usually to emphasis it as a defensive rather than 
offensive act. BNP publications almost uniformly 
characterized acts of violence involving their activists 
as ‘self-defence’ or in extremis ‘very rare’ instances of 
unsurprising ‘retaliation’ during the course of an ‘open 
war’ which had been declared upon the party by anti-
fascists (Tyndall, 1998, pp. 486-87). When convicted 
for violent offences, party publications portrayed this 
as an injustice. Party narratives also undermined the 
seriousness of certain convictions. Absent, within BNP 
propaganda, however, were the types of overt narrative 
glorifying violence that characterize the publications 
and pronouncements of groups like C18. 
Where the BNP did attempt to connect its political 
narratives with movements who disavowed violence 
was in the evolution of how it expressed its racial 
ideology, which moved from biologically racist 
calls for ‘white power’ to embrace white grievance 
narratives, influenced by cultural arguments for ethno-
plurality. The ‘Rights for Whites’ lexicon for instance 
drew upon a wider constellation of ideas from within 
the milieu which sought to position the movement as 
a white advocacy group, no different from the black 
civil rights movement with all the implications that this 
comparison implied with regards non-violence. These 
narratives would evolve in sophistication over the 
course of the following decade as the party’s electoral 
position embedded.
Brake 3b
Disassociation from more violent groups or factions 
and/or association with less violent groups or 
factions.
Though the BNP had created C18 it quickly become 
a political liability from which they sought to 
disassociate themselves. The negative headlines C18 
garnered in the media inevitably served to discredit the 
BNP given the group’s provenance. The principal tool 
used to disassociate the BNP from C18 was to officially 
proscribe the group, indicating to members the party’s 
rank-and-file that the BNP could no longer tolerate its 
style of violent activism. 
Another way in which the BNP – and other groups – 
sought to define themselves against C18 was through 
the medium of conspiratorial politics. Despite or 
perhaps because of its militancy C18 was characterized 
as an MI5 ‘honey trap’ operation. By positioning C18 
in this way, the BNP sought to marginalize the group 
and discredit it in the eyes of its own activists who 
might be seduced by its siren call for militant action. 
They also shifted the responsibility for the violence 
carried out in its name away from ‘genuine’ extreme 
right activists and onto the State.  
The same strategy for disassociating themselves from 
the violence of the movement’s radical flank can be seen 
vis-à-vis the BNP response to David Copeland’s terrorist 
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campaign. British Nationalist, the BNP newspaper, 
posited four theories regarding responsibility for the 
attacks: a so far unknown ‘racist terror group’, a loner 
‘racist or otherwise’, Muslim extremists or ‘it was the 
work of the state itself’. For British Nationalist it was 
the last explanation that fitted the bill since it tallied 
with its assertion that its’ chief political rival, C18, 
‘was actively sponsored by at least one state agency’. 
‘Some readers who might have difficulty accepting that 
“our” security services might do such a thing,’ claimed 
British Nationalist, ‘need think on the state involvement 
of a number of terrorist outrages on the continent and 
the probable FBI involvement with the Oklahoma 
bombing in the USA’.39  In a similar vein Nick Griffin, 
the future BNP chairman, claimed it was ‘probable’ 
that MI5, working through a ‘state-sponsored “pseudo-
gang”,’ had orchestrated the bombings to derail the 
party’s European election campaign and to enable 
them to introduce repressive laws that could be used 
against the party, and legitimize an increase in the 
security service budget.40 Linking back to brake 1a, 
such conspiracy theories also functioned as a warning 
against involvement with overtly militant groups, since 
they were construed by their less tactically radical 
opponents as being not what they purported to be. 
Disillusionment also led individual C18 activists to 
begin disassociating from violence, particularly in the 
aftermath of the killing of Chris Castle, prior to exiting 
the group altogether. One leading C18 activist involved 
in the group’s letter bomb campaign in 1997 recorded 
that after being asked to travel to Germany to post more 
bombs the following year
I began to take stock of my life and realized 
that my heart wasn’t in it any more. I also saw 
the futility in the right wing and particularly 
how many of the idiots within it. How can 
you talk about racial superiority when you 
have the perverts, Satanists and weirdos that 
are constantly attracted to the right within 
your ranks? When you’re involved and are 
totally committed to the conspiracy theories 
and simplistic way of looking at life, it is 
easy to forget just what sort of people are 
involved. There were some decent ordinary 
people, family types, but there were also the 
trash. (Searchlight, 2001).
39 British Nationalist, May 1999. 
40 Spearhead, June 1999. 
Brake 3c
(The threat of) sanctions for activists who advocate 
or undertake violence beyond the established 
parameters of the group’s action repertoire, and/
or opportunities to achieve intra-group respect and 
prestige without undertaking or encouraging the 
use of violence at or beyond the parameters of the 
group’s action repertoire.
BNP guidance to party recruiters noted that those 
talking the ‘language of violence’ were best kept at 
‘arm’s length’ since ‘the people who perform best in 
these [violent] situations are those who talk least on 
the subject’ (British National Party, n.d., p. 13). Within 
the extreme right milieu, respect and prestige, was 
afforded activists with a proven record of militancy and 
commitment. BNP leader John Tyndall was a case in 
point. His authority flowed from his past and present 
militancy whilst his own personal experience and the 
‘mistakes’ of his past meant that his rejection of the 
strategy of revolutionary violence as futile carried 
some weight. Tony Lecomber and Eddy Butler, the key 
BNP ‘modernisers’ also had reputations for ideological 
and physical militancy which lent a certain gravitas to 
their efforts to recalibrate the party. The BNP victory 
in the Isle of Dogs victory in 1993 reinforced their 
standing within the party, though not across the entire 
movement, indicated by the fact that C18 subsequently 
targeted both men, both for personal reasons, and wider 
perceptions of their political moderation. 
Despite being able to apply a range of sanctions 
against those who breached party edicts, there were 
very few instances of the party leadership sanctioning 
its activists for transgressing established parameters, 
particularly where violence was concerned. ‘Eddy 
Butler, who had gone home from the attack on the 
ANL with his hands and face covered in his victims’ 
blood, was not disciplined by the BNP leadership 
and was soon afterwards promoted within the BNP 
to the post of national elections organizer,’ recorded 
one former activist (Searchlight, 1993, p. 36). Indeed 
Tyndall dismissed Lecomber’s 1985 conviction under 
the Explosives Act as ‘foolish’ which he declined to 
take further action against because the court had 
already pronounced upon it: ‘He has suffered enough’. 
He similarly refused to accept, publicly at least, that 
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his national organizer, Richard Edmonds, or the other 
activists convicted with him, were guilty of the act of 
racial violence for which they were jailed, blaming 
the actual attack – in which a black man had his face 
slashed – upon ‘fringe’ elements unconnected with the 
party (Tyndall, 1998, pp. 495-496). 
In this case study, the relative absence of sanctions for 
violence beyond the parameters of the action repertoire 
might also reflect the limited authority of movement 
leaders over the movement. Even after Tyndall officially 
proscribed C18, many BNP activists simply used both 
labels as banners of convenience, operating as ‘BNP’ 
or ‘C18’ depending on the activity in question. ‘We 
won’t admit to having anything to do with [C18], but at 
the same time, if our policies don’t work, it’s switched 
over to them. It’s basically the same people, but with a 
violent side to it,’ recalled one Scottish BNP activist.41 
Tyndall and his lieutenants were all mindful that many 
BNP members ‘were keen to align themselves with 
C18 on a street level while some in the leadership 
remained national socialists at heart.’ C18 and its 
political wing, the National Socialist Alliance, were at 
their ‘peak’ during 1995. Tyndall faced the dilemma 
that if he applied the brake too firmly (i.e., by expelling 
BNP activists) he would only strengthen C18 thereby 
weakening his own political position (Lowles, 2014, 
pp. 149 and 151). 
Whilst there were opportunities for achieving prestige 
and position within the movement without recourse 
to extreme violence, albeit based upon a past track 
record of proven militancy, extreme right subcultures 
continually privileged certain forms of physical 
masculinity from which individuals derived ‘respect’ 
from fellow activists. Such physical authority can serve 
as a brake or an accelerant on violence depending upon 
the context, however. Within the NF, Eddy Whicker’s 
reputation meant that fellow militants sought his view 
when Matthew Collins’ loyalty to the NF was suspect 
as a result of his proximity to certain figures within the 
BNP. This selfsame reputation also accorded Whicker 
the respect of C18 who relied upon his judgement 
whilst they pondered Collins’ fate once they suspected, 
rightly, that he was an informer. Whilst Collins notes 
Whicker’s role in preventing violence against his 
person, he was under no illusion that had Whicker 
known that the accusations against him were true ‘the 
41 Channel 4, Dispatches. 
one protector I’d had on the far right was possibly the 
one who would finally give the go-ahead for C18 to do 
me in’ (Collins, 2011, pp. 62, 289, 293, 295, 296).
Brake 3d
Circulation of limited expectations that they will be 
involved in greater levels of violence.
In his autobiographical account of life as the NF youth 
organizer during the early 1980s Joe Pearce recalled 
the ‘endemic’ level of street violence which ‘seemed to 
be woven into the very fabric of life for active members 
of the NF’ (Pearce, 2013, pp. 54-55).  Recalling the 
regularity of its practice and the ‘flashpoints’ at which 
it would occur, newspaper sales and marches, what can 
also be inferred from Pearce’s account is the generally 
predictable nature of when and where violence would 
take place combined with an expectation of what the 
activists involved could expect and, perhaps more 
importantly, what not to expect. Prior experience 
served to inhibit a serious escalation in future violence. 
When tactical escalations did occur, for instance with 
C18’s formation during 1992, the activists involved, 
initially at least, remained bound by the same collective 
understanding of the limits of street violence. In 
brawling with AFA, C18 militants expected a ‘tear-up’ 
but did not expect anyone to be killed (Lowles, 2014, 
p. 18). 
This weight of expectation led one anti-fascist 
interviewee to highlight the existence of certain 
unwritten ‘rules of engagement’ regarding street 
violence i.e., you might go out to hurt someone but you 
wouldn’t be going out to kill them or that you wouldn’t 
attack people at home. These rules depended upon the 
willingness/unwillingness of local activist cultures or 
clusters of activists to uphold them, however. In Leeds 
extreme right activists’ targeted anti-fascist opponents 
at home, in one instance firing a crossbow bolt through 
the window. Anti-fascists in London also assaulted 
BNP treasurer Mike Newland at home too. More often 
than not, however, AFA targeted property in an attempt 
to ‘inconvenience’ their opponents i.e., cutting phone 
wires, slashing car tires and gluing locks in a bid to 
deter future involvement (Hann & Tilzey, 2003, pp. 148 
and 151). Importantly, even these transgressions of the 
‘rules of engagement’ did not deviate too far from the 
broadly conceived parameters of the conflict. 
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Limited expectations of violence inhibited preparations 
for greater violence, reflected in the choice of weapons 
taken to events, connecting here with brake 5a regarding 
the development of capabilities that focused upon 
strategies of action that entailed more limited forms 
of violence. Indeed, although some BNP activists 
upgraded to arming themselves with hammers and 
adjustable spanners during the escalating clashes in the 
East End during the spring of 1992 (Searchlight, 1993, 
p. 34), they did not countenance a serious escalation in 
violence by acquiring firearms. This brake undoubtedly 
reflects an internalization of, and interaction with, a 
powerful external brake on violent escalation: Britain’s 
restrictive gun laws. These were tightened after the 
massacres in Hungerford (1987) and Dunblane (1996) 
making it much harder, though not impossible, for 
activists to obtain firearms. 
These brakes weakened on the radical flank, however, 
as C18 increasingly exhorted its activists to greater 
acts of violence, publishing ‘hit lists’ of opponents 
alongside exhortations for them to be killed and bomb-
making instructions. C18 publications frequently 
called for ‘ethnic cleansing’ to restore racial purity 
alongside atrocity photographs from the Holocaust but 
also, contemporaneously, the Yugoslavian civil war 
in which the C18 sided unambiguously with Serbian 
paramilitaries. Despite this rhetorical violence, C18 
failed to invest in its tactical wherewithal, that was 
rudimentary. Its lack of professionalisation was evident 
in a subsequent effort by C18 leader Will Browning and 
his colleagues to firebomb the home of Gerry Gable, 
editor of Searchlight magazine: 
Arriving at Gable’s road in the early hours 
of the morning, Browning realized that he 
had forgotten the balaclavas. He decided 
to continue and the gang went to a nearby 
garage, bought some plastic bags and cut 
out eyeholes. They returned to Gable’s, 
where Browning leapt out of the car and lit 
the device he had made. At that moment, a 
gust of wind swung the plastic bag round on 
his head. Unable to see, Browning panicked 
and hurled the lighted bomb in the general 
direction of what he thought was the correct 
house. He pulled the bag from his head only 
to see the device explode in the next-door 
neighbor’s drive. Even if he had hit the right 
house it was unlikely to have had the desired 
effect as Browning had not realized that to 
cause maximum damage he needed to pack 
shrapnel into the device. After a huge blast 
caused by the petrol igniting, the bomb soon 
fizzled out. (Lowles, 2014, pp. 142-3). 
Even when the group embarked upon a letter bomb 
campaign in 1997, it did not develop the bombs 
themselves, outsourcing the task to Danish C18 
supporters who shouldered the burden of making and 
sending the packages themselves albeit at the behest of 
C18 in London. 
2.4 BRAKE 4
Boundary softening in relation to putative out-
groups (e.g., opponents, opponents’ perceived 
supporters, the general public or state actors).
Brake 4a
Resistance to generalizations about their opponents. 
The strategic concerns outlined with regards brake 
1b led subsequently to boundary softening. This 
tactical recalibration of the BNP outlined above also 
underpinned a de-escalation of party’s ideological 
militancy, at least on the level of public presentation, 
in order to build an electoral base amongst those 
elements of the ‘white working class’ that might 
support its anti-immigration policies but would baulk 
at its overt biological racism. Toning down this element 
of its programme led the BNP, ultimately, to drop its’ 
symbolically sacrosanct commitment to ‘compulsory’ 
repatriation in favour of ‘voluntary’ repatriation 
because of the violence that this forced removal of 
people and their families implied. This reframing of 
ends and means fed back to action planning; party 
organisers phased out activities that might associate 
the party with violence and undermine their electoral 
ambitions. 
That said, this boundary softening was slow to take 
effect and not readily observable during the 1990s. It 
would be another decade before it began to embed. 
During the period in question conspiratorial extreme 
right wing rhetoric and praxis across the constellation 
of groupuscules that comprised the milieu routinely 
dehumanized racial and political opponents as agents 
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of an ‘evil’ plot in a way that anti-fascist narratives 
about fighting the ‘fash’ or ‘boneheads’ did not. 
The BNP and the NF both did purge their publications 
of crude racist language, but this was likely primarily 
because they were aware that its inclusion invited 
prosecution under the Race Relations Act. C18, 
meanwhile, was visceral in its racist and anti-Semitic 
invective, demanding the ‘noose’ for racial and 
political ‘traitors’ whilst reveling in fantasies of ‘ethnic 
cleansing’ and ‘race war,’ which left little room for 
compromise. 
Despite their antipathy towards their opponents, 
extreme right accounts of anti-fascist violence against 
them occasionally exhibited a grudging respect for their 
capabilities, which indicated, at least to an extent, that 
their opponents had not been completely dehumanized. 
C18 leader Steve Sargent recalled an attack on Red 
Action activists drinking at a North London pub 
following a demonstration: ‘I remember that Gary 
O’Shea just standing there in the pub doorway throwing 
pool balls. Give him his dues, game geezer’ (Lowles, 
2014, p. 18).42 Whether this had any implications for 
the level of violence that they were willing to deploy 
towards them is unclear.
Brake 4b
Identification of segments of the public beyond 
their previously-imagined support base as potential 
converts to their cause.
The extreme right and anti-fascists were both essentially 
fighting, beyond their immediate support bases, for 
the hearts and minds of the broader ‘white working 
class’ who were perceived as potential coverts, either 
to the cause of race and nation or the class struggle 
against capitalism. This central point of conflict 
also served to highlight a powerful brake on violent 
escalation, which was not evident in other contexts. 
Carter’s study of cumulative extremism in Northern 
Ireland highlights that one of the ways in which the 
Republican and Loyalist groups could escalate their 
conflict, particularly when they were not able to attack 
one another directly, was to target the support base of 
their opponents through the targeted or indiscriminate 
killing of Catholics and Protestants (Carter, 2017, pp. 
42 Portinari (2016, p. 37) also notes a ‘begrudging respect’ for Red Action based on an appreciation of their capacity for street violence. 
37-51). In the case of the British extreme right, this 
was never a strategic option since to wage war on 
their opponents conceived constituency would be to 
wage war against oneself and ergo ones’ own sense of 
identity, which would be politically counterproductive 
not to mention cognitively dissonant for the groups in 
question. 
Brake 4c
Limited intra-movement pressure to ‘burn-bridges’ 
with social contacts outside of the movement or 
outside of the radical flank of the movement.
The social and cultural ties maintained by individual 
militants with friends, family and employers, exerted 
a powerful brake upon involvement with militant, 
and indeed less militant, extreme right sub-cultures. 
Groups like the BNP never encouraged its members 
to ‘go underground’ but rather to serve as beacons of 
racial rectitude within their own communities which 
the ‘community action’ component of party activism 
was meant to entrench. Whilst activists were often 
dismissive of the ‘sheeple’ (i.e., people behaving like 
sheep) the BNP's ‘Rights for Whites’ strategy was 
paradigmatic of the party’s attempt to mobilise rather 
than alienate broader public support from the ‘white 
working class.’ C18 by comparison was contemptuous 
of the public. Inspired by US ideas of small, racialised 
communes, C18 supported developing a white racial 
‘homeland’ in Essex though there were few takers for 
the scheme or its underlying rationale of withdrawing 
from wider society.
The BNP’s pre-natal policies, which encouraged the 
cultivation and maintenance of (racially appropriate) 
personal relationships in order to produce future 
generation of white children was also indicative of a 
broader desire to engage rather than withdraw from 
society. Even without external pressure, racist militants 
often internalized the day-to-day drudgery of earning a 
living, and remaining employed, as a brake upon certain 
categories of violent activity. ‘Having concluded with 
others that a race war would be the only possibility for 
nationalist survival, I realised that I would do everything 
I could to make it happen,’ recalled Matthew Collins. 
‘However, my job in the civil service was not conducive 
to revolutionary activity’’ (Collins, 2011, p. 38). 
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Brake 4d
Expressions of reluctance to conceive of the state 
security forces as ‘the enemy’.
The criminality of many of its activists aside, a basic 
patriotic respect for ‘law and order’ including the 
police and the army was a central tenet of ideological 
faith. Senior BNP activists worked to prevent violence 
against the police, albeit sometimes for political and 
pragmatic reasons. During violence at a march in 
Bermondsey in 1991, Matthew Collins recalled BNP 
national organiser Richard Edmonds shouting ‘Don’t 
throw stones at the police’ though other voices in the 
mob could be heard shouting ‘Get the police on bikes’ 
whilst stones and bottles are thrown in their direction, 
highlighting that control over countervailing tendencies 
was never complete (Collins, 2011, p. 149). 
The effectiveness of such brakes was also compromised 
at times through claims about political bias within the 
upper echelons of the police as opposed to regular 
officers. Tyndall for example regularly criticized the 
‘political’ leadership of the Metropolitan Police (Sir 
Paul Condon coming in for a particular amount of 
vitriol) with the justification that the higher echelons 
of the police were ‘playing at politics’ and subverting 
police ‘impartiality’ which fed into wider narratives of 
‘establishment’ subversion (Tyndall, 1998, p. 495). 
This brake appears almost non-existent on the 
radical flank. C18 publications regularly denigrated 
all police officers as ‘scum’ working for ‘ZOG’ (the 
Zionist Occupation Government) and therefore paid 
collaborators of a ‘system’ that they wanted to overthrow 
through revolution. Such rhetoric could be tempered by 
personal experience at a micro-level, however. David 
Myatt, one of the group’s most ardent advocates for 
revolution found, after being arrested in 1998, that 
the ‘professional attitude’ and ‘courteous’ manner 
of the arresting officers and those who subsequently 
interviewed him ‘made me revise my attitude toward 
the Police’ (Myatt, 2013). Both the BNP and C18 
spoke of the Armed Forces with greater respect than 
the police.
2.5 BRAKE 5 
Organisational developments that either (a) alter 
the moral and strategic equations in favour of non- 
or limited violence, (b) institutionalise less violent 
collective identities and/or processes of boundary 
softening, and/or (c) reduce the likelihood of 
unplanned violence.
Brake 5a
Limited investment in capabilities to escalate 
violence, and/or development of capabilities to 
undertake strategies of action that either entail non- 
or limited violence or more controlled violence.
Once the ‘Rights for Whites’ campaign began gathering 
momentum local BNP activists began refining their 
tactics. ‘By this stage in our development we decided that 
the unpredictable, noisy and volatile public meetings 
were a thing of the past,’ stated local organizer Steve 
Smith. ‘Although they helped us establish our name in 
Tower Hamlets, they required a great deal of resources 
and time to organize. More importantly, we had learnt 
from canvassing feedback as well as from anecdotal 
evidence that public meetings were becoming, by this 
time, somewhat counter-productive’ (Lowles, 2014, p. 
39). This also implied a tactical shift away from C18, 
which was now surplus to requirements, an observation 
that intersected with brake 3d regarding the group’s 
limited expectations that they would be involved in 
greater levels of violence, at least in the short term, not 
least because the group’s own political ambitions also 
counselled against investing in such capabilities.
The break from the BNP also coincided with C18 
losing interest in Northern Ireland, which it viewed as 
‘increasingly futile and counter-productive’ (Lowles, 
2014, pp. 78 and 81), and focusing instead upon the 
football hooligan scene, which, curtailed the group 
developing the sort of ‘revolutionary’ forms of violence 
that its publications paid lip service to. 
Activists also put measures in place to manage levels 
and styles of violence during actions. In his memoir of 
his time as a leading AFA activist in Northern England 
Dave Hann observed that ‘Some of the most dangerous 
situations came when small groups of fascists and anti-
fascists chanced upon each other in back-streets, well 
away from the police’ (Hann & Tilzey, 2003, p. 223). 
Both AFA and groups like the BNP generally sought 
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to avoid such encounters by meticulously planning 
for violent face-to-face encounters. Being able to 
control violent situations and to modulate the levels of 
violence applied during them, depends on the extent 
to which such groups can control the micro-dynamics 
of violence that arise from the fears and tensions that 
accumulate in anticipation of violence conflict. This 
can result in what Randall Collins calls ‘forward panic’ 
– those moments in which control is lost and panic sets 
in which leads activists on either side (including the 
police) to try and re-establish ‘emotional dominance’ 
through violence. 
To minimize the chance of this happening the BNP and 
NF both sought to manage, modulate and co-ordinate 
their violence at marches though the institution of 
certain individuals as ‘Stewards’ answerable to a 
‘Chief Steward’ who is in turn answerable to the party. 
Those who became stewards were likely a self-selecting 
cadre of experienced militants who came to the fore 
through ‘voluntary’ participation in street activism, 
as was the case with AFA (Hann & Tilzey, 2003, pp. 
240-241). To what extent an extreme right trained its 
stewards regarding how not to react to provocation or, 
importantly, not ‘over-react’ is unclear though the BNP 
Activist's Handbook laid down a series of guidelines for 
personal conduct indicating that some level of thought 
had been devoted to the issue. Arrangements to limit 
or at least control violence appeared more advanced 
within London BNP than amongst its regional branches 
where one activist perceived a ‘purpose, determination 
and planning behind the activities’ which had been 
absent in West Yorkshire where he was previously 
active (Searchlight, 1993, p. 22). C18 began life as 
the BNP ‘Stewards’ Group’ though it quickly moved 
beyond the party’s control, highlighting the fragile 
nature of said ‘control’ within the extreme right milieu 
during this period. 
Stewarding and security arrangements were also 
applied to protect activists out canvassing since any 
violent confrontations would undermine their ‘non-
violent’ electoral strategy. To this end: 
Groups were not to split up, to use their 
common sense and to stick together in the 
face of trouble. We were also told not to 
leaflet houses obviously occupied by non-
whites, although it was quite usual to leaflet 
a house with left-wing posters or stickers in 
the window… The thing about activities in 
south London, with which I was involved on 
a daily or often twice daily basis, was the 
animal-like territorial nature of activities. 
Edmonds, Tyler or White would know a 
“bad street” from a good one, and often, a 
“bad house” from a good one. (Searchlight, 
1993, p. 22) 
Whilst this attention to detail regarding a ‘bad street’ 
undoubtedly related to an awareness of houses 
populated by ethnic minorities and therefore not worth 
canvassing, it also highlights calculations made by 
senior party activists to avoid knocking on doors where 
their message was unwelcome which could needlessly 
provoke, leading to incidents that might spiral beyond 
their control.
Brake 5b
Foregrounding more modest or intermediate 
objectives and de-prioritising revolutionary goals.
The intermediate political goals of the BNP i.e., local 
elections, which came to dominate the day-to-day 
activities of the organisation, served to undermine the 
strategic logic of violence and neutered the party’s 
‘revolutionary’ pretensions in the process. Whilst the 
BNP continued officially to campaign for its long-
term goal of the destruction of liberal democracy 
and its replacement with a racial state (which it never 
renounced) in practice this goal was effectively de-
prioritised because the party and its activists ploughed 
their energies into achieving their intermediate goal of 
electoral representation and public support.
Brake 5c
Construction and maintenance of spaces in which a 
range of activists that includes and extends beyond 
the radical flank are able to freely discuss tactics and 
movement objectives.
Despite his centralized control Tyndall developed 
spaces and forums within the party through which 
activists could freely discuss tactics, ranging from 
the annual party rally, which gave activists a role in 
developing and shaping policy, to contributing to 
Spearhead, the party’s ideological journal, which 
Tyndall used as a forum to facilitate discussion. Whilst 
Tyndall exerted full editorial control (and ownership) 
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over Spearhead (though occasionally he entrusted 
editorship of the magazine to reliable lieutenants 
for long periods) he published articles from a range 
of sources and authors, not simply those who were 
BNP members or with whom he agreed tactically or 
ideologically. Tyndall also tolerated publications like 
Patriot, set up as a mouthpiece to further the agenda 
of BNP ‘modernisers’, though they were not initially 
explicit about their overarching agenda, which was to 
work for his removal (because his reputation was seen 
as a drag upon their electoral ambitions). 
The key question is whether within the ideological and 
theoretical spaces provided by such publications radical 
flank actors were exposed to the views of the wider 
movement that might have led them to understand 
that support for more militant action was less than 
they might have imagined. It is not possible to answer 
this question based on the available data. However, it 
might be noted that whilst Tyndall tolerated a measure 
of ideological heterodoxy, so long as contributions 
adhered to core racial nationalist principles, he 
operated a tighter control over the political structure 
of the party itself, which caused some tension. Tyndall 
had a close circle of long-standing political comrades, 
which frustrated newer voices with different strategic 
views who found that this relatively closed clique hard 
to influence (Tyndall, 1998, p. 486). He also styled 
himself as the supreme arbiter of ideology and strategy, 
meaning that those with tactical differences to those 
he prescribed, were forced to operate outside the BNP. 
This made it easier for the BNP to distance itself from 
the resulting violence of group’s like C18 which it bore 
some responsibility for cultivating in the first place. 
Brake 5d
Concerns among some group members that violent 
escalation will compromise their ability to shape the 
direction of the movement and/or negatively affect 
their position within the movement.
Following the debacle with C18, the BNP leadership 
identified how violence and their investment in violent 
capabilities had actually disrupted their organization 
and weakened both their own ability to control their 
party and tarnished their political capital within the 
milieu more generally. Having belatedly learned this 
lesson, Tyndall and his lieutenants made no further 
effort to re-invest in the party’s physical capabilities, 
which in any case had become surplus to its evolving 
political requirements.
Brake 5e
Concentration of energy on targeting movement 
rivals, leading to reduced capability to prosecute 
campaigns of violence against their external 
enemies.
From the outset, C18 appeared more interested in 
attacking internal rivals within the BNP than with 
protecting the party from external assault. Whilst the 
BNP dealt with internal discord politically, C18 sought 
to resolve such conflicts with violence. This approach 
manifested itself more widely as the group sought to 
exert its control over the lucrative Blood & Honour 
music scene, which magnified internal tensions over 
money, personal prestige, reputational damage, and 
tactics, that led to the killing. 
The impact of internecine feuding within C18 
undoubtedly blunted the movement’s capacity 
for violence, leading ultimately to its murderous 
conclusion in 1997 when C18 leader Charlie Sargent 
killed Chris Castle, a friend of his factional rival, Will 
Browning. The impact of the killing had a profound 
impact, because, as Darren Wells, a senior C18 figure 
in Browning’s faction, suggests, it brought home to 
even the core C18 group, the consequences of their 
activism. The psychological impact on the leadership 
of the group served as a further constraint on external 
violence as Browning’s focus ‘moved totally to getting 
retribution for Chris Castle’. Many members drifted 
out the group as a result ‘because they knew where it 
was heading… I think it pushed a lot of people away, 
and a lot of people did think that about Will, they 
thought he’s bad news to be around.’ ‘I know it sounds 
awful,’ Wells added, ‘but really Chris dying probably 
saved lives because that put an end to any plans for race 
war.’ Wells also highlighted the personal impact of the 
killing on his own life, leading him ultimately to exit 
from the scene too (Searchlight, 2001).
80
rEfErEncES
THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION
3. REFERENCES
British National Party. (n.d.). Spreading the word: 
British National Party handbook on propaganda. 
Welling: BNP.
Birchall, S. (2010). Beating the fascists: The untold 
story of Anti-Fascist Action. London: Freedom Books.
Collins, M. (2011). Hate: My life in the British far 
right. London: Biteback. 
Copes, H., Hochstetler, A., & Forsyth, C. J. (2003). 
Peaceful warriors: Codes for violence among adult 
male bar fighters. Criminology, 51(3), 761-794.
Copsey, N. (2008). Contemporary British fascism: 
The British National Party and the quest for 
legitimacy. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
Copsey, N. (2011). From direct action to community 
action: The changing dynamics of anti-fascist 
opposition. In N. Copsey & G. Macklin (Eds.) British 
National Party: Contemporary perspectives (pp. 123-
141). Abingdon: Routledge.
Dobratz, B. A. & Waldner, L. K. (2012). Repertoires 
of contention: White supremacist views on the use 
of violence and leaderless resistance. Mobilization, 
17(1), 49-66.
Frost, S. L. (2014). ‘Twaz a good fight’! The life of 
Colin Jordan. Heckmondwike: NS Press.
Goodwin, M. (2010). New British fascism: Rise of the 
British National Party. Abingdon: Routledge.
Hann, D. & Tilzey, S. (2003). No retreat: The secret 
war between Britain’s anti-fascists and the far right. 
Lytham: Milo Books.
Hann, D. (2013). Physical resistance: A hundred years 
of anti-fascism. London: Zero Books.
Hayes, M. (2014). Red Action – left-wing political 
pariah: Some observations regarding ideological 
apostasy and the discourse of proletarian resistance. In 
E. Smith & M. Worley (Eds.) Against the grain: The 
British far left from 1956 (pp. 229-246). Manchester: 
Manchester University Press. 
Ivarsflaten, E. (2006). Reputational shields: 
Why most anti-immigrant parties failed 
in Western Europe, 1980-2005. Retrieved 
from http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.695.761&rep=rep1&type=pdf 
Lowles, N. (2014). White riot: The violent story of 
Combat 18. Lytham: Milo Books.
Lowles, N. & McLagan, G. (2000). Mr Evil: The 
secret life of racist bomber and killer David Copeland. 
London: John Blake. 
Macklin, G. (2011). Modernising the past for the 
future. In N. Copsey & G. Macklin (Eds.) British 
National Party: Contemporary perspectives (pp. 19-
37). Abingdon: Routledge.
Myatt, D. (2013). Myngath: Some recollections of a 
Wyrdful and extremist life by David Myatt. Retrieved 
from http://www.davidmyatt.info/david-myatt-
myngath.pdf 
Pearce, J. (2013). Race with the devil: My journey 
from racial hatred to rational love. Charlotte, NC: 
Saint Benedict Press.
Portinari, F. (2016). Left-right loyalist: From one 
extreme to another. No publishing details. 
Renton, D. (2006). When we touched the sky: The 
Anti-Nazi League, 1977-1981. Cheltenham: New 
Clarion Press.
 Searchlight (1993). At war with society: The exclusive 
story of a Searchlight mole inside Britain’s far right. 
London: Searchlight.
Searchlight (2001). Why I turned my back on C18 
– An exclusive interview with ex-nazi Darren Wells. 
Searchlight, no. 318, December.
81
rEfErEncES
BUSHER , HOLBROOK & MACKLIN
Simi, P. & Windisch, S. (2018). Why radicalization 
fails: Barriers to mass casualty terrorism. Terrorism 
and Political Violence, Online First. Retrieved from 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/095465
53.2017.1409212 
Tyndall, J. (1998). The eleventh hour. Welling: Albion 
Press.
82
annEx c: thE animal libEration movEmEnt in thE uk, 1972-Early 2000S
THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION
ANNEX C: THE ANIMAL LIBERATION 
MOVEMENT IN THE UK, 1972-EARLY 2000S
1. INTRODUCTION
For the purpose of this case study, we consider the 
Animal Liberation Movement to comprise a sub-section 
of the wider animal rights movement, characterised by 
their willingness to use illegal forms of direct action 
in order to advance campaigns for animal rights, 
including, but not necessarily limited to, trespass and 
property damage.
Scholars and activists alike often trace the origins of 
the animal liberation movement to the formation of the 
Band of Mercy in 1972 by Ronnie Lee, Cliff Goodman 
and four others. Lee and Goodman, both previously 
activists with the Hunt Saboteurs Association (HSA), 
are said to have formed the Band of Mercy out of 
frustration both at the slow pace of change and at how 
the HSA’s commitment to non-violence sometimes 
made hunt saboteurs a soft target for violence from hunt 
supporters (Nagtzaam, 2017, p. 49). A short campaign 
of criminal damage ensued: focused initially on targets 
associated with fox hunting and seal hunting, it soon also 
targeted factory farming and animal experimentation 
(Molland, 2002). The first use of arson took place in 
1973 at an animal experimentation laboratory under 
construction in Milton Keynes (Henshaw, 1989, p. 
14). Lee and Goodman were arrested in 1974 for their 
part in a raid on Oxford Laboratory Animal Colonies, 
Bicester. On release from prison in 1976, Goodman 
renounced animal rights activism, but Lee, along 
with 30 other activists, formed the Animal Liberation 
Front (ALF). Causing in the region of £250,000 worth 
of damage to property in their first year of existence 
(Nagtzaam, 2017, p. 74), the ALF soon made news 
headlines and has remained one of the most prominent 
animal liberation groups in the UK and beyond up to 
the present day.
Throughout most of its history the animal liberation 
movement has operated through a loosely structured 
network of prominent individuals, groups and 
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campaigns. The ALF itself has always operated on a 
cell-based structure, said to have been inspired by 
the IRA and a desire to maximise resilience to police 
disruption (Henshaw, 1989; Liddick, 2013). As such, 
while there has at times been a centralised public 
communications team, local groups of activists operate 
largely under their own steam, providing that they 
operate within the group’s ‘Credo’. Indeed, according 
to that Credo ‘Any group of people who are vegetarians 
or vegans and who carry out actions according to ALF 
guidelines have the right to regard themselves as part 
of the ALF.’1
There have also been multiple groups alongside the 
ALF that could be considered part of the animal 
liberation movement, including the Animal Rights 
Militia (ARM), Hunt Retribution Squad (HRS), Justice 
Department (JD) and the various regional Animal 
Liberation Leagues that briefly gained prominence in 
the 1980s. The extent to which these ever comprised 
distinct groups has been subject to debate. As a 
minimum, there has been significant overlap between 
them in terms of personnel, and some observers have 
considered these labels little more than banners of 
convenience or ‘ad hoc acronyms dreamt up for the 
occasion’ (Henshaw, 1989, p. 12). Where new labels 
have been used to claim more violent actions, such 
‘groups’ have enabled hitherto radical groups, such as 
the ALF, to position themselves as relative moderates 
and sustain their claims to eschew the use of physical 
violence.
Since the latter half of the 1990s, the organisational 
picture has been further complicated by the emergence 
of several multi-faceted campaigns against specific 
entities involved in breeding or storing animals for 
experimentation, such as the Save the Hill Grove 
Cats campaign, a campaign to close down Consort 
Kennels, and the Save the Newchurch Guinea Pigs 
campaign against Darley Oaks Farm. These campaigns 
involved a broad spectrum of pro-animal activists, with 
different tactical appetites, who deployed a variety of 
more or less legal and more or less violent strategies 
of action, ranging from information and fundraising 
stalls, to marches, pickets, lock-ons and liberation 
raids, through to serious property-damage, harassment 
1  Accessed via http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/alf_credo.htm. 
2  Henshaw (1989, p. 165) also argues that groups such as the National Anti-Vivisection Society (NAVS), accepted footage from groups such as the Animal Lib-
eration Leagues and ALF because ‘when it came to what the ALF had to offer, even though it had been obtained illegally, the temptations were too great for nice 
considerations about the ethics of receiving stolen property
and intimidatory home visits. The successes achieved 
through these campaigns – several of which achieved 
their primary objective of closing down the entity 
that they were mobilising against – inspired some of 
the most high-profile animal rights campaigns of the 
early 21st century, such as Stop Primate Experiments 
at Cambridge (SPEAC), SPEAK (a similar campaign 
focused on Oxford University), and Stop Huntingdon 
Animal Cruelty (SHAC).
Throughout this time, the animal liberation movement 
has had a complex relationship with wider animal 
rights and animal welfare movements. On the one 
hand, relations between the more radical and moderate 
strands of pro-animal activism have been ‘based on 
a considerable amount of mutual distrust, which 
sometimes even turns into hostility’ (Posłuszna, 2015, 
p. 68). Activists in both camps frequently accuse one 
another of undermining the cause and, often, of placing 
their own personal interests before those of the animals 
on whose behalf they claim to be campaigning. Whole 
sections of some of the ALF Supporters Group (ALF 
SG) Bulletins were given over to identifying ‘fifth 
columnists’ (e.g., ALF SG Bulletin 13, Oct 1984) while 
critics of ALF, and of the ALF SG in particular, blamed 
the rise of what they described as a ‘cult of militancy’ 
for undermining efforts to build a mass movement to 
promote animal rights (Roberts, 1986).   
Yet there are also examples of collaboration and mutual 
recognition across moderate and radical strands of pro-
animal activism. During the 1980s, for example, while 
the established and highly respected British Union for 
the Abolition of Vivisection (BUAV) criticised some of 
the property damage carried out under the ALF banner, 
particularly when it involved targeting individuals, they 
also made use of video and documentary evidence 
captured during raids by the Animal Liberation 
Leagues during their attempts to bring legal action 
against a number of organisations involved in animal 
experimentation (Mann, 2007),2 and even provided 
office space for ALF and the ALF SG until 1984 
(Stallwood, 2004). 
There have also been frequent overlaps in personnel 
between ostensibly more radical and moderate animal 
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rights organisations. There have, for example, been 
cases of individuals who were on the committee of 
organisations that officially opposed the use of illegal 
actions, such as BUAV, the League Against Cruel 
Sports (LACS), National Anti-Vivisection Society 
(NAVS) and Animal Aid, while being actively involved 
in groups deploying more radical strategies of action. 
For example, Mike Huskisson was for a while a 
LACS press officer, until his position became publicly 
untenable when he was caught during a South East 
Animal Liberation League (SEALL) raid on the Royal 
College of Surgeons laboratory (Henshaw, 1989, p. 
167). It is likely that such overlaps in personnel were 
partly the product of attempts by some animal liberation 
activists to gain a voice in, even control of, some of the 
larger, more established and resource-rich pro-animal 
organisations, such as BUAV, LACS, NAVS and even 
the RSPCA (Henshaw, 1989, pp. 156-165).3 They were 
also likely a product of more general recognition across 
the animal liberation movement and among some of the 
more tactically moderate pro-animal activists that pro-
animal activism was more likely to be effective when 
they adopted a pluralistic approach to their tactical 
repertoire (Best & Nocella, 2004).
1.1 VIOLENT ESCALATION AND 
NON-ESCALATION WITHIN 
ANIMAL LIBERATION ACTIVISM
As with most social movements, the tactical repertoire 
of animal liberation activism has encompassed a wide 
range of more and less radical activities, evolving 
over time at least partly in response to changes in 
their operating environment. In the case of animal 
liberation activism, such changes have included the 
3  ‘Flashback: 5 November 1994 – Police called as rival factions clash at anti-vivisection group’s meeting’, Red Black Green, 5 November 2017, accessed via 
https://network23.org/redblackgreen/2017/11/05/flashback-5-november-1994-police-called-as-rival-factions-clash-at-anti-vivisection-groups-meeting/ 
4  This has included the Public Order Act 1986 (especially Section 5, enabling detention of people causing harassment, alarm or distress); the Malicious Commu-
nications Act 1988; the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (especially the offense of aggravated trespass in section 68); the Protection from Harassment 
Act 1997 (used to establish exclusion zones where activists are unable to protest; to seek civil injunctions against animal rights activists to prevent harassment of 
employees; and prohibit forms of harassment including abusive communications and defamatory public notices); the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 (which 
extended police powers established under previous legislation); the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003 (which enabled, on conviction, the imposition of ASBOs 
banning individual activists from approaching the premises of or making contact with companies involved in animal experimentation); and the Serious Organised 
Crime and Police Act 2005 (especially sections 145–149, which prohibit acts or threats intended to cause someone to terminate or not enter into a contract with 
animal testing facilities). See Monaghan (2013) and Ellefsen (2016) for detailed descriptions of the application of these legal instruments and analysis of how they 
affected the trajectory of animal rights activism and specific campaigns.
5  Mann (2007, p. 597) argues, ‘campaign adaptations have been necessary to deal with increasingly unreasonable policing. With the police steadily softening the 
effect of lawful protest by designating ‘protest zones’ and dictating what language and images can be used, tactics have had to change. Step over the protest line 
to get near enough to be heard and risk arrest. Say something that might be deemed offensive to an animal poisoner within the hearing of a police officer and risk 
arrest.’
6  Accessed via http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/alf_credo.htm 
7  Mann (2007, p. 61) appears to acknowledge this in his observation about the initial use of home visits: ‘At that time, unlike thirty years later, there was little 
appetite for actions which specifically targeted people’s homes as opposed to the centres of abuse. In stark contrast to today’s environment, vivisectors were left 
largely unmolested at home.’ 
significant upgrading of the security at animal breeding 
centres and research laboratories, largely as a result 
of the threat of raids from animal liberation activists, 
and, more importantly still, significant developments 
in the legal environment, with several new pieces of 
legislation being used to criminalise the radical flank 
of animal rights activism and reduce the range of legal 
protest methods available.4,5 
What makes the animal liberation movement an 
interesting case study with which to explore the 
internal brakes on violent escalation is that it is open to 
contrasting interpretations of the effectiveness of these 
brakes. On the one hand, it could be read as an example 
of repeated brake failure. The ALF, the foremost animal 
liberation group, established itself ostensibly as a ‘non-
violent campaign’ and has continued to insist on its 
non-violent credentials. In their Credo they make clear 
that anybody operating under the ALF banner should 
take ‘all precautions not to harm any animal (human or 
otherwise)’.6 Yet there have been multiple and repeated 
instances of violent escalation during the history of the 
ALF and the wider movement. From the outset, there 
was a rapid escalation from minor property damage 
and animal rescue to arson, and then in the early 1980s 
‘an observable shift’ took place as ALF activists began 
‘personalizing’ threats as part of their campaigns of 
intimidation (Monaghan, 2013, p. 935) – a shift that 
arguably converted itself into a lasting norm.7
In 1982 the ARM sent letter bombs to the leaders 
of the main political parties. By the mid-1980s ALF 
activists were using pocket-sized incendiary devices to 
carry out arson attacks on department stores selling fur, 
and during the winter of 1985-86 a series of ‘six minor 
bomb attacks’ on scientists’ homes and four car bombs 
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were carried out under the ARM banner (Monaghan, 
2013, p. 936). Violence escalated further in April 
1986 when ARM adopted a ‘no more warnings’ policy 
for such attacks, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
serious injury, or worse (Monaghan, 2013, p. 936). 
No fatal attacks were forthcoming. However, in 
1989-90 a further escalation occurred when three 
devices using high explosives were set off: one at the 
Senate House, Bristol University, one under the car 
of a veterinary surgeon working at the Porton Down 
laboratories of the UK Government, and another under 
the car of a Bristol University scientist (Vines, 1990). 
The first device was claimed by the previously unheard 
of Animal Abused Society, and was dismissed by 
some activists as a ‘false flag’ operation. The second 
two devices remain unclaimed. Nobody was seriously 
injured by any of these devices, although a baby in a 
passing push chair was reported to have received some 
shrapnel injuries during the last attack. The attacks 
attracted strong condemnation from within the animal 
rights movement, including from some within the 
ALF (Graham, 1990). Even Lee, often an advocate 
for the more militant tendencies within the movement, 
intimated that such attacks went beyond the bounds of 
legitimate action (Lee, 1989).  
In spite of the condemnation of such tactics, there was 
another wave of violent escalation at the radical flank 
of the movement three years later, this time under the 
banners both of the ARM and the JD. In October 1993 
a package addressed to an individual connected with 
field sports exploded in a postal sorting office and 
was subsequently claimed by the JD. They claimed a 
further 31 attacks in 1993, ‘predominately poster tube 
and video cassette bombs’ and claimed in the region 
of 100 attacks during the course of 1994 (Monaghan, 
1999, p. 163). This included a series of letter-bombs 
in June of that year, targeting the live exports industry, 
one of which exploded in the hands of a secretary at 
the offices of Stena Sealink, a shipping company, 
causing minor injuries.8,9 Unusually within the animal 
liberation movement, these attacks were accompanied 
8  ‘Animal protesters send five bombs’, Mary Braid, The Independent, 4 June 1994. Accessed via https://www.independent.co.uk/news/animal-protest-
ers-send-five-bombs-1420284.html 
9  Gurjeet Aujla was subsequently arrested for the Stena Sealink letter bombs, but was not adjudged to have been responsible for other JD campaigns. ‘Justice 
Department’, accessed via  http://www.animalliberationfront.com/Philosophy/AbuseLinked/justiced.htm; 
10  For example, ‘Activists blamed for child sex slur’, BBC News, 7 October 2003, accessed via http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/stafford-
shire/3172766.stm
11  As Mann (2007, p. 596) argues, ‘The campaign against HLS galvanised the movement and changed the rules of the game against vivisection. It opened up 
the fact that the battle against HLS is a war against vivisection between the people and the entire petrochemical/ pharmaceutical/ governmental machine, whose 
activities are sanctioned, protected, and funded by the State and its various branches, who in turn profits from the power and wealth of those industries.’
by public statements about ‘their desire to inflict injury 
on their targets’ (Mann, 2007, p. 503). Meanwhile, 
in the summer of 1994 the ARM set off a number of 
incendiary devices, one of which caused a major fire 
in Cambridge, and a series of attacks that caused an 
estimated £3m worth of damage across the Isle of 
Wight. The ARM attacks were later attributed to Barry 
Horne.
Outside of these campaigns of violence aimed at 
damaging the commercial interests of companies 
identified as responsible for animal abuse, there have 
been numerous isolated assaults, as well as prolonged 
campaigns of intimidation. These have included the 
attacks on Brian Cass, managing director of Huntingdon 
Life Sciences (HLS) and Andrew Gay, HLS marketing 
director, outside their homes in February 2001; 
campaigns depicting specific individuals involved with 
animal experimentation industry as paedophiles;10 
instances of grave desecration and even, perhaps 
most notoriously, the removal of the body of Gladys 
Hammond, mother-in-law of one of the partners at 
Darley Oaks Farm, from her grave in 2004. While it is 
clear that support for such activities within the animal 
liberation movement, and even the ALF itself, has 
always been far from unanimous (Stallwood, 2004), 
it has led some observers to argue that the ALF has 
an ‘almost schizophrenic attitude to violence against 
humans’ in which they ‘publicly argued against 
violence against humans while condoning it in many 
cases as a legitimate tactic’ (Nagtzaam, 2017, p. 63). 
On the other hand, the animal liberation movement 
could be read as an example of remarkably effective 
internal brakes being applied over a period of more than 
40 years. During this time there have been significant 
upward spirals of political opportunities as the main 
political parties in the UK and elsewhere have made 
clear their support for the animal experimentation 
and meat industries;11 a substantial escalation of state 
repression in the form of significantly expanded legal 
and police powers to disrupt animal rights activism 
(see above); and several serious provocations by their 
86
introduction
THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION
opponents (including the deaths of one anti-live-exports 
campaigner, two hunt saboteurs and another seriously 
injured in confrontations with hunt supporters). All 
of these developments could potentially, and at times 
arguably did, lend themselves to emergent radicalisation 
dynamics. 
Nonetheless, animal liberation activists have never 
used lethal force, albeit this in some cases appears to 
have been more a result of good fortune than careful 
planning.12 Where violence has escalated, such as with 
the adoption of arson attacks, care has usually been 
taken to avoid serious physical injury, for example by 
using timers so that devices go off outside of business 
hours when there are unlikely to be people around; 
checking around and inside of buildings and vehicles 
for human and non-human animals prior to undertaking 
arson attacks, and even on occasion aborting actions 
where they are considered to pose too great a risk of 
harm (Stallwood, 2004). Certainly, instances of animal 
liberation activists setting out to cause serious physical 
harm are outliers, and much of the most bellicose 
rhetoric – Lee’s advocating for ‘the lightening of 
violence’ (Henshaw, 1989, p. 100) or his comment 
that ‘Someday, someone will get a screwdriver in the 
face’ (Henshaw, 1989, p. 11) – has rarely if ever been 
matched by their deeds.
Instead, close attention to the history of the animal 
liberation movement reveals fairly consistent and 
widespread intra-movement push-back against 
escalation of violence beyond established repertoires 
of action. There have only ever been a small number of 
activists willing to carry out acts of arson (Mann, 2007, 
p. 508), with many within the movement expressing 
concern not only that such attacks undermine public 
support but that they also carry too great a risk of 
harming humans or other animals (e.g., Webb, 1990). 
Direct opposition to violent escalation can often be 
found within the pages of movement-wide publications 
such as Arkangel magazine, and has also taken the form 
of tactical innovations away from violence. One of the 
clearest examples of the latter was the formation in the 
1980s of the various Animal Liberation Leagues and 
their adoption of daylight information gathering raids 
in which activists explicitly eschewed clandestinity and 
12   In Asal & Rethemeyer’s (2008, p. 260) study on the use of lethal force, they also note that ‘Though two environmental/animal rights organizations committed 
enough attacks to make our list of the fifty most active terrorist organizations in our database, not one of these attacks was lethal’.
13  It is possible that such statements contain a certain element of bravado and posturing, implying in effect that the only reason they haven’t done more violence 
is because they have chosen not to, but that that might change, so their opponents ought to be wary.
sought to minimise damage to property (Monaghan, 
1999, p. 71) – a shift away from violence that was 
however curtailed when such actions resulted in the 
mass arrests of those involved (Nagtzaam, 2017, p. 71). 
Similarly, opposition to the adoption of personalised 
targeting was reportedly what led the BUAV to expel 
the ALF SG from their London offices in May 1984, 
and the Peace News Collective to expel the ALF SG 
from their PO Box later in the same year (Stallwood, 
2004). 
As such, the animal liberation case enables us to 
explore both how brakes have been applied over four 
decades, and how some activists at the radical flank of 
the movement have at various points undermined the 
effectiveness of these brakes. It also enables us to look 
at how different brakes combine. Of particular interest 
here is the way that different brakes at times operate 
apparently in isolation, almost as trade-offs of one 
another – for example in Lee’s observation that ‘the only 
reason the ALF so far has not killed any of the enemy is 
not a principle position, but rather a matter of tactics’ 
Nagtzaam (2017, p. 82),13 or in Best & Nocella’s (2004, 
p. 57) reflection that the challenge for the ALF concerns 
‘how to be as militant and effective as possible without 
losing the moral high ground, without alienating public 
support, and without diluting the values of freedom 
and compassion’. At other times however the moral and 
strategic logics appear to align with one another, such 
as for example when moral proscriptions of violence 
coincide with arguments about how campaigns based 
on a mass movement are more effective than isolated 
acts of militancy (e.g., Roberts, 1986). 
87
intErnal brakES in thE animal libEration movEmEnt
BUSHER , HOLBROOK & MACKLIN
2. INTERNAL 
BRAKES IN 
THE ANIMAL 
LIBERATION 
MOVEMENT
Throughout its history, there has been limited 
ostensible organisational control of violent escalation 
within the movement. The ALF has tended to exert 
scant direct control over individual cells (Monaghan, 
1999, p. 165), and some of the most violent actions 
have been carried out by people acting largely on their 
own e.g., Barry Horne’s and Gurjeet Aujla’s respective 
‘ARM’ and ‘JD’ bombing campaigns. Yet academic 
accounts, activist memoirs and documentary evidence 
indicate a range of internal brakes on violent escalation 
being applied through activist networks at the levels of 
campaign planning, action planning and during actions, 
applied both by some of the more tactically moderate 
actors and by some situated very much within the 
radical flank.  
2.1 BRAKE 1
Identification of non- or less violent strategies of 
action as being as or more effective than more 
violent alternatives.
Brakes operating on strategic logics are prominent 
across contexts of campaign planning, action planning 
and during actions. As noted above, their relationship 
to moral brakes in particular is somewhat ambivalent. 
While at times the strategic logics for limiting violence 
are presented as coinciding with moral logics, at other 
times moral and strategic logics are presented as being 
in competition. Lee, for example, argued on occasion 
that he had no moral qualms about using greater levels 
of violence, in particular violence against persons, but 
that he did have concerns that such violence would 
undermine public support and therefore urged activists 
14  A letter in Arkangel magazine from Pippin Took, a contributor, citing Inti Peredo, A Bolivian guerrilla of the 1960s, writes, ‘Those who participate in the 
preparatory stage of a guerrilla movement must have an extra-ordinary capacity for self-control and sacrifice’ before going on to talk about the relevance of this 
(Mann 2007, 352).
to respect norms regarding the limited use of violence. 
Each of the five sub-brakes under brake 1 are evident 
within this case study. 
Brake 1a
Expressions of scepticism about their ability to beat 
their opponents in a violent struggle, including 
concerns that greater militancy will increase 
backlash or repression from opponents or the state 
towards them and their supporters. 
Scepticism about their ability to beat their opponents in 
a violent struggle was rarely foregrounded by activists, 
presumably as it was largely taken as a given. After all, 
in the final analysis their campaign was conceived of 
in terms of challenging the state-industrial complex. 
It is nonetheless present and appears to have played 
an important role in shaping tactical decisions within 
animal liberation activism. While some radical fringe 
actors conceived of direct action, including some 
limited forms of violence (primarily against property) 
as being a fundamental part of the struggle, there is 
little indication that even the more radical actors 
within the radical fringe of the movement conceived 
of their struggle as one that could be won primarily, 
let alone solely, through violence. Rather, direct action 
was almost always conceived of ultimately as part of a 
wider movement strategy (e.g., Stallwood, 2004). This 
did not preclude the use of some violence. Some radical 
flank actors framed their actions as those of a guerrilla 
campaign, for example. However, such framing in itself 
generates opportunities to apply brakes on violent 
escalation due to the emphasis that it places both on 
notions of maintaining discipline and self-control14 and 
on building support within the wider population (see 
brake 1b). 
Concerns about the personal costs of conflict escalation 
were frequently expressed, with the spectre and prior 
experience both of state repression and of backlash from 
opponents used repeatedly to urge caution about loss 
of discipline and control. During campaign planning, 
action planning and during actions activists frequently 
reminded one another about the risks of arrest. This was 
often expressed through comments about how it wasn’t 
‘worth it’ (Respondents C1, C2 and C3), a phrase that 
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simultaneously worked on moral logics – with notions 
of not needing or wanting to ‘stoop’ to the level of their 
opponents – and on strategic logics through the idea 
that they were more likely to be able to help animals 
if they weren’t in prison or under a restraining order. 
As might be expected, concerns about state repression 
intensified as activists found themselves and their 
colleagues facing increasingly severe sentences (Mann, 
2007, p. 597).
Concern about backlash from opponents is most 
apparent in contexts relating to hunt sabbing, where 
activists experienced the most intense and frequent 
interpersonal violence through their clashes with 
hunt supporters, albeit personal accounts of hunt 
saboteuring indicate considerable regional and local 
variation in the levels of violence, often a function of 
the relationships formed between local hunt supporters 
and local hunt saboteurs (Respondent C1 and C2; 
Mann, 2007). Such concerns clearly impacted on 
activists’ actions. Respondent C2 recalled that even 
where they felt aggrieved about violence that had taken 
place during previous meets, they and their fellow hunt 
saboteurs would in general seek to avoid confrontation 
at subsequent meets rather than pursuing revenge due, 
at least partly, to a desire not to escalate the violence. 
Mann also describes how awareness of the consequences 
of escalation in effect set up a conundrum for some 
hunt saboteurs, keen to get together with other hunt 
saboteurs to ‘hit’ hunt supporters with mass disruption 
as ‘payback’ for previous actions, but at the same time 
aware that this would likely lead to retribution.
National hits were big payback for something 
serious, a show of strength with 200 sabs to 
say: you hit us we hit you. It didn’t always 
help, of course, to support these big hits on 
the local hunt and then leave, because local 
sabs would later bear the brunt of subsequent 
retribution. But equally, these raids would 
have a controlling effect on some hunts. 
(Mann, 2007, p. 234).
The way that concerns about backlash from opponents 
translated into internal brakes is perhaps illustrated 
most starkly by Mann’s account of the deaths of two 
young hunt saboteurs, Mike Hill (1991) and Tom Worby 
(1993). Mike Hill’s death prompted a vigil by activists 
outside the house of the man who had been driving the 
vehicle from which Hill fell and died. The vigil turned 
into a house-raid that resulted in multiple arrests. Mann 
claims that Hill’s death ‘instilled a new resolve in the 
hearts of many to fight that bit harder’ (2007, p. 260). 
He also argues however that it encouraged activists 
to fight a bit more ‘cautiously’ in future, something 
reflected in a change to the words of a popular mantra:
'Once upon a time, the popular mantra on 
marches was:
What do we want?
Animal liberation!
When do we want it?
Now!
Are we going to fight for it?
Yes!
Are we going to die for it?
Yes!
We no longer invite each other to die for it; 
this has quietly drifted from the chanting 
since tragic deaths started to happen for 
real’. (Mann, 2007, p. 260).
Two years later, when Tom Worby was killed, 
There was, not surprisingly, a mood for 
revenge, but local sabs asked for calm. They 
didn’t want a repeat of Dodleston [where 
Mike Hill had been killed] and to have to 
take the flak when the dust settled […] There 
was no response from anyone to the killing 
of Tom Worby. (Mann, 2007, p. 265).
Nonetheless, while the request of local sabs was 
respected by the wider hunt saboteur community, some 
activists, including Mann, wondered whether ‘turning 
the other cheek’ might ‘make us more vulnerable’ 
(Mann, 2007, p. 265) – indicating that one way in 
which such brakes might be undermined is through in 
effect raising questions about the possible unintended 
consequences of less confrontational approaches. 
There are also indications that while concerns about 
backlash and repression might deter some activists 
from engaging in violent escalation, that once people 
had become involved in such practices these concerns 
became an acknowledged but largely accepted risk:
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‘there aren’t really that many people who 
have been prepared to build and plant 
incendiaries in shops, not even within 
Animal Liberation Front circles. During 
the fruitful fur campaign between 1984 
and 1987, around 40 in-store devices were 
placed by only a small number of activists, 
mostly known to each other… Less technical 
devices were and have been used much more 
often, but still not by any great number of 
people. Put simply, it isn’t something a lot of 
people do and those that do so once then lose 
the fear, and go on to do most of the work, 
prepared to continue until the inevitable 
happens. (Mann, 2007, p. 508).
Indeed, it is possible that, as Jasper & Nelkin (1992, p. 
46) discuss in their account of animal rights activism 
in the USA, for some activists their willingness to 
suffer for their cause becomes a source of pride and 
a sign of their commitment and righteousness. There 
is little doubt that being arrested acted as a source of 
prestige for activists in the UK, and through his hunger 
strikes and the impact that these had on the wider 
movement, Barry Horne demonstrated that one could 
still contribute to the cause when imprisoned. In the 
early 2000s, imprisoned SHAC activists also enjoyed 
celebrity status within the movement.
What may also have undermined the effects of brake 1a 
within the animal liberation movement was the support 
provided to activists who were facing convictions. As 
Henshaw notes, ‘the knowledge that the Front would 
pay your way if you got caught was encouraging to cell 
members who were by and large young, otherwise law 
abiding and not well off’ (Henshaw, 1989, p. 139) – 
although it is unclear whether this continued to be the 
case once sentences became much more significant.
Brake 1b
Expressions of concern that violent escalation will 
undermine support for the group.
One of the most frequently deployed brakes within the 
animal liberation movement were expressed concerns 
about how violent escalation might undermine public 
15  Jasper & Nelkin (1992, p. 50) note that within animal rights groups in the USA, concerns about alienating public opinion are a significant factor in their 
reluctance to condone violence.
16  The sprinkler system happened to be undergoing repairs on the day that the incendiary device was set off.
support for their cause.15 As is often the case in radical 
social movements, animal liberation activists in some 
respects distanced themselves from the general public, 
marking themselves out in ways that emphasised their 
particular moral worth. Einwohner (2002, p. 257), 
for example, describes how animal rights activists in 
the USA, drew distinctions between themselves as 
members of an ‘aware’ community and the general 
‘unaware’ public that could be described with terms 
such as ‘the lunkheads’, ‘those dead heads’, ‘the meat 
eaters’ or ‘slime’. Similarly, Henshaw describes ALF 
activists that he met showing open ‘contempt’ for the 
public (1989, p. 83) and argues that Lee’s vision of the 
ALF contained a ‘subtext of exclusivity’ (1989, p. 56). 
Nonetheless, most activists conceived of public support 
as being fundamental to the success of the movement 
and the need to build such support was frequently 
invoked as a reason not to escalate violence (e.g., 
Roberts, 1986). 
Recognition of the need for public support resulted in 
most activists making distinctions between the types of 
direct action that they thought were likely to win public 
sympathy and those that were not (Henshaw, 1989, p. 
160). The use of tactics thought likely to undermine 
public support e.g., bombs and incendiary devices, was 
usually met with expressions of frustration and anger, 
particularly from some of the more tactically moderate 
actors, multiple examples of which can be found in the 
pages of Arkangel. 
It seems likely that part of the reason why even militant 
activists placed value on the importance of public 
support was that there was an acknowledgement 
that public support was financially important for the 
movement. SHAC for example is reported to have 
raised more than £1m through street collections and 
street stalls (Nagtzaam, 2017, p. 99). 
This brake sometimes failed however, particularly 
within radical flank groups who became increasingly 
detached from public opinion. Respondent C3 observed 
for example that this brake had little purchase among the 
SHAC leadership as they became increasingly insular. 
Similarly, Henshaw notes that in 1987 after ALF 
activists had burned down Debenham’s department 
store in Luton,16 the ALF’s central press office ‘issued 
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a statement saying that […] he was more interested in 
stopping the slaughter of animals than in winning over 
public opinion; he didn’t think the activists cared too 
much about what the public would think’ (Henshaw, 
1989, p. 111). Yet such arguments appear to have 
gained little traction outside of the most radical fringes 
of the movement and, as already noted above, even 
individuals such as Lee who tended to be supportive of 
actions that pushed at the boundaries of their tactical 
repertoire, spoke about the risks associated with 
alienating the public.
Brake 1c
Attempts to build or maintain ties with strategically 
useful allies who are not supportive of violent 
escalation.
As described above, there was considerable overlap in 
‘membership’ across the various groups comprising 
the animal liberation movement and the wider animal 
rights movement. It is not clear however that attempting 
to build or maintain ties with strategically useful allies 
who are not supportive of violent escalation constituted 
a significant brake within this movement. It does 
appear to have been relevant within some of the more 
moderate groups. Henshaw for example argues that the 
‘politicos’ within the movement 
believed in the ideology of animal rights, 
the principle that they were parallel and 
equivalent to human rights; but when it 
came to the balaclava’d hit squads of the 
direct action tendency, there was some 
embarrassment. (Henshaw, 1989, p. 160)
Such brakes are less evident within the radical flank of 
the movement. 
Where more militant or radical flank activists sought 
either to influence the direction of the wider movement 
or access the resources available through some of the 
larger and more moderate groups, in some cases they 
in fact sought to take control of those groups,17  rather 
than trying to forge alliances, which may have partially 
short-circuited this brake.  
17  E.g., ‘Flashback: 5 November 1994 – Police called as rival factions clash at anti-vivisection group’s meeting’, Red Black Green, 5 November 2017, accessed 
via https://network23.org/redblackgreen/2017/11/05/flashback-5-november-1994-police-called-as-rival-factions-clash-at-anti-vivisection-groups-meeting/ 
Brake 1d
Identification of political opportunities that favour 
(re)adoption of non- or less violent strategies of 
action. 
Outside of the calls for hard political lobbying made 
by people from the more moderate flank of the animal 
rights movement, such as Kim Stallwood, former 
director of BUAV and PETA (e.g., Henshaw, 1989, p. 
160; Stallwood, 2004), there are limited examples of 
this brake. This is likely a reflection of the fact that there 
have been relatively few occasions on which there has 
been a significant opening up of political opportunities 
for animal rights activism (Henshaw, 1989, p. 161). 
Rather, the state and other elite actors have by and 
large shown repeated commitment to support major 
industries such as farming and pharmaceuticals, or at 
least political opportunities for pro-animal activism 
have tended to be heavily circumscribed and more 
suited to those with welfarist agendas. 
There are however two noteworthy examples in which 
activists within the animal liberation movement appear 
to have identified political opportunities and where this 
has led some within the movement to innovate away 
from violent escalation. The first of these takes place in 
early 1980s when the animal liberation leagues sought, 
through their daytime raids, to capitalise on what they 
perceived to be a rising tide of public sympathy for 
pro-animal agendas, and the fact that ‘few news editors 
(or the viewers and the readers they serviced) could 
resist touching stories featuring the rescue of animals,’ 
particularly if they were provided with ‘dramatic 
picture material’ (Henshaw, 1989, pp. 79-80). 
The other example takes place in the late 1990s when, 
Robin Webb, former spokesperson of the ALF, claims, 
animal liberation-related violence abated amidst hope 
that the Labour Party would deliver on a number of 
promises relating to addressing animal abuse and 
exploitation (Nagtzaam, 2017, pp. 107-8). 
Brake 1e
Identification of non- or less violent strategies of 
actions that are perceived to be effective, including 
identification of ‘sufficient’ levels of violence.
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Within the animal liberation case study, the idea 
of ‘sufficient’ levels of violence is more often 
associated with moral rather than strategic logics. The 
identification of non- or less violent strategies of action 
as being effective is however evident. Again, perhaps 
the clearest example of this relates to the adoption of 
daytime raids by the animal liberation leagues in the 
early 1980s – raids in which activists entered in daylight, 
doing minimum damage to property with the aim only 
of collecting evidence that could be used to support 
legal action against the companies that were targeted 
(Monaghan, 1999, p. 71). A series of successes in the 
early 1980s – including at University Park Farm (by the 
Central Animal Liberation League, 1984) and the Royal 
College of Surgeons (RCS) establishment in Downe, 
Kent (South East Animal Liberation League, 1984, 
which resulted in a successful summons against the 
RCS for inadequate ventilation of cages) – encouraged 
similar invasions across the country until such raids 
began to lead to significant numbers of arrests.
2.2 BRAKE 2
Construction of moral norms and evaluations that 
inhibit certain forms of violence and the emotional 
impulses towards violence (e.g., revenge).
While resistance to violent escalation from within 
the movement is often expressed with reference to 
perceived strategic shortcomings, ‘efficacy is certainly 
not the only criterion in choosing particular methods. 
Equally important for a vast majority of animal rights 
activists is the moral aspect of the methods used’ 
(Posłuszna, 2015, p. 74). 
The application of these brakes is most apparent at the 
level of campaign planning, with multiple and repeated 
expression of moral concerns within movement-wide 
publications and in the communiqués of the more 
moderate actors within the movement. However, these 
brakes are also evident at the level of action planning 
and in the context of actions themselves, with activists 
reporting that on more than one occasion actions 
were ‘aborted’ due to concern either about possible 
confrontations or to the possibility that the actions 
would result in physical harm. Mann (2007, p. 58) for 
example claims that ‘[w]hile fire is seen as the best 
18  Respondent C2 emphasised that while as a young person involved in animal rights activism part of the attraction was the excitement of direct action, what 
gave this meaning was the idea that ‘you were saving lives’. 
option for inflicting maximum damage, many attacks 
have been aborted where a potential risk of it spreading 
was identified.’ A similar claim is made by Stallwood 
(2004). 
Where moral brakes seemingly failed, this made 
some alliances within the wider movement untenable. 
For example, the Peace News Collective explained 
the withdrawal of a PO box for the ALF in 1984 on 
the ground that the ALF’s ‘increasingly and publicly 
showing a willingness to support acts of intimidation 
and physical violence to animal abusers’…‘raises 
difficult questions for pacifists’ (Henshaw, 1989, p. 95).
Brake 2a
Articulation and performance of general moral 
norms and principles that problematise certain 
forms of violence, require violence to be justified or 
enable activists to forestall on entering the ‘tunnel of 
violence’ (e.g.,, the conception of violence as a tactic 
of last resort; positioning non-retaliation as a virtue; 
emphasising values such as mercy and compassion).
The ALF was initially established as a non-violent 
organisation, and the concept of non-violence, in 
particular non-violence towards human and non-
human animals, has continued to be invoked to inhibit 
the adoption of more violent strategies of action. 
These concepts are discussed at considerable length 
in movement publications, with particular attention 
given to the contradictions that arise if a movement 
supposedly committed to reducing the suffering of 
all animals, both human and non-human,18 prosecutes 
a campaign of violence that itself causes harm and 
suffering. In 1974, Lee argues that direct action should 
be ‘limited only by a reverence for life and a hatred of 
violence’ (Stallwood, 2004, p. 83), and Lee and Gary 
Treadwell are also reported as writing in Freedom 
magazine, ‘The ALF is not violent in that much care 
is taken to prevent injury to people and many raids 
have been called off because of possible confrontation. 
In any case our aims are for human as well as (other) 
animal liberation’ (Nagtzaam, 2017, p. 80).
The articulation of general moral principles also 
operated as a braking mechanism by infusing decisions 
to avoid confrontation, and in particular to avoid 
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retaliation, with feelings of moral righteousness, rather 
than, for example, feelings of shame or humiliation: 
they enabled non-violence and non-retaliation to be 
constructed as the brave and noble thing to do. This 
can be seen, for example, in the decision not to retaliate 
after the death of Tom Worby, where activists could 
explain their actions not only in terms of avoiding 
subsequent state repression, but as a means in effect 
of elevating themselves morally both above their 
opponents and above other organisations elsewhere 
involved in campaigns of violence. Mann, for example, 
muses about whether the decision not to seek revenge 
makes them ‘more mature’ than the IRA, although as 
discussed above, he also wonders whether it makes 
them ‘more vulnerable’ (Mann, 2007, p. 265). 
The effectiveness of general moral norms as a brake on 
violent escalation has been circumscribed in a number 
of ways, however (Liddick, 2013). One of these has 
been through some activists’ adoption of a narrow 
definition of ‘violence’ as referring only to direct 
physical violence against human or non-human animals. 
This has generated considerable ambiguity around the 
parameters of legitimate force, with property damage 
and even in some cases campaigns of intimidation, 
effectively being deemed morally acceptable, enabling 
some activists to continue to claim the moral high 
ground despite the use of actions that many people 
would consider violent. This is epitomised by much of 
the discussion of violence within Mann’s memoir:
[L]et me make clear I object so greatly to 
the use of violence that I joined the ALF. I 
separate violence against the individual 
from damage done to inanimate objects. The 
latter moves me not a jot, the other always 
will. (Mann, 2007, p. 21).
It has also meant that, within the radical flank of 
the movement, this moral brake appears to be more 
effective with regards to higher levels of violence i.e., 
physical violence against persons, and indiscriminate 
violence. As an activist writes in Snarl! Handbook of 
the Leeds Animal Liberation Front,
Personally speaking, as an activist for some 
time, I wouldn’t plant a ‘bomb’…on or near 
any human or animal; no matter how cruel 
19  ALF SG Bulletin, 13
they may be. However, I would be prepared 
to use a device against empty property. This 
may sound contradictory, but it’s not. To 
kill or seriously main [sic] someone seems 
very contradictory, to me at least. (Cited in 
Nagtzaam, 2017, p. 81).
This brake was also undermined through appeals 
to arguments of necessity: that certain forms of 
violence are acceptable because they are the only 
means of achieving their objectives. Throughout the 
history of the animal liberation movement, actors on 
its radical flank have tended to equate militancy with 
effectiveness. During one of its bombing campaigns, 
for example, the ARM stated in a communiqué – 
published without comment in the ALF SG Bulletin - 
‘”Our power is in the two petrol bombings…and the 
car bombings”’ (Henshaw, 1989, p. 118). Similarly, 
the violence deployed by hunt supporters against hunt 
saboteurs caused some saboteurs to express scepticism 
about the viability of non-violence. Henshaw (1989, p. 
96) for example reports a hunt saboteur who argues, 
‘Right now…I’d say that effective hunt sabotage and 
non-violence look about a million miles apart’. 
Claims that the ends justify the means have also been 
made with reference to historical examples of struggles 
for liberation that used limited forms of violence 
to pursue social justice, such as the anti-Apartheid 
struggle, the suffragists or the anti-slavery struggle 
(Posłuszna, 2015, p. 95). In 1984 Lee, in a contribution 
to the ALF SG Bulletin went so far as to rail against 
what he described as a ‘half-baked pacifist ideology’19 
on the grounds that it was hindering their ability to 
bring about the desired change. In their most extreme 
form, appeals to the underlying utilitarian logic of such 
arguments have even been used to propose that killing 
vivisectors could be morally justified, 
‘I don’t think you‘d have to kill – assassinate 
– too many vivisectors before you would see a 
marked decrease in the amount of vivisection 
going on. And I think for 5 lives, 10 lives, 
15 human lives, we could save a million, 
2 million, 10 million nonhuman animals’. 
(Jerry Vlasak, ALF press officer in the USA, 
quoted in Posłuszna, 2015, p. 95).
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Since no lethal attacks have followed such 
statements, the intention of making such 
arguments is unclear. It is possible that 
they are made, and interpreted by fellow 
activists, as an indirect means of threatening 
and intimidating those involved in animal 
experimentation.
Some activists have also justified the use of limited 
forms of violence by arguing that their violence pales 
in comparison to that of their opponents. They point 
both to the violence meted out against animal liberation 
activists – e.g., reminders that in the UK context 
while pro-animal activists have never deployed lethal 
force two hunt saboteurs and one anti-live-exports 
campaigner have been killed and one hunt saboteur left 
with life-long disabilities – and, above all, the massive 
scale of violence carried out against animals by the 
meat, dairy, cosmetic and animal experimentation 
industries. Sometimes the rhetoric of being ‘at war’ 
is used to make this point. Henshaw (1989, p. 91) for 
example cites Tim Daley as saying he can ‘support 
petrol bombing, bombs under cars, and probably 
shootings at a later stage’ on the grounds that ‘It’s a 
war.’ As one ARM communiqué argued
Animal liberation must be part of a wide 
spectrum of revolutionary change in the 
structure of society, for British democracy is 
based on more blood, terror and exploitation 
than any other country in history. It has a 
brutal police force whose crimes against 
people and animals the media will not 
report, and whose government blatantly 
supports repressive systems of governments 
[sic] around the world. (Quoted in Henshaw, 
1989, p. 118). 
This enables some forms of violence, especially 
property damage and animal rescue, to be positioned 
as a form of ‘extensional self-defense’ (Best, 2008), or 
even as a moral obligation, on the basis that it might 
be the only way to prevent or at least reduce the threat 
of imminent harm (Jasper & Nelkin, 1992, p. 49). 
Again, references to supposed historic parallels, such 
as hypothetical conundrums about whether or not to 
destroy Nazi gas chambers or torture chambers are 
often used to make these points, particularly in relation 
to property damage, 
‘There was a bit of tension between the 
ideology of the daylight big break-ins and 
the night-time small break-ins in the sense 
that some people would say, well, if you’re 
going to all the trouble of getting in there you 
should at least smash the torture equipment 
up, and you can imagine the kind of thing 
you break into a set of dungeons and there’s 
all the shackles there, do you leave them or 
do you take them sort of thing, and so you 
can see where that tension was coming from’ 
(‘Phil’, quoted in Plows, Wall & Doherty, 
2004, p. 212). 
References to the violence of their opponents are also 
used to explain, if not necessarily to justify, violence 
emerging out of revenge dynamics. Campaigns are 
described as becoming deeply personal – activists 
might themselves have been attacked, or seen friends 
attacked. When describing how the owner of Hill Grove 
Farm’s Range Rover was ‘burnt out in front of their 
house and windows were broken…’ Mann for example 
observes that ‘too much momentum had gathered to 
stop what was happening to the business now. It had 
become personal for too many people’ (Mann, 2007, 
p. 535). Similarly, major property damage carried out 
at Regal Rabbits is explained as an act of revenge for 
an alleged intimidation of female activists by Regal 
Rabbits security staff (Mann, 2007, pp. 579-86). 
Such arguments nonetheless continued to position 
non-violence as an ideal (albeit, for some, unrealistic) 
position and violence as a tactic of last resort, placing 
pressure on activists who did use violence to justify 
their actions. Furthermore, the arguments undermining 
non-violence norms tend also to only address limited 
or specific forms of violence. For example, drawing 
parallels with the Underground Railroad is used 
primarily to justify property damage undertaken in the 
process of liberating animals; while comparisons with 
those who sought to destroy Nazi concentration camps 
are used to justify damage to laboratory or farming 
equipment rather than direct physical violence towards 
vivisectors or farmers. No moral arguments were put 
forward in support of indiscriminate violence, and 
those that advocated physical harm to their opponents 
were outliers.
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Brake 2b
Identification of some groups of actors as 
illegitimate targets for violence.
Brake 2b is most often evident in the extensive debates 
about the rights and wrongs of arson attacks, where 
there are widespread expressions of concern about the 
risks of harming or endangering the life of human and 
non-human animals. As Robin Webb, an ALF press 
officer, states,
In my opinion, arson does not fall under 
the classification of ‘damage to property’ 
but rather, actions that endanger life. The 
ALF is proud of its claim never to have 
harmed human life but arson has, almost 
undisputedly, taken life, whether it be a 
mouse, rat, or spider. One cannot check 
every nook and cranny of a department 
store or broiler shed; the presence of a small 
creature is not as obvious as that of a human 
and they do not understand fire alarms and 
emergency exists. (Webb, 1990).
Even Lee, who at various points extolled the virtues 
of (limited forms of) violence, later reflected on the 
problematic nature of claims that arson could be used, 
providing that buildings were first cleared of animals:
‘This is clearly untrue. Since every building 
is home to countless very small animals, e.g.,, 
insects, who could not be evacuated to safety 
and who would therefore be murdered…I 
think we were naïve to think that animals 
would not be harmed.' (Lee, in conversation 
with Carolyn Bailey, 2010).20
Concerns about harming those who do not deserve to 
be harmed also informs intra-movement criticism of 
letter bombing campaigns, with concern frequently 
expressed that such letters might go off in the hands of 
postal workers or other innocent parties (Lee, 1989). 
The concept of ‘innocents’ is also prominent in the intra-
movement condemnation of an incendiary attack on a 
pub in 1995. The pub was attacked with an incendiary 
device on the grounds that it was being frequented by 
two individuals playing a significant role in the live 
20  Lee’s comments here touch on an extensive debate within animal rights movements about the relative weight that should be put on the lives of different ani-
mals (see also Jasper & Nelkin, 1992)
export of animals, but the attack was undertaken at 
night when the landlord and the landlord’s family were 
in their flat above the pub.  
‘Tactically and morally in this case, however, 
the problem was considered by many to be 
the indiscriminate nature of the action; it 
wasn’t so much the fact the pub had been 
frequented by the two exporters, but more 
that there had been innocent people upstairs 
at the time of the attack. The targeting of 
a business over its use by a Hunt or even 
because of a customer’s attendance has been 
a legitimate tactic, but not the targeting of 
innocent tenants. (Mann, 2007, p. 454). 
No similar attacks have taken place in the name of 
animal rights in the UK subsequently. 
This brake appears to have had purchase even within 
the most radical fringes of the movement. For example, 
activists operating under the ARM banner emphasised 
in a communiqué after an attack that their attacks were 
targeted at ‘“the real animal abusers, the vivisectors, 
huntsmen and slaughterhouse owners”’ i.e., they were 
not indiscriminate and did not target those who might 
be considered innocent (Henshaw, 1989, p. 68).
2.3 BRAKE 3
Self-identification as a group that is either non-
violent or uses only limited forms of violence.
As described under brake 2, concepts of and 
identification as a non-violent movement have shaped 
the trajectory of the animal liberation movement. 
It is not therefore surprising that maintenance of 
these identities was often used as a brake on violent 
escalation, with the upholding of principles of non- or 
minimal violence placed at the very core of activists’ 
sense of who they collectively are – a theme that runs 
throughout Mann’s memoir,
the rules are unwritten but the central edict 
is: don’t use violence or incite others to do 
so….We break the rules to end the bloodshed, 
not to pursue it. (Mann, 2007, p. 22). 
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Even when actions clearly exceed the 
established parameters of legitimate action, 
Mann maintains that movement norms make 
it unlikely that such strategies of action will 
proliferate. For example, reflecting on the 
assault on Brian Cass, Mann states, 
Premeditated violence is a new phenomenon. 
It is not widespread. It doesn’t seem like it 
ever would be given the track record thus 
far and the lack of motivation for bloodshed 
from animal activists. (Mann, 2007, p. 606).
Observation of brake 3 highlights the difficulty at times 
of trying to disaggregate moral and strategic logics. Do 
the efforts of ALF activists to distance themselves from 
the actions of the ARM (brake 3b) reflect moral or 
strategic considerations? Are they even made in good 
faith?21 Our contention however is that what is important 
here is that in the act of distancing themselves from the 
ARM they both signal to other activists the parameters 
of acceptable strategies of action and acknowledge, and 
arguably seek to align themselves with wider public 
mores about the acceptable parameters of direct action 
and violence (see also Jasper & Nelkin, 1992, p. 49).
The observations here also raise questions about 
the extent to which dissociation from violence by a 
specific ‘group’ does in fact act as a brake on violence, 
or simply causes it to be carried out under another 
banner. The many different names under which animal 
liberation activists could operate was used to protect 
the reputation of groups who claimed to be relative 
‘moderates’. Lee even appears to actively encourage 
such an approach in 1981, 
For tactical reasons I feel that it is best that 
the ALF retains its current policy on these 
matters…however there is nothing to stop 
fresh groups being set up under new names 
whose policies do not preclude the use of 
violence towards animal abusers. (Quoted in 
Henshaw, 1989, p. 58).
Yet the relative scarcity of physical violence directed 
at people during the 30 years after Lee’s comment 
21  Henshaw, for example, appears to consider that some ALF activists at least distanced themselves from ‘groups’ such as ARM simply to give themselves a 
‘degree of respectability’ (Henshaw, 1989, p. 58).
22  See ALF SG Bulletin, 11, Jan 1984, for an account of an incendiary raid on a farm at Ampthill in Bedfordshire
indicates that such braking mechanisms did do more 
than simply displace the violence.
Brake 3a
Production of group narratives that emphasise 
non-violence or the limited use of violence either by 
themselves or by those they claim have inspired their 
movement.
Animal liberation activists were engaged in ongoing 
construction of themselves as part of a movement 
that only uses non- or limited forms of violence – 
particularly within those strands of the movement 
where activists sought to distinguish themselves from 
the most tactically radical elements of the movement. 
Henshaw (1989, p. 83) talks for example about how 
those activists involved in the animal liberation leagues 
‘were keen to present an image of reluctant and 
fundamentally decent activism; a kind of animals’ SAS 
with all the cool efficiency and none of the nastiness.’ 
This process is most obviously evident in movement 
publications and memoirs. First-hand accounts of raids 
by ALF activists frequently include comment, at least 
in passing, about how they ensured that the risk of 
physical harm was minimised, particularly in the case 
for actions where there was a greater risk of harm, such 
as arson attacks.22 In several of these accounts activists 
emphasise the fact that the non- or limited violence was 
a matter of their choosing. For example, recounting raid 
on Wickham Laboratories, Mann describes himself 
and colleagues on the roof observing lab workers; 
Had we been the type of people they say we 
are, it would have been the easiest thing in 
the world to inflict some serious GBH on 
these people as they were doing to others far 
less capable of defending themselves right in 
front of our very eyes. (Mann, 2007, p. 626).
Such accounts must of course be read partly as 
statements intended to counter accusations from their 
opponents and critics that they comprise some form of 
‘extremist’ organisation. However, they also serve to 
culturally embed practices that reduce the risk of harm 
and contribute to establish moral parameters. 
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The other way that such group narratives were 
constructed was through the historic figures and 
movements from which they claimed to draw their 
inspiration, with famous leaders of non-violent 
resistance and liberation movements, such as Ghandi 
and Martin Luther King, particularly prominent. This 
was sometimes challenged to a greater or lesser degree. 
Those who advocated the limited use of illegal actions 
and even violence might, for example, de-emphasise 
the figures such as Ghandi and Martin Luther King 
and instead draw parallels with the underground 
railroad, the activists who sought to liberate prisoners 
during the Holocaust, the suffragists and the wider 
civil rights movement: all of whom, it is pointed out, 
deployed what at the time were illegal methods, and 
sometimes also violence, in pursuit of higher moral 
goals (Liddick, 2013). As discussed above, such 
points of reference nonetheless still only created moral 
opportunities for highly circumscribed forms of illegal 
or violent activity. Some on the radical flank argued 
that animal liberationists should not allow themselves 
to be inhibited by what, as described above, Lee once 
described as a ‘half-baked pacifist ideology’, but such 
occasional outbursts appear to have done fairly little to 
shift the broad identification of most activists as part of 
a movement committed fundamentally to non-violence 
and the reduction of harm.
Brake 3b
Disassociation from more violent groups or factions 
and/or association with less violent groups or 
factions.
As early as 1974, a ‘local figure’ in the HSA in Lee’s 
hometown of Luton
…offered a reward of £250 for information 
leading to the identification of the Band of 
Mercy. The ‘area commander’ told the press, 
‘we approve of their ideals, but are opposed 
to their methods’. (Henshaw, 1989, pp. 15-
16).
Disassociation in the animal liberation movement is 
made complicated by the chaotic nature of movement 
structures and the extent to which organisational titles 
were used as banners of convenience. Disassociation 
was most evident after incidents had taken place that 
were deemed to have exceeded established parameters 
of acceptable action. For example, activists in groups 
such as BUAV, LACS and Animal Aid distanced 
themselves from the ALF when ALF activists 
adopted their campaign of personal targeting; after 
the desecration of the grave of the Duke of Beaufort 
(1984) activists from LACS and the HSA ‘roundly 
condemned the “ghoulish” adventure’ (Henshaw, 1989, 
p. 97) and even ‘some of the harder elements of the 
movement’ described it as being ‘somewhat excessive’ 
(Henshaw, 1989, p. 99), and ALF activists distanced 
themselves from ‘groups’ such as ARM, JD and the 
Animal Abused Society after their attacks. While 
disassociation might at times have been undertaken for 
fairly instrumental reasons (Carnell, 1998) it is likely 
that such distancing inhibited proliferation of these 
strategies by marking them as being incompatible with 
the group identity.
Meanwhile, some of the most radical activists defined 
their activism in contrast to that of what they considered 
comprised genuine ‘extremist’ groups. Prior to the 
2000s this tended to entail distinguishing their actions 
from those of the IRA. Activists operating under the 
ARM banner, for example, sought to differentiate 
themselves from the IRA by emphasising that they 
were not going to undertake ‘indiscriminate violence’ 
(Henshaw, 1989, p. 68). After 2000, the comparison 
point shifted to extreme Islamist groups.
The extent to which disassociation resulted in any 
change on the ground rather than comprising simply 
a symbolic distancing is unclear. On some occasions 
at least however there is evidence that attempts 
at disassociation did entail efforts to inhibit the 
organisational influence of more radical factions. 
When ALF activists undertook an incendiary device 
campaign, for example, Animal Aid distributed 
criticism of the ALF to their members in the form of 
a circular to local groups calling for organisational 
separation from the ALF.
‘If we are to continue to build on our 
successes then (we) must exclude from our 
groups those individuals whose views on 
campaigning are fundamentally at odds 
with ours’…’We believe that the ALF as an 
organisation has behaved irresponsibly by 
allowing advocates of premeditated violence 
to operate within its ranks; by publishing 
articles advocating violence; and through 
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its constant refusal to issue an outright 
condemnation of campaigns of violence’. 
(Quoted in Mann, 2007, p. 180).
Local Animal Aid groups were then provided a model 
resolution to be adopted stating that they would sever 
links with anyone who supported the ALF.
Brake 3c
(The threat of) sanctions for activists who advocate 
or undertake violence beyond the established 
parameters of the group’s action repertoire, and/
or opportunities to achieve intra-group respect and 
prestige without undertaking or encouraging the 
use of violence at or beyond the parameters of the 
group’s action repertoire.
This sub-brake is less visible within the animal 
liberation case. This sub-brake is less visible within the 
animal liberation case. Indeed a number of accounts of 
the evolution of the movement indicate that leadership 
positions were often occupied by individuals or small 
groups of actors with a greater appetite for and record of 
participation in violence than many of the supporters. 
Describing the early evolution of the ALF, for example, 
Henshaw argues, 
By 1981 a new generation of much harder, 
unsentimental leadership had taken charge 
of the direction of ALF policy, with the 
approval of Ronnie Lee. These included 
figures whose political background lay in 
anarchism and some whose experience lay 
in the violent confrontationlism of the far 
right. (Henshaw, 1989, p. 91). 
Similarly, Respondent C3 observed that the SHAC 
leadership appeared to have a far greater appetite 
for radical strategies of action than most with the 
movement.
There is however some evidence that activists whose 
actions clearly exceed established action repertoires 
were sanctioned. In most cases this appears to be 
limited to criticism from co-activists. Such criticisms 
can often be found in movement publications. Henshaw 
notes for example that after one ARM communiqué 
was published in the ALF SG Bulletin,
there were several dissenting voices to be 
heard in the Supporters Group Bulletin, 
accusing the Militia of being “wankers” 
who were using the animal rights cause as 
a vehicle for their own ludicrous fantasies. 
(Henshaw, 1989, p. 122).
After the arson attack on the White Hart pub, which 
broke movement protocol by putting at risk the lives of 
people considered ‘innocent’, sanctions also included 
a decision from the ALF supporters group to withhold 
financial support for those who had carried out the 
attack.
The White Hart episode caused a serious 
dilemma for the ALF SG. For the first time 
in its history, it was faced with having to 
deal with an action, which had crossed the 
defining line between that deemed acceptable 
and unacceptable under the ALF ‘statutes’. 
A great deal of energy was expended on the 
debate that followed the attacks and arrests, 
and the SG members narrowly voted that 
financial support should not be offered to the 
defendants, though moral support should. 
(Mann, 2007, p. 454). 
It is likely that such decisions served to consolidate 
established parameters of action, and perhaps dissuaded 
others from pursuing similar courses of action.
Brake 3d
Circulation of limited expectations that they will be 
involved in greater levels of violence. 
This brake is not prominent in any of the accounts 
of animal liberation activism accessed. However, it is 
unclear whether this is because the brake was relatively 
unimportant, or whether it reflects the somewhat 
taken for granted nature of this particular sub-brake. 
They anticipated violent confrontations with hunt 
supporters. However, expectations of violence varied 
depending on the hunts that they were attending, and 
there was an expectation that these confrontations 
would usually remain within established levels of 
violence (Respondents C1 and C2). Activists did not 
prepare themselves for greater levels of violence.
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2.4 BRAKE 4
Boundary softening in relation to putative out-
groups (e.g., opponents, opponents’ perceived 
supporters, the general public or state actors).
One of the ways in which animal liberation activists 
generated and accentuated moral outrage was through 
forms of ‘boundary making’, including the de- or –infra-
humanization of some of their opponents – a common 
mobilisation strategy within social movements. 
Individuals involved in animal experimentation for 
example were often portrayed as monsters, akin to 
the Nazi doctors experimenting on concentration 
camp inmates; as sick perverts getting their kicks out 
of making animals suffer; or simply as mercenary 
profiteers oblivious to the suffering of the animals. 
Similarly, as described above, activists engaged in 
boundary hardening with regards to the general public, 
positioning them as at best unaware and at worst 
uncaring or even actively colluding in the suffering of 
animals. Forms of boundary softening were however 
also apparent and appear to have contributed to support 
intra- and inter-group brakes on violent escalation. 
Brake 4a
Resistance to generalizations about their opponents.
For ALF activists, resistance to generalisations about 
opponents is at least in principle institutionalised 
through the ALF Credo that states that one of the 
commitments of ALF activists is:
To analyse the ramifications of any proposed 
action and never apply generalizations 
(e.g.,, all ‘blank’ are evil) when specific 
information is available.23 
Apart from contributing to inhibit the dehumanisation 
of their opponents, resistance to generalisations also 
on some occasions appears to have enabled processes 
of strategic adaptation and attempts to achieve a form 
of negotiated conflict balance. As already noted above, 
hunt saboteurs often drew distinctions between more 
and less violent hunts. By not treating all hunts the 
same, cases developed over time in which some groups 
of hunt saboteurs and hunt supporters were able to 
23   Accessed via http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/alf_credo.htm 
interact with one another without violent escalation 
taking place. Mann for example recalls,
We had an odd relationship with the 
Holcombe Hunt. Years of intense pressure by 
‘antis’ had restricted their freedom and the 
endless encroachment of urbanisation had 
engulfed the hunt’s former territory so that 
it was closed by Manchester’s suburbs to the 
south, Liverpool to the east and Preston to 
the north…We knew where they all lived, 
and they knew it, especially whenever 
there was any trouble and someone on our 
side got hurt. In response to a big day of 
killing, a home visit could be guaranteed; 
someone’s horsebox might get sabotaged or 
they’d be treated to a Sabbing Special when 
hundreds would descend on their Saturday 
get-together and cause havoc! It got to the 
stage where the thinkers among their ranks 
began to appreciate the stupidity of trying to 
beat everyone up, and a situation developed 
in which it became possible to sab alone or 
monitor them without fear of attack. I often 
did and got away with it unscathed. Such was 
the relationship with the hunt that one or two 
even went out of their way to be polite and 
would buy me a drink in the pub at the end of 
the day. One would even give me the dates of 
meets if I rang him! He was himself grateful, 
knowing that although we had his name, 
phone number and address, he only ever got 
called occasionally for meet details and at a 
reasonable hour. He was also respectful and 
one of the few who never engaged in violence 
towards us. (Mann, 2007, p. 216).
While this negotiated conflict balance emerges through 
what are essentially movement – countermovement 
interactions, it is enabled by individuals on both sides 
resisting the temptation to generalise about their 
opponents.
‘De-humanisation’ as a concept fits somewhat 
awkwardly with AL activism given the limited value 
placed by animal rights activists on human lives and 
human well-being as opposed to non-human animal 
well-being. However, the basic idea of not reducing 
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the value of the life of their opponents by placing 
them within in an inferior ontological category does 
apply and is prominent within animal liberation 
activism, being used to highlight the contradiction if, 
for example, harm is done to animal scientists in the 
course of a supposed struggle for animal liberation. In 
the statement from the Peace News Collective in which 
they explained why they were withdrawing the PO Box 
from the ALF, they argued: 
‘The use of violence to liberate animals 
is itself a contradiction. At its crudest, 
humans are animals too, even vivisectors are 
animals.' (Quoted in Henshaw, 1989, p. 95).
Brake 4b
Identification of segments of the public beyond 
their previously-imagined support base as potential 
converts to their cause.
While activists are often disparaging of the general 
public, they are usually constructed as potential 
supporters for the cause. There are only relatively few 
sub-groups (animal scientists, butchers, farmers) who 
are positioned as necessarily comprising opposition 
groups, and even here these are all categories that 
individuals could potentially leave. It is the perceived 
potential support from a broad spectrum of the public 
that is used to reinforce arguments described under 
brake 1b about the importance of not alienating the 
public through the use of violence. 
Brake 4c
Limited intra-movement pressure to ‘burn-bridges’ 
with social contacts outside of the movement or 
outside of the radical flank of the movement.
While animal rights comes to dominate the lives 
of activists, this does not usually entail isolating 
themselves from the outside world (Posłuszna, 2015, p. 
89). It is likely that this contributed to inhibit potential 
small-group processes of radicalisation. Of note, 
where tactical radicalisation has taken place, it usually 
appears to have done so within factions or cliques that 
became increasingly isolated from the wider movement 
community. Henshaw for example notes that the radical 
flank actors that he meets tell him, 
We’re not organized in the sense that most people 
would understand it…there’s a small group of us and 
we trust each other implicitly. We don’t discuss things 
on the telephone and we no longer get involved in local 
animal rights groups. (Henshaw, 1989, p. 62).
In the early 1990s, both Aujla and Horne operated 
largely in isolation, and the tactical radicalisation of the 
SHAC campaign coincided with the SHAC leadership 
becoming increasingly insular and disconnected from 
the wider animal rights movement (Respondent C3).
Brake 4d
Expressions of reluctance to conceive of the state 
security forces as ‘the enemy’.
There is scant comment within the animal liberation 
movement about the legitimate exercise of power 
by security forces: perhaps to be expected given the 
anarchist influences within the movement. At least 
at the radical flank of the movement, the police are 
identified as part of the state-industrial complex against 
which they are fighting. 
However, there is a consistent reluctance to conceive of 
them as part of the opposition. It seems likely that this 
is largely a product of strategic logics, with widespread 
concerns about increased state repression and declining 
public support if they target the police directly.
2.5 BRAKE 5
Organisational developments that either (a) alter 
the moral and strategic equations in favour of non- 
or limited violence, (b) institutionalise less violent 
collective identities and/or processes of boundary 
softening, and/or (c) reduce the likelihood of 
unplanned violence.
Brake 5a
Limited investment in capabilities to escalate 
violence, and/or development of capabilities to 
undertake strategies of action that either entail non- 
or limited violence or more controlled violence.
The development of capabilities to undertake strategies 
of action that use non- or limited violence is arguably 
so ubiquitous within the animal liberation case study 
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that it becomes almost invisible, since most of the 
activities undertaken entailed non- or very limited 
forms of violence. Where the brake is more evident is 
when there is a concerted tactical shift away from more 
radical strategies of action, as happened with the rise of 
the animal liberation leagues in the 1980s. In this case, 
activists reduced the amount of violence likely to take 
place by developing techniques to enter laboratories 
while causing minimal damage and train activists not 
to carry out violence during the raids. Henshaw for 
example observes that Tim Johnston, the leader of the 
Central Animal Liberation League 
was proud of the professionalism of CALL, he 
said. Stealthy, informed, careful operations 
had meant few arrests: there was no room for 
macho displays of reckless violence. ‘Units 
like this train very hard. We’re not going to 
raid places every week in order to prove we 
exist.’ (Henshaw, 1989, p. 81).
During the planning phase of raids on laboratories and 
other installations activists sought to identify how they 
might minimise the risk of confrontations with security 
guards and other personnel. For example, describing 
planning for a campaign targeting a chain of chemists, 
Mann recalls, 
It was decided very early on to focus on 
the kennels rather than the lab, since the 
latter posed a greater risk of confrontation 
with security. As valuable as entering the 
lab would surely have been, this was to be 
about rescuing animals and shaming Boots 
as vivisectors. (Mann, 2007, p. 277). 
Movement publications also provided information 
about reducing the risk of harm during actions. For 
example, while Interviews with Animal Liberation 
Front Activists provided information about how to 
carry out a campaign using incendiary devices, it also 
provided advice on how to minimise the risk of harm 
from such actions. Henshaw, for example, notes a 
passage that states, 
Before a device is placed in a vehicle, two 
things must be done… Firstly, we check that 
there is not a driver sleeping overnight in the 
vehicles, and secondly we catter “Scoot” all 
around the vehicle. This is a product we get 
from pet shops that puts off cats and dogs 
from going under the vehicles. (Henshaw, 
1989, p. 107).
In terms of developing capabilities to limit violence, 
the obvious example from this case study is the 
development of timed incendiary devices. While this 
enabled animal liberation activists to cause considerable 
property damage, it also enabled them to minimise the 
risk to human and other animal life.
Brake 5b
Foregrounding more modest or intermediate 
objectives and de-prioritising revolutionary goals.
As we would expect, tactical escalation was often 
motivated, or at least justified, through calls for objective 
widening and the adoption of more revolutionary 
campaign outlooks. SHAC provide one of the most 
obvious examples of this. Mann, for example notes,
The campaign against HLS galvanised the 
movement and changed the rules of the 
game against vivisection. It opened up the 
fact that the battle against HLS is a war 
against vivisection between the people and 
the entire petrochemical/ pharmaceutical/ 
governmental machine, whose activities are 
sanctioned, protected, and funded by the 
State and its various branches, who in turn 
profits from the power and wealth of those 
industries. (Mann, 2007, p. 596).
However, within the animal liberation movement there 
are repeated impulses in the other direction e.g., calls for 
campaigns around getting changes in the law regarding 
animal experimentation rather than a total ban on 
experimentation. These campaigns do not necessarily 
give up on the longer term goals of an end to animal 
experiments and the meat trade, but they do mean that 
strategic equations are tipped more towards forming 
relationships with lawmakers, building public support 
etc. It is unclear the extent to which the circulation of 
such modest or intermediate objectives acted as a brake 
on radical flank actors.  
Brake 5c
Construction and maintenance of spaces in which a 
range of activists that includes and extends beyond 
the radical flank are able to freely discuss tactics and 
movement objectives.
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There are multiple forums through which radical flank 
actors come into contact and engage with activists from 
beyond the radical flank. In some of these forums, such 
as within Arkangel magazine, the most tactically radical 
actors face considerable criticism from within the 
wider movement. The impact of these spaces is difficult 
to discern, but it is clear that such forums served to 
expose radical flank activists to a broad spectrum of 
intra-movement criticism. 
Brake 5d
Concerns among some group members that violent 
escalation will compromise their ability to shape the 
direction of the movement and/or negatively affect 
their position within the movement.
No examples identified in this case study, although it 
is possible that such dynamics contributed to efforts by 
some of the movement moderates to inhibit attempts by 
groups associated with the ALF to gain greater influence 
within some of the larger pro-animal organisations.
Brake 5e
Concentration of energy on targeting movement 
rivals, leading to reduced capability to prosecute 
campaigns of violence against their external 
enemies.
There is no shortage of internal feuds within the animal 
liberation movement. Henshaw notes that by 1984 ‘the 
purest vitriol…seemed reserved for those who the ALF 
contemptuously referred to as the “enemy within”’ 
(Henshaw, 1989, p. 99). It is less clear however that this 
saps activist energy in the way that it did in the extreme 
right scene (Annex B), or that it acted as a brake on 
violence.
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3. TIMELINE
YEAR SIGNIFICANT ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1972 •	 Band of Mercy is formed by Ronnie Lee 
and Cliff Goodman
•	 Band of Mercy begin campaign of economic sabotage and 
immobilisation of hunt vehicles
1973 •	 First Band of Mercy arson attack
1974 •	 Lee, Goodman and Robin Howard arrested 
for a raid on Oxford Laboratory Animal 
Colonies in Bicester
1975
1976 •	 Lee and 30 others form the ALF
1977 •	 Desecration of John Peel’s grave in Caldbeck, Cumbria, by 
a group of anti-bloodsports campaigners, including Mike 
Hutchisson
1978
1979 •	 First laboratory break-in by the American ALF
1980 •	 Northern Animal Liberation League 
(NALL), the first of several animal 
liberation leagues (ALLs), is launched 
•	 People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals (PETA) formed in the US by 
Ingrid Newkirk and Alex Pacheco
•	 First NALL evidence gathering raids
•	 First ALF home visit to an employee of a pharmaceutical 
company: messages are painted on target’s property 
1981 •	 Multiple and coordinated ALF home visits
1982 •	 ALF SG is formed •	 Nov: ARM sends ‘letter bombs’ to leaders of the main 
political parties in Britain
1983
1984 •	 May: BUAV expel ALF SG from their 
London offices
•	 Sept: Peace News Collective expels ALF 
SG from their PO Box
•	 The ALLs close down after mass arrests; 
prisoner support schemes set up 
•	 Multiple largescale (up to 300 people) daylight ‘invasions’ 
by regional ALLs, generate evidence and attract public 
support but result in multiple arrests.
•	 ALF burn down Aintree grandstand: estimated £100k 
damage
•	 Nov: Mars Bar hoax represents first use of contamination 
scams
•	 Dec: HRS desecrate the grave of the Tenth Duke of Beaufort
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YEAR SIGNIFICANT ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1985 •	 Arrests of national ALF leadership in 
Sheffield, including Lee
•	 Major internal struggle for control of 
BUAV
•	 Two scientists have their homes attacked with Molotov 
cocktails 
•	 ALF’s first use of pocket-sized incendiary devices set off 
sprinklers in department stores selling fur. Devices timed 
to go off at night 
•	 Publication of Interviews with Animal Liberation Front 
Activists, containing guidance on how to carry out 
incendiary attacks.
•	 ARM claim 6 minor bomb attacks on scientists’ homes and 
vehicles.
1986 •	 Lee receives 10 year prison sentence
•	 ALF offices in Hammersmith are raided 
and shut down and publication of ALF SG 
Bulletin is halted
•	 Jan: coordinated car-bomb attacks on 4 animal scientists 
•	 Apr: a communiqué from ARM after a car-bomb attack, 
published in the ALF SG Bulletin, announces ‘no more 
warnings’ policy.
1987 •	 NAVS staff are replaced as more radical 
activists gain control of the organisation
•	 Debenhams department store, Luton, gutted by fire when the 
sprinkler system happens to be turned off for maintenance 
at the time of an incendiary attack
1988
1989 •	 Arkangel Magazine is launched •	 Bombing at Bristol University claimed by the Animal 
Abused Society. The attack is condemned by the ALF
•	 BUAV set up Sarah Kite to infiltrate Huntingdon Research 
Centre 
1990 •	 Barry Horne arrested with incendiary 
devices for the first time. He receives a 3 
year sentence
•	 Mike Huskisson and Melody MacDonald Infiltrate National 
Institute for Medical Research, leading to revocation of Dr. 
Feldberg’s licence
•	 June: two car bombs attacks, targeting a veterinary surgeon 
working at a research defence laboratory and a Bristol 
University academic
1991 •	 9 Feb: hunt saboteur Mike Hill (18), dies 
after an altercation with hunt supporters
•	 More than 100 meat and animal transportation vehicles 
burnt out over 12-month period
1992
1993 •	 3 Apr: hunt saboteur Tom Worby (15) is 
killed when he falls under the truck of a 
huntsman. No charges are brought against 
the driver.
•	 Animal rights activists disrupt the Grand National.
•	 JD claims 31 attacks, including 13 devices sent by post 
comprising poster tubes with explosive devices and HIV 
infected needles.
104
timElinE
THE INTERNAL BRAKES ON VIOLENT ESCALATION
YEAR SIGNIFICANT ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1994 •	 Fighting breaks out at the BUAV EGM 
between ‘modernisers’ and ‘dissidents’ 
•	 Pre-emptive detention used to avoid 
disruption of Grand National in response 
to 1993 disruption
•	 Gurjeet Aujla arrested and charged for 
Stena Sealink campaign.
•	 JD claim approx 100 attacks, including posting metal 
mousetraps fitted with superglued razor blades. Use of 
secondary targeting, e.g.,, campaign against Stena Sealink 
for their role in live animal exports.
•	 Multiple incendiary attacks claimed by ARM.
1995 •	 National campaign against live animal exports, during 
which Jill Phipps (31) is killed by a truck at Baginton 
airfield, Coventry.
•	 Petrol bombing of White Hart pub in Henfield. The landlord 
and their family were in the flat above the pub at the time.
1996 •	 Barry Horne arrested in possession of 
incendiary devices in Bristol. Receives a 
10-year sentence.
•	 Launch of the Consort Beagles campaign, 
led by Greg Avery and Heather James.
1997 •	 Robin Webb (ALF UK press officer) 
and Simon Russell (ALF SG newsletter 
editor) convicted for Conspiracy to Incite 
Criminal Damage, along with prominent 
figures from the Green Anarchist. The 
convictions are subsequently overturned.
•	 Hill Grove Cat Farm campaign begins
•	 Consort Kennels closes in September
•	 Horne’s first hunger strike, 6 Jan – 9 Feb
•	 Horne’s second hunger strike, 11 Aug – 26 Sept
•	 ARM threatens to kill 5 vivisectors if Horne dies, and 
publishes a ‘hit list’ 
1998 •	 Horne’s third hunger strike 6 Oct – 13 Dec, accompanied 
by further death threats against named scientists
•	 6000 mink released into the New Forest provokes media 
furore and public backlash
1999 •	 Save the Shamrock Monkeys (STSM) 
campaign launched
•	 Save the Newchurch Guinea Pigs (SNGP) 
campaign launched against Darley Oaks 
Farm
•	 SHAC launched, led by Greg Avery and 
Heather James 
•	 Kathleen Brown, wife of Christopher Brown, director of 
Hill Grove Farm, is ‘accosted while out walking the dog 
one evening in the woods at the rear of the farm’ (Mann, 
2007, p. 536). Hill Grove closes shortly after
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YEAR SIGNIFICANT ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS
2000 •	 RSPCA appoint former Shamrock Farm 
employee Paul West as Assistant Chief 
Veterinary Officer, provoking outrage 
from ALF and STSM campaigners
•	 Hunt saboteur, Steve Christmas (41), is 
run down by a hunt supporter. Subsequent 
raids by hunt saboteurs on hunt kennels 
result in 18 arrests and a 4-year legal 
campaign for compensation for Steve 
Christmas.
•	 Close Down Regal Rabbits campaign 
launched
•	 Feb: bomb threats made against HLS’s major shareholders
•	 Apr: Phillips and Drew fund management group sell 11% 
stake in HLS after receiving death threats and hate mail 
•	 Aug: several HLS workers have their cars firebombed
•	 Dec: mass sell-off of HLS shares after The Sunday 
Telegraph prints a list of shareholders given to it by SHAC
2001 •	 SHAC leaders, Heather James, Greg 
Avery and Natasha Dallemagne, arrested 
and receive 12 month sentences
•	 David Blenkinsop is sentenced to three 
years in prison for the attack on Brian 
Cass. 
•	 Horne dies 5 Nov 2001 during a hunger 
strike
•	 Feb: HLS managing director in the UK, Brian Cass, beaten 
outside his home by three masked men. Andrew Gay, HLS 
marketing director, is also attacked on his doorstep with a 
chemical spray to his eyes that left him temporarily blinded. 
2002
2003 •	 SPEAC campaign prevents construction 
of primate research centre at Cambridge 
University
2004 •	 SPEAK set up to challenge primate lab in 
Oxford
•	 Oct: body of Gladys Hammond, mother-in-law of one of 
the partners at Darley Oaks Farm, is disinterred
2005 •	 ALF activists claim responsibility for an arson attack at 
the home of Phil Blackburn, the corporate controller of 
GlaxoSmithKline, in Beaconsfield.
•	 ALF activists claim responsibility for firebombing a car 
belonging to an executive of a Canadian Brokerage firm 
associated with Life Sciences Research (LSR), the name 
under which HLS had incorporated in the USA. 
2006 •	 Donald Currie is jailed for 12 years in 
connection with fire-bombing offenses 
against HLS customers
•	 An anonymous group begin a postal and email campaign 
of intimidation against GlaxoSmithKline's small investors.
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YEAR SIGNIFICANT ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS SIGNIFICANT TACTICAL DEVELOPMENTS
2007 •	 Operation Achilles sees 700 police officers 
in England, the Netherlands and Belgium 
arrest 32 prominent SHAC activists. 
•	 Mel Broughton, co-founder of SPEAK, 
arrested following the discovery of 
incendiary devices at Oxford University 
colleges
2008 •	 Seven members of SHAC’s senior 
leadership charged with blackmail. They 
are sentenced to between 4 and 11 years in 
January 2009.
•	 Close Highgate Farm campaign is 
launched, including an ALF liberation 
raid.
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